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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of World War II, vigorous attempts were made
to protect human rights. In those endeavors the development of a
trend can be seen, proceeding from the mere formulation of general
principles to international, genuinely judicial adjudication of viola* Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Georgia, School of Law; J.U.D. University of
Breslau, 1921; J.D. University of Genoa, 1934.
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tions of individual human rights and even to the condemnation of
states to provide material indeminification to the victims of such
violations. The Charter of the United Nations provided the initial
principles for protecting human rights. First, its Preamble declares
that one of its aims is "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights." In addition, the Charter states that one of its purposes is
"[t]o achieve international cooperation . . .in promoting and en-

couraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
..

"I

Moreover, members of the United Nations pledge to coop-

erate for the achievement of "universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms .... "2 Finally, the
Economic and Social Council is commanded to establish a commis'3
sion "for the promotion of human rights."

As a result of this command the Commission on Human Rights
was created. This Commission brought forth the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948, with no negative votes and only eight abstentions.4
The Universal Declaration lists the basic human rights. Yet, like
the above mentioned principles in the Charter, this list does not
become the internal law of the Member States; instead, it only indicates the aims to be followed by them. This result is evident from
the language in the preamble to the Universal Declaration:
The General Assembly [piroclaims this Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these
rights and freedoms ...
This initial stage of defining human rights in terms of general
guiding principles was followed by the development of international
covenants on human rights, which would become binding on those
States that ratified or acceded to them. On December 16, 1966, the
General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights5 and the International Cove'U.N.

CHARTE

art. 1, para. 3.

Id., art. 55, para c, art. 56.
Id. art. 68.
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant].
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nant on Civil and Political Rights.' Both covenants provide for implementation in varying degrees that would become binding upon
the States Parties.
The extent of this implementation in the Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights Covenant is quite modest. The States Parties are
to submit reports to the Secretary General of the United Nations for
transmittal to the Economic and Social Council "on the measures
which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the
observance of the rights recognized . . ." in the Covenant.' These
reports are to be furnished in stages under a program established by
the Economic and Social Council.' Then, based upon a system of
consultation among the Council, the States Parties, the Specialized
Agencies and the Commission on Human Rights,9 the Economic and
Social Council "may submit from time to time to the General Assembly reports with recommendations of a general nature ...
10
These implementation procedures, of course, do not amount to judicial enforcement or even to administrative supervision of specific
violations.I
The degree of implementation is somewhat stronger in the Civil
and Political Rights Covenant. Like the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Convenant, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant
requires the States Parties to "submit reports on the measures they
have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and
on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights ...
."" But
unlike the reports under the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Covenant, which are transmitted to the Economic and Social Council, the reports under the Civil and Political Rights Covenant are
transmitted to the Human Rights Committee (hereinafter referred
to as the Committee). 3 The Committee, in turn, is to study the
I G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Civil and Political Rights Covenant].
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, supra note 5, art. 16, para. 1.
Id. art. 17, para. 1.
Id. arts. 18-22.
10 Id. art. 21 (emphasis added).
1 This Covenant came into force on January 3, 1976. Schwelb, Entry into Force of the
InternationalCovenants on Human Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 511, 512 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Schwelb].
" Civil and Political Rights Covenant, art. 40, para. 1.
'= Id. arts. 28-39. The Committee is a body consisting of eighteen members, established and
defined in the above cited articles.
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reports and transmit them with any appropriate comments to the
States Parties. It may also transmit both comments and reports to
the Economic and Social Council.' 4 In addition, the Committee has
the role of a fact finding body to "consider communications to the
effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not
fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant."'" This role,
however, is restricted to only those findings between States Parties
which have recognized the competence of the Committee to deal
with such claims.'6 Moreover, States Parties may also sign the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of December 16, 1966,1 in which
[a] State Party that has become a Party to the Protocol ...
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to the jurisdiction
who claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party that also is
a Party to the Protocol of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.'"
Finally, if its fact finding does not lead to a resolution satisfactory
to the concerned States Parties, the Committee may, with the prior
consent of the States Parties, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission, whose good offices "shall be made available to the States
Parties concerned ..
.9 Like the Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights Covenant, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant came into
force three months after thirty-five State Parties ratified or acceded
to it.10 In addition at least ten State Parties must have declared that
they recognize the competence of the Committee as a fact finding
body,2 ' and at least ten must have ratified the Protocol before any
22
Committee procedure can be implemented.
Even when both Covenants and the Protocol are in force there will
"

Id. art. 40, para. 4.

"1

Id. art. 41, para. 1.
IId.

, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Protocol].
" Id. art. 1.
civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 6, art. 42, para. 1.
Id. art. 49. This occurred on March 23, 1976.
2 Id. art. 41, para. 2; Schwelb, supra note 11, at 512.
2 Protocol, supra note 17, art. 9; the optional Protocol to the Convention came into force
at the same time the Convention did, since by then 12 countries had ratified it [ten were
needed]. Schwelb, supra note 11, at 512.
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still be no actual international, judicial procedure under them. In
order to understand this lack of adjudicatory power, however, one
must consider the enormous difficulties involved in harmonizing the
diverse political and philosophical attitudes concerning human
rights found in the more than a hundred States Members of the
United Nations. Thus, in order to obtain the necessary ratifications,
the draftsmen of both Covenants had to dilute the strength of the
enforcement procedures.
This explanation applies equally to the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 21,
1965.23 Its implementation procedures are similar to those of the
Civil and Political Rights Convenant, and it entered into force on
January 4, 1969, after receiving the requisite 27 ratifications or accessions.24
II.

THE EUROPEAN

CONVENTION

ON

HUMAN

RIGHTS AND

ITS

IMPLEMENTATION

The diversity of philosophical and political attitudes regarding
civil and political rights was less pronounced among the nations of
Western Europe than among those in the United Nations. The common experience of total suppression of the individual under the
Hitler regime and the observation of the developments in neighboring Communist countries made it easier and more compelling to
cooperate in strengthening the protection of human rights, especially in the field of civil and political rights. Thus, in Rome, on
November 4, 1950, less than two years after the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations, the
members of the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
dealt with civil and political rights.15 After ten instruments of ratification, 6 it entered into force on September 3, 1953.2 The Convention has been supplemented or amended in five Protocols, all of
23 G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doc. A/6181 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Racial Discrimination Convention].
24 Id. art. 19.

z' Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, done November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter cited as Convention].
24 Id. art. 66, para. 2.
[1955-1957] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HuMAN RIGHTS vi (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights).
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which are now in force, the latest having come into force on December 20, 1971.2
The most significant aspect of the Convention lies in its implementation procedures for adjudication 2 through the European
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the Court) .3 Besides the Court, the Convention creates another organ for implementation, the European Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) .31 In addition to establishing
some procedural provisions for each organ, 32 the Convention also
directs each one to draw up its own rules of procedure, 33 which has
been done.3 A third organ, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 35 is also involved in implementing the procedures of
the Convention.
In order to facilitate an understanding of some of the procedural
decisions of the Court, the following outline of implementation provisions of the Convention is provided. The members of the Commission consist of one national from each High Contracting Party, who
sits in his individual capacity, not as a representative of his country.3 6 Each member is elected by an absolute majority of the Committee of Ministers 37 for a period of six years.38 Any High Contract" Protocol No. 1, done March 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, Europ. T.S. No. 9 (added to the
protection of the right of peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions and the right to education;
established the duty of the High Contracting Parties to hold free elections); Protocol No. 2,
done May 6, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 44. (conferring upon the European Court of Human Rights
competence to give advisory opinions); Protocol No. 3, done May 6, 1963, Europ. T.S. No.
45 (amending arts. 29, 30 and 34 of the Convention); Protocol No. 4, done Sept. 16, 1963,
Europ. T.S. No. 46 (securing right to free movement and choice of residence; prohibition of
exile, collective expulsion of aliens and imprisonment for civil debts); Protocol No. 5, done
Jan. 20, 1966, Europ. T.S. No. 55 (amending arts. 22 and 40 of the Convention).
" Convention, supra note 25, arts. 19-57.
" Id. art. 19, para. 2.
31Id. art. 19, para. 1.
32 Id. art. 20-56.
u Id. art. 36: "The Commission shall draw up its own rules of procedure;" art. 55: "The
Court shall draw up its own rules and shall determine its own procedure."
"' Rules of Procedure of the European Commission of Human Rights, done Apr. 2, 1955,
reprinted in [1955-1957] Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTs 58 (Eur. Comm. on Human
Rights); Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights, adopted Sept. 18, 1959,
reprinted in [1958-19591 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHrS 2 (Eur. Comm. on Human
Rights).
Convention, supra note 25, arts. 31, 32, 54.
Id. arts. 20, 23.
3' Id. art. 21.
31Id. art. 22, para. 1.
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ing Party may present to the Commission any alleged breach of the
Convention by another High Contracting Party. 9 The Commission
may also receive petitions "from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights" established in the Convention if the accused High Contracting Party
has consented to the Commission receiving such petition,"0 provided
that at least six High Contracting Parties have recognized this competence.4 ' There are a mixture of substantive and procedural restrictions imposed upon the Commission. It may not deal with any violation until all domestic remedies have been exhausted and,
"according to the generally recognized rules of international law,"
even then, it has only six months from the date of the final decision
to deal with it. 2 In addition, if it receives a petition from an individual person, the Commission shall not deal with it if that petition
is anonymous, substantially similar to a matter already examined
by the Commission or already submitted to another international
body, incompatible with the Convention, manifestly ill-founded, or
abusive of the right of petition.4 3 If the Commission rejects the individual's petition after it has already accepted it, it must do so by a
unanimous vote, while otherwise it decides by a majority of the
members present and voting. 4
After a petition is considered, if the Commission effects a friendly
settlement, it sends a brief report of the facts and solution to the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and to its Secretary General for publication. 5 If no solution is reached, however, the
Commission sends a report of the facts, its opinion whether a breach
occurred, and any proposals for a solution to the Committee of
Ministers and to the States concerned, who are not at liberty to
publish it."6 If the Commission does not reach a solution, there are
31 Id. art. 24.
1oId. art. 25, para. 1.
" Id. art. 25, para. 4.
42 Id. art. 26.
41 Id. art. 27.
" Id. arts. 29, 34 as amended. A quorum of the Commission consists of nine members; in
some cases, only seven are sufficient when considering individual petitions. Rule 25, Rules of
Procedure, [1955-1957] Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 68 (Eur. Comm. on Human
Rights).
4 Id. art. 30.
11 Id. art. 31.
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two methods to achieve a binding decision on the merits of the case.
The first method involves the Committee of Ministers. "[T]he
Committee of Ministers shall decide by a majority of two-thirds of
the members entitled to sit on the Committee whether there has
been a violation of the Convention."47 If the Committee of Ministers
finds there was a violation, it gives the violating High Contracting
Party a period within which it must comply with the Committee's
decision as to the measures to be taken.4 8 "If the High Contracting
Party . . . has not taken satisfactory measures within the pre-

scribed period, the Committee of Ministers shall decide by the majority.

. .

what effect shall be given to its original decision and shall

publish the Report." 9 The High Contracting Parties undertake as
binding on them the decisions made by the Committee of Ministers." This method may be characterized as quasijudicial; it is not
a real judicial proceeding since the Committee of Ministers does not
consist of independent judges. Rather, it consists of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs or alternatively other members of the governments which form the Council of Europe.5 Thus, the members of
the Committee act as representatives of their respective governments, not as independent individuals.
The second method of achieving a binding decision if the Commission does not reach a solution involves the European Court of
Human Rights 5. 2 This method is clearly judicial. The very use of the
word "court" and the denomination of its members as "judges"
emphasizes this point. Perhaps it is for this reason that the framers
of the Convention thought it unnecessary to repeat what is expressly
provided for the members of the Commission, i.e., that the judges
should "sit in their individual capacity.

53

This notion of the inde-

pendence of the judges is further reinforced by Rule Four of the
Rules of Court: "A judge may not exercise his functions while he is
a member of a Government or while he holds a post or exercises a
profession which is likely to affect confidence in his independence."
The Court is composed of the number of judges equal to the number
Id. art. 32, para. 1.
Id. art. 32, para. 2.
" Id.
art. 32, para. 3.
Id. art. 32, para. 4.
"
Statute of the Council of Europe, done May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, Europ. T.S. No.
1, art. 14.
12 Convention, supra note 25, arts. 38-56.
0 Id. art. 23.
'7
"
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of members on the Council of Europe. 54 No two judges may be nationals of the same State.5 5 A quorum consists of eleven judges.5
Individual cases are considered by a Chamber consisting of seven
judges.5 7 Where a serious question about the interpretation of the
Convention arises, however, "the Chamber may . . . relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the plenary Court."" Since the Chamber must
always sit with the full number of seven judges, it has no problem
as to quorum.59 Both the Chamber and the plenary Court reach
decisions by a majority of the judges sitting. 0
Using language very similar to that in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Convention requires that judges "be of
high moral character and must either possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of
recognised competence."'" The Court was to be established after
eight High Contracting Parties declared recognition "as compulsory
ipso facto and without special agreement the jurisdiction of the
Court in all matters concerning the interpretation and application
of the present Convention."" The Court has jurisdiction only after
the High Contracting Parties concerned in the case have made such
a declaration or have consented to the Court's jurisdiction in a
particular case . 3 "The Court may only deal with a case after the
Commission has acknowledged the failure of efforts for a friendly
settlement and within the period of three months provided for in
Article 32."11 The proceedings before the Committee of Ministers
and before the Court are exclusive of each other. Only the Commission and a High Contracting Party have the right to bring a case
before the Court. 5 Thus, there is no provision which allows individu Id. art. 38.
5 /d.

Amendments to the Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights, rule 17,
para. 1, reprinted in [1966] Y.B. EUR. CoNy.

ON HUMAN RIGHTs

2 (Eur. Comm. on Human

Rights) [hereinafter cited as Rules of Court].
5' Convention, supra note 25, art. 43.
Rules of Court, supra note 56, rule 48, para. 1.
" Id. rules 21 and 22.
$oId. rule 20, para. 1. The requirement of a fixed number of judges corresponds to the
general European practice for courts of more than one judge.
11Convention, supra note 25, art. 39, para. 3.
11Id. arts. 46, 56. This prerequisite was fulfilled on Sept. 3, 1958. See [1958-1959] Y.B.
EUR. CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 92 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights).
' Id. art. 48.
$' Id. art. 47.

When a national of a High Contracting Party is alleged to be a victim, a High Contract-
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uals or nongovernmental organizations to bring a case before the
Court, as there is for bringing a petition to the Commission. If the
Court finds a violation of the Convention by a judicial or other
authority of a High Contracting Party "and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation . . . the decision of the
Court shall . . . afford just satisfaction to the injured party."66 Like
the rule pertaining to decisions by the Committee of Ministers,
"[tihe High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the decision
7 and the Comof the Court in any case to which they are parties,"
8
execution.1
its
mittee of Ministers shall supervise
A comparison of these two methods of achieving a binding decision reveals that the first, the quasijudicial activity of the Committee of Ministers, is but a necessary followup to the work of the
Commission. The second method, the proceedings before the Court
which takes place only upon express demand by the Commission or
any concerned High Contracting Party, seems to have some characteristics of an appeal even though it can be initiated by the Commission itself.
The speed with which the Council of Europe responded to the
civil and political rights portion of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights could not be applied to that Declaration's economic,
social and cultural rights portion. Nevertheless, on October 18,
1961, in Turin, Italy, the Council of Europe signed the European
Social Charter" which covered these rights-more than 5 years before the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant was established. Reflecting the difficulty of harmonizing the attitudes of the
signing States, Part I of the European Social Charter is little more
than a declaration of economic, social and cultural rights. Parts 1170
and III,' however, establish an obligation by members to acknowling Party has referred the case to the Commission, or a High Contracting Party has had a
complaint lodged against it, then the High Contracting Party may bring the case before the
Court. Id. arts. 44, 48.
" Id. art. 50.
67 Id. art. 53.
U Id. art. 54.
" European Social Charter, done Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, Europ. T.S. No. 35.
to consider themselves bound by
70 Id. part II: "The Contracting Parties undertake ...
art. 1 (the right to work); art.
the obligations laid down in the following Articles .... .e.g.,
2 (the right to just conditions of work); art. 3 (the right to safe and healthy working
conditions); art. 4 (the right to a fair remuneration); art. 5 (the right to organize).
" Part III: "Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes:
(a) to consider Part I . . . a declaration of aims which it will pursue by all appro-
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edge certain rights. A very mild degree of implementation is provided in Part IV. It establishes a duty to make reports concerning
accepted provisions7 2 as well as those provisions which are not accepted.7 3 In addition, Part IV establishes a procedure for examination and evaluation of these reports by a Committee of Experts, a
Subcommittee of the Governmental Social Committee of the Council of Europe, and the Consultative Assembly, which is the parliamentary branch of the Council of Europe .7"On the basis of the views
of the Subcommittee and the Consultative Assembly, the Committee of Ministers may "[bly a majority of two-thirds of the members
• . . make to each Contracting Party any necessary recommenda' This mild form of censure and the publicity resulting from
tions." 75
the procedure of handling the reports are the only means of enforcement provided in the European Social Charter, which came into
force on February 26, 1965, after the fifth ratification.7
A comparison between the implementation procedures in the
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant and the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant and those in the European Social Charter
and the Convention reveal the greater strength of the latter. Even
the Human Rights Committee provided for in the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant has fewer powers than the European Commission
on Human Rights. If no solution is reached, the Human Rights
Committee can merely submit a brief statement of facts to the
States Parties concerned and, with the prior consent of these Parties, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission. On the other
hand, the European Commission on Human Rights can draw up a
report on the facts and state its opinion as to whether a violation of
the Convention has occurred.77 Finally, there is no counterpart in
the United Nations covenants to the functions of either the Committee of Ministers or the European Court of Human Rights.78
priate means...
(b) to consider itself bound by at least five of the following Articles of Part II...
Articles 1, 5, 6, 12, 13, 16, and 19."
Id. art. 20, para. 1.
' Id.
art. 21.
7' Id. art. 22.
7 Id. arts. 24-28.
7' Id. art. 29.
1 CouNcL. OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND AGREEMENTs 366 (1971).
" Convention, supra note 25, art. 31.
7 The Committee of Ministers' Deputies, in a Resolution of May 15, 1970, made a declaration about the preliminary interpretation of article 62 of the Convention. It stated that State
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The European Convention has, to a certain extent, served as a
model for the American Convention on Human Rights promoted by
the Organization of American States and signed at San Jos6, Costa
Rica on November 22, 1969.11 It has not yet come into force. Like
the European Convention, the American Convention provides for a
Commission on Human Rights 0 and Court of Human Rights.8' The
powers of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, whose
members, like those of the European Commission, sit in their individual capacity, 2 appear to be broader than those of its European
counterpart. If a solution is not reached, each Commission can draw
up a report stating the facts and the conclusion as to whether there
was a violation of protected rights. The substantive function of the
European Commission ends with this procedure, reserving any future action for the Committee of Ministers or the Court. The InterAmerican Commission, however, may, by a majority vote, set forth
its opinions and conclusions regarding the question under consideration, if, within 3 months after its report, the question has not been
settled or submitted to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Where appropriate the Inter-American Commission shall also make
pertinent recommendations and prescribe a period within which the
situation is to be remedied. After the expiration of this prescribed
period, it decides whether the State concerned has implemented
adequate corrective measures and whether it should publish its report. Whether this procedure amounts to an actual decision of the
case by the Inter-American Commission, however, is doubtful. Although it shall "decide" whether the State has taken adequate meaParties to the Convention which are also Parties to the United Nations Convenant on Civil
and Political Rights and have recognized the jurisdiction of the United Nations Human
Rights Committee "should normally utilise (sic) only the procedure established by the European Convention in respect of complaints against another Contracting Party to the European
Convention relating to an alleged violation of a right which in substance is covered both by
the European Convention (or its Protocols) and by the UN (sic) Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, it being understood that the UN (sic) procedure may be invoked in relation
to rights not guaranteed in the European Convention (or its protocols) or in relation to States
which are not Parties to the European Convention." Resolution (70) 17, CoUNciL OF EUROPE,
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS

cited as COLLECTED TEXTS].
213 O.A.S. T.S. 1 reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL
I arts. 34-51.
Id.
"

Id. arts. 52-69.

12Id. art. 36, para. 1.

Id. art. 35.

MAT'LS

904 (9th ed. 1974) [hereinafter

673 (1970).
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sures, the Inter-American Commission may only set forth its
"opinion and conclusions" about the question submitted to it.
There is also a permanent Arab Regional Commission on Human
Rights which was created by the Council of the Arab League on
September 3, 1968.11 Its Rules of Procedure 5 do not indicate that
this Commission has any decision making power regarding specific
human rights violations. Rather, as Article 12 states, "[tihe Commission's duties . . . are preparatory, being submitted as draft
agreements to the League Council. The Commission may submit its
researches, recommendations and suggestions to the Council." 6
Moreover, each member of this Commission is a representive of the
State appointing him, and, thus, does not act as an independent
person in his individual capacity. 7 In short, this Commission does
not even possess a quasijudicial quality.
The preceding survey reveals that, at present, the European
Court of Human Rights is the only truly functioning, international
judicial organ, established by international agreement, with the
power to adjudicate violations of internationally guaranteed human
rights. Thus, it should be of interest to learn how the Court's decisions have answered some of the procedural and some of the substantive questions regarding its judicial functions.

Ill.
A.

THE DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF

HUmAN

RIGHTS

Lawless Case

The first case before the Court called upon it to make a decision
regarding the validity of one of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. Gerard Richard Lawless, 8 a national of the Republic of Ireland, alleged in a petition lodged with the Commission on November 8, 1957, that the authorities in Ireland had violated the Convention because he was detained without trial from July 13 to December 11, 1957, in a military detention camp under an order of the
A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 145, n.10.
,sRules of Procedure of the Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights, reprinted in
A. ROBERTSON, note 84 supra, at 274.
1' Id. art. 12.
87 Id. arts. 2, 3.
'5 Lawless Case, [1961] 1 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 4 reprinted in [1961] Y.B. EUt. CoNY.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 430-35, 438-89 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). See [1960] Y.B. Eui.
CONy. ON HUMAN RIGwrs 308 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights), as to the decision on admissibility.
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Minister of Justice, based upon the Offences Against the State Act
of 1940. He claimed a violation of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention
which protect the liberty of everyone. He denied that there existed
a public emergency threatening the existence of Ireland or that his
detention was strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. He
asserted that in any case the Irish Government had not fully informed the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of the measures which it had taken as prescribed in Article 15 of the Convention, and of the reasons thereof when it derogated from Articles 5
and 6. He asked for an immediate release from detention, for payment of compensation and damages for his detention and for payment of all costs and expenses of the proceedings in the Irish courts
and before the Commission. He maintained the requests for payment after he was released from detention. The Commission unanimously concluded after failure of attempts at a friendly settlement"9
that basically the detention was in violation of Article 5 of the
Convention, but, by divided opinions, that there existed a public
emergency threatening the existence of Ireland and that the detention was strictly required by the exigencies of the situation; therefore, a valid derogation from Article 5 of the Convention existed and
the Convention was not violated. 0 On December 19, 1959, the Commission drew up the Report required by Article 31 of the Convention
holding that there was no breach of the Convention and that no
action should be taken on the applicant's request for payments. The
Report was sent to the Committee of Ministers on February 1, 1960,
and on April 13, 1960, the Commission referred the case to the Court
due to the fundamental importance of the questions raised.' In
conformity with Rule 76 of its Rules of Procedure," the Commission
transmitted its Report to the applicant on April 13, 1960, and in" Lawless Case, [1961] 3 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 41, 42.
" Id. at 47, 56, 57.
" Lawless Case, [1961] 1 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 7.
" On March 30, 1960, the Commission adopted Rule 76 of its Rules of Procedure, reading:
When a case brought before the Commission in pursuance of Article 25 of the
Convention is subsequently referred to the Court, the Secretary of the Commission
shall immediately notify the applicant. Unless the Commission shall otherwise
decide, the Secretary shall also in due course communicate to him the Commission's Report, informing him that he may, within a time-limit fixed by the President, submit to the Commission his written observations on the said Report. The
Commission shall decide what action, if any, shall be taken in respect of those
observations.
COLLECTED TExTs, supra note 78, at 319.
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vited him to submit his observations to the Commission, pointing
out to him that that document must be kept secret and that the
applicant was not entitled to publish it. At the first hearing of the
case on October 3 and 4, 1960,11 the Court confined its debate to
preliminary objections and questions of procedure brought forward
by the Commission and the Irish Government in their Memorial and
94
Counter Memorial.
The Court, in its judgment of November 14, 1960 ("Preliminary
Objections and Questions of Procedure"), found three points at
issue: (1) Is Rule 76 in general contrary to the Convention? (2) Could
the Commission, after bringing the case before the Court, communicate its Report to the applicant without violating the Convention?
and (3) Should the Court, either at the instance of the Commission
acting on its own authority, or through the Commission after authorization by the Court, receive the applicant's observations on the
5
Report or on points arising during the proceedings?1
As to point (1) the Court emphasized that a general decision on
the compatibility of Rule 76 with the Convention was necessary. It
spelled out the functions of the Commission to carry out an indepen11The President of the Court, Mr. Cassin, was French. France, a member of the Council
of Europe, had signed but not ratified the Convention. [1972] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 26 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). Therefore France was not a Party to the Convention. Convention, supra note 25, at art. 66(3). Article 38 of the Convention prescribes that
the Court shall consist of a number of judges equal to that of the Members of the Council of
Europe and that no two judges may be nationals of the same State, while as to the Commission Article 20 reads: "equal to that of the High Contracting Parties." Id. art. 20. From this
it results clearly that a Judge need not be a national of a State Party to the Convention. See
A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 93 (1963). As to a case where a Judge is a national
of a State which ceases to be a member of the Council of Europe see infra note 290.
" The Commission declared in its Memorial its readiness "to submit to the Court the
Applicant's comments upon the Report as a document relevant in the present proceedings"
but thought it appropriate at the preliminary stage of the proceedings to request the Court
(1) to give leave to file the Memorandum containing the applicant's comments as a document
submitted by the Commission (2) in general to give directions as to the right of the Commission to communicate to the Court the comments of the applicant in regard to matters arising
in the proceedings. The Irish Government countered these requests by asking the Court to
declare that any publication by the Commission of its Report other than that expressly
authorized by the Convention is a breach of the Convention, to rule that the comments of
the applicant on the Report of the Commission or any further comments by the applicant be
not received by the Court, and to declare that a correct interpretation of the Convention does
not permit action of the nature contemplated by Rule 76. At the hearing the Commission,
clarifying its request, asked the Court to decide that Rule 76 and the communication of the
Report to the applicant fall within the competence of the Commission. Lawless Case, [1961]
1 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 6, 8-10.
"1 Id. at 10.
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dent inquiry, to seek a friendly settlement, and, if necessary, to
bring the case before the Court. Once this has been done, its function then becomes to assist the Court, its action even at this stage
being determined not by its own decision but by the Convention
itself. It concluded from the whole body of the rules governing the
Court that it could not interpret the Convention in an abstract
manner, but only in relation to specific cases referred to it and,
according to Article 53 of the Convention, concluded that only the
High Contracting Parties, parties to the case, are bound by its decisions. The Court considered itself not competent to make decisions
such as deletion of a Rule from the Commission's Rules of Procedure, which would affect all parties to the Convention and would
amount to having the power to make rulings on matters of procedure
or to render advisory opinions. The Court declared itself without
power to consider a point raised in a general manner and rejected
the objections by the Irish Government relating to the procedure 6
As to point (2) the Irish Government argued that Article 31 forbade the States concerned to publish the Commission's Report and
that this also referred to the report of Committee of Ministers unless
the States concerned did not comply with the Committee's decision. 7 The Court, however, followed the general reasoning of the
Commission that the Contracting States, subject to the express provisions of the Convention, had conferred upon the Commission the
necessary powers to fulfill the functions entrusted to it; it emphasized the differences of the nature of the proceedings before the
Commission or before the Committee of Ministers as contrasted
with those before the Court, the latter ones not being in camera but
of a judicial character which in a democratic society called for public proceedings as established as a general principle in Article 18 of
the Convention. It concluded that not even Rule 52 of the Rules of
Court, under which documents other than the debates and judgment can be published only after special authorization by the
Court," would prevent the communication of the documents of the
*e Id. at 11, 16.
7 Therefore, to allow the Commission to publish its Report or to communicate it to anybody would put the Contracting Parties to the Convention in a position subordinate to that
of the Commission. Individuals, under the Convention, had no part in the proceedings either
before the Committee of Ministers or before the Court and dropped out of the proceedings
completely once the Commission had adopted its Report. Id. at 12.
" Rule 52 of the Rules of Court read at the time of the preliminary Judgment in the Lawless
Case of November 14, 1960: "The Registrar shall be responsible for the publication of judg-
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case to the persons or bodies directly concerned, with the proviso,
made either by the Commission or one of the Parties, that they
should not be published. The Court therefore decided that the Commission, in communicating its Report to Lawless, did not exceed its
powers."
As to point (3) the Commission invoked precedents from the advisory opinion procedure at the Permanent Court of International
Justice and the International Court of Justice where observations of
individuals submitted by international organizations that applied
for advisory opinions have been taken into consideration, although
States alone could be represented in Court. It also referred to the
English version of Article 44 of the Convention ("Only the High
Contracting Parties and the Commission shall have the right to
bring the case before the Court") as compared with the French text
("Seules les Hautes Parties Contractants et la Commission ont
qualit6 pour se presenter devant la Court") in order to show that the
authors of the Convention did not intend to dissociate entirely from
the proceedings before the Court the individual who had applied to
the Commission, but simply to prevent him from bringing a case to
the Court himself. The Irish Government thought that the French
version of Article 44 allowing only the High Contracting Parties and
the Commission to appear before the Court excluded any agreement
by the Court to receive the applicant's observations. It also thought
that receiving the applicant's observation as a Commission document would impair the Commission's impartiality and would give
an individual the opportunity to use the proceedings as a means of
attack against his own government. 0 0
The Court distinguished the international cases cited by the
Commission on the basis that in none of them had an individual
appealed against the action of his own government. Accepting both
versions of Article 44 the Court thought that nevertheless it had to
safeguard the interests of the individual who might not be a party
ments and of such other decisions and documents, whose publication may have been authorized by the Court." [1958-1959] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HumAN RIGms 4, 42 (Eur. Comm. on
Human Rights). A much larger duty of the Registrar to publish or make accessible to the
public material brought before the Court was establsihed in an amendment of October 24,
1961, that reworded Rule 52. It made a resriction of this duty dependent on an express
decision by the President of the Court. COLLECTED TaxTS, supra note 78, at 421-22.
"
'®

Lawless Case, [1961] 1 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 12-14.
Id. at 14, 15.
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to any Court proceedings since the whole of the proceedings are
upon issues which concern the applicant; the Court should, therefore, have knowledge of and take into consideration the applicant's
point of view. It emphasized that in this regard it had at its disposal
the Commission's Report which in defending the public interest
would make known the applicant's views even if it did not share
them; that the Court could, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court 0 1
hear the applicant and invite the Commission, ex officio or authorize it at its request, to submit the applicant's observations. The
Court concluded that, though recognizing these possibilities at the
preliminary stage of the proceedings where the merits of the case
had not been considered, it had no reason to authorize the Commission to transmit to it the applicant's written observations on the
Commission's Report. 102
One Judge dissented, 10 3 believing that the Commission's jurisdiction as a body responsible for ascertaining the facts and drawing up
a Report ceases with the transmission of the Report to the Committee of Ministers and that therefore the provision of Rule 76 of the
Rules of the Commission violates the Convention and that the Court
though not declaring Rule 76 void (which it has no power to do)
must refuse to apply any Rule that is contrary to the Convention.
He saw only one way to acquaint the applicant with the contents of
the Report, that is, the Registrar of the Court could invite him to
read it in his presence; if he wished to make any observations on it,
the Court alone would have power to decide about this.
It appears that the judgment of the majority better protects the
aims of the Convention. The Convention does not prohibit a simple
and restricted communication of the Commission's Report to the
applicant, the individual most concerned with it. The Court's deci"I Rule 38(1) of the Rules of Court reads: "The Chamber may, at the request of a Party or
of delegates of the Commission or propriomotu, decide to hear as a witness or expert or in
any other capacity any person whose evidence or statements seem likely to assist it in the
carrying out of its task." COLLEcrE TEXTS, supra note 78, at 416.
102 Lawless Case, [1961] 1 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 15-16. The Court reiterated its position
in a judgment of April 7, 1961. It refused to consider at the preliminary stage of the proceedings written observations by the applicant contained in a statement of the Commission to
the Court of December 16, 1960, but stated that the Commission had full latitude in its
debates to take the applicant's views into account for the enlightenment of the Court and
for this purpose also to invite the applicant to place some person at its disposal to give
assistance to the Delegates of the Commission without this person gaining any locus standi
in judicio. Id. at 23, 24.
'1
Id. at 17-20 (Judge G. Maridakis dissenting).
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sion also preserves the position that the applicant is not a party
before the Court but provides for a degree of equitable treatment
that appears commensurate with the spirit of the Convention.', 4
The case covers also another procedural point. Although it does
not refer to the procedure before the Court itself or before the Commission, it deals with a provision of the Convention which is procedural but which may be of decisive importance for the judgment of
the Court. One of the contentions of Lawless had been that the
derogation from the rights guaranteed in Articles 5 and 6 of the
Convention as allowed in Article 15(1)-(2) of the Convention had not
been duly communicated to the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe as provided for in Article 15(3)105 and that even if there was
a sufficient notification, it could not be enforced against persons
within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Ireland, with respect to the
period before it was first made public in Ireland, seven weeks before
101The topic dealt with in these decisions has, more recently, been considered by the
Committee of Ministers with regard to the proceedings before them. In 1972, it decided:
The Ministers agreed that since the individual applicant is not a party to the
proceedings before the Committee of Ministers under Article 32 of the European
Convention, he has no right to be heard by the Committee of Ministers or to have
any written communication considered by the Committee. This should be explained by the Secretary General to the applicant when he writes to inform him
that the report of the Commission of Human Rights on his case has been transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in accordance with Article 31 of the Convention.
If communications from the individual applicant intended for the Committee of
Ministers are nevertheless received, the Secretary General should acknowledge
their receipt and explain to the applicant why they will not form part of the proceedings before the Committee of Ministers and cannot be considered as a document in the case. In appropriate cases, the Secretary General might add that it is
possible for the applicant to submit a new application to the Commission if he
wishes to invoke important new information.
[1972] Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 60, 62 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). A different attitude prevails where the Committee of Ministers is called upon by an individual
applicant to supervise the execution of a judgment of the Court according to Article 54 of
the Convention. The Committee decided, at the same meeting in 1972:
As regards the procedure to be followed in relation to letters from individual applicants within the framework of the functions conferred upon the Committee of
Ministers by Article 54 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Ministers agreed that the Committee of Ministers is entitled to consider a communication
from an individual who claims that he has not received damages in accordance with
a decision of the Court under Article 50 of the Convention affording him just
satisfaction as an injured party and also any further information furnished to the
Committee of Ministers concerning the execution of such a judgment of the Court.
Consequently, any such communication should be distributed to the Committee of
Ministers. Id. at 64.
105Lawless Case, [1961] 3 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 60-62.
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his dismissal from detention. The Irish Government had informed
the Secretary General on July 20, 1957, that legislation allowing
imprisonment in derogation from Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention
had been brought into force on July 8, 1957. It gave the reasons for
establishing exceptional detentions and called attention to the fact
that under the Act a special Commission had been established to
inquire into the grounds of the detention. 06 It asked that the letter
be considered as an information in compliance with Articles 15(3)
of the Convention or in the alternative that the government was not
deprived of reliance on Article 15(1) by any provision of Article
15(3). The Court found that the Irish Government had not delayed
in notifying the Secretary General of the derogation. It added that
Article 15(3) required only information to the Secretary General
regarding the measures of derogation taken without any obligation
to give notice of derogations in the framework of municipal law
within Ireland. Thus, the detention of Lawless was founded on the
right of derogation duly exercised by the Irish Government under
Article 15 of the Convention. 07
The Court had, under this ruling, no opportunity to address itself
to the question whether the requirement of notification of Article
15(3) of the Convention amounts to a substantive condition whose
nonfulfillment would prevent a valid derogation in the sense of Article 15(1). The wording of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 15 as com"IId. at 36,

43. For the full text of this letter of the Irish government see [1955-1957] Y.B.

EUR. CONY. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 47 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). For other notifications,
derogations or withdrawals of derogations under Article 15 see id. at 48-51 (U.K.), [19581959] Y.B. Eua. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 78-87 (U.K.); [1960] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 68-90 (U.K.); [1961] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 38-63 (U.K., Tur.); [1962]
Y.B. EuR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 6-11 (Ire., U.K.); [1963] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 28-33 (Tur., U.K.); [19641 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 22-31 (Tur., U.K.);
[19651 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 10-17 (U.K.); [19661 Y.B. EuR. CoNy. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 16-21 (U.K.); [1967] Y.B. Eua. CONy. ON HUMAN RIoHTS 26-45 (Greece); [1968] Y.B.
EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 10-35 (Greece); [1969] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3875 (Greece, U.K.); [19701 Y.B. EuR. CorNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTs 18-23 (Tur.); [1971] Y.B. EUR.
CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 24-33 (Tur., U.K.); [1972] Y.B. ON EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
16-23 (Tur.); [1972] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 16-23 (Tur.); [1973] Y.B. EUR.
CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 16-29 (Tur., U.K.); [1974] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2429 (Tur.); [1975] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 8-19 (Tur., U.K.).
1*1Lawless Case, [1961] 3 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 61-62. The Court also found unanimously that the substantive conditions of Article 15(1) (existence of a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation, strict requirement by the exigencies of the situation of the
measures taken in derogation from the obligations under the Convention, and consistency of
the measures with other obligations under international law) were fulfilled. Id. at 55-60.
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pared with paragraph 3 speaks against such an interpretation. In
paragraph 1 the derogation is defined with express limitations and
under a proviso clearly indicating the presence of conditions for its
validity. Paragraph 2 likewise is specific as to the exclusion of derogation in certain cases. Paragraph 3 does not spell out the extent to
which derogation is available. It only establishes the duty of any
High Contracting Party availing itself of the right of derogation to
inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of the measures taken under the right of derogation and of the reasons therefor
as well as of the fact that such measures have ceased to operate and
that the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.
The last requirement seems to make it especially clear that paragraph 3 does not go to the substance of validity of the derogation.
Certainly, the derogation would not be considered as persisting beyond the points indicated in this last requirement only because the
duty of notification was not fulfilled. 0 8
B.

De Becker Case

The relation between an applicant and the Court recurred in the
De Becker Case'0 9 and was discussed within the framework of the
question whether or not the Court should strike the case from its
list."' The Court gave expression to the affinity of the De Becker
Case with the Lawless Case in an order by the President of the
Chamber of October 6, 1960, which granted the Commission a time
limit of six weeks from the date of the Court's decision on the preliminary objections raised in the Lawless Case for the filing"' for its
first Memorial.
Raymond De Becker, a journalist of Belgian nationality, was condemned to death in 1946 by the Brussels Conseil de Guerre for
"I In the "Greek" Case, the Commission denied that certain notifications by the Greek
Government to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fulfilled the requirements of
Article 15(3) of the Convention. [19691 Y.B. Euin. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 41-43 (Eur.
Comm. on Human Rights) (The Greek Case). But besides being less than a judicial decision,
the opinion as to this point is only dictum, for the Commission came to the conclusion that
the substantive requirement for the derogation under Article 15(1) of the Convention that
there be a public emergency threatening the life of the Greek nation was not fulfilled. Id. at
76.
I" De Becker Case, [1962] 4 Eur. Ct. Human Rights, reprinted in [1962] Y.B. EUR. CONy.
ON HUMAN RJGHTS 320-37 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights); see [1958-1959] Y.B. EUR. CONV.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS 214 as to the decision of the Commission about admissibility.
See Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 78, at 419.
,10
De Becker Case, [1962] 4 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 5.
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collaboration with the German authorities in Belgium during World
War II. The judgment also decreed the forfeiture of certain civil
rights, among them any journalistic activity as set out in Article 123
sexies of the Belgium Penal Code. On appeal, the Brussels Military
Court in 1947 commuted the death penalty to life imprisonment,
confirming the rest of the judgment. In 1950, the sentence of life
imprisonment was, in way of clemency, reduced to 17 years. In
February 1951, De Becker was conditionally released upon making
a declaration that he would voluntarily take up residence in France
within one month of his release (which he did) and that he would
not engage in politics."'
In September 1956, De Becker applied to the Commission. While
declaring the application inadmissible as to certain points, the
Commission considered admissible that part which disputed the
compatibility of Article 123 sexies of the Belgian Penal Code with
Article 10 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to freedom
of expression with regard to the period after June 14, 1955, the date
on which the Convention entered into force with respect to Belgium.
The Commission reported, after failure to reach a friendly settlement, that only Article 10 was to be considered, not Articles 2, 4 and
5 of the Convention, and that certain paragraphs of 123 sexies of the
Belgian Penal Code were not fully justifiable under the Convention
"whether they be regarded as providing for penal sanctions or for
preventive measures in the interests of public security;" that they
were "not justifiable in so far as the deprivation of freedom of expression in regard to non-political matters, which they contain, is
imposed inflexibly for life without any provisions for its relaxation
when with the passage of time public morale and public order have
been re-established and the continued imposition of that particular
incapacity has ceased to be a measure 'necessary in a democratic
society' within the meaning of Article 10, Paragraph 2, of the Con-

vention.

''

On April 29, 1960, the Commission referred the case to the Court.
In its letter to the Court, it pointed out that the Belgian government
had referred on several occasions to the existence of proposals and
draft legislation directed toward amending Article 123 sexies or mitigating its application and that at that very moment steps were
,, Id. at 7-10.
,' Id. at 10-12.
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being taken in the Belgian Parliament to amend Article 123 sexies.
As to the substance, the Commission and the Belgium government
submitted opposing viewpoints as to the compatibility of Article 123
sexies with Article 10 of the Convention."' On June 30, 1961,
Belgian legislation was enacted that, in its application to De Becker,
restored his rights to journalistic activities to the extent that they
were not of a political character and, even as to those of a political
character, limited his freedom of expression in a way that possibly
did not go beyond the "formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties" admissible under Article 10(2) of the Convention.,' De
Becker submitted to the Commission a statement that he considered that his application to the Commission had been met by the
adoption of the act. It recognized that it gave everyone the possibility of regaining full rights of free expression including that of political expression, and regarded it as unnecessary to proceed with his
case, therefore withdrawing his application. The Commission transmitted the text of this statement to the Court on October 7, 1961."1
After this statement both the Commission and the Belgian government focused their attention on the point of whether the case
should now be stricken off the list of the Court. The Commission
expressed that it would not oppose such a solution on the basis of
the fact that the applicant's interest had been met; however, in case
Id. at 4, 13-14.
Id. at 12, 14-17. Under the changed conditions the Belgian Government asked the Court
(1) to rule that in view of the present Belgian legislation De Becker had no interest in further
proceeding on his application, (2) to rule that in determining the compatibility of Article 123
sexies of the Belgian Penal Code with the Convention, both in regard to the past and to the
future, the provisions of the Act of June 30, 1961, must be taken into account, and (3) to state
that there is no incompatibility between Article 123 sexies and the provisions of the Convention. The Commission asked the Court to confirm the Commission's view as to Article 123
sexies and to note that the limitations of the Act of June 30, 1961, as regards freedom of
expression in so far as they apply to De Becker, do not go beyond the "formalities, conditions,
restrictions, or penalties" authorized in Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention. Later the
Belgian Government stated that both the Commission and the Belgian Government had
identical views as to Article 123 sexies as amended by the Act of June 30, 1961, recognizing
that the opinion of the Commission had contributed to this legislation and that there was no
longer a single person in Belgium to whom the former Article 123 sexies was applicable; it
therefore asked the Court to state that there is no incompatibility between the new Article
123 sexies and the provisions of the Convention and that there is no further need to deal with
any application concerning this article. The Commission, however, wished the Court to say
whether during the whole or part of the period between the entry into force of the Convention
for Belgium (June 15, 1955) and the Act of June 30, 1961, the applicant was the victim of a
violation of Article 10. Id. at 18, 19.
"I Id. at 19, 20.
"'
"
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of disapproval of the dismissal by the Court, it asked for a decision
on some of the substantive matters."' The Belgian government
asked the Court to strike the case off the list or in the alternative,
to declare that the present Article 123 sexies, as applicable to De
Becker, is not incompatible with the Convention." '
The Court decided, by six votes to one, to strike the case off its
list. It denied that De Becker's withdrawal of his application had
any legal character or could produce the effects of a notice of discontinuance as provided in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because it
came from an individual not entitled to bring a case before the
Court (Articles 44, 48 of the Convention); it also denied that the
withdrawal was binding on the Commission which, as defender of
the public interest, had to take the statement into account if it
considered that it enlightened the Court on the points at issue. It
found that in the last oral proceedings both Parties submitted to the
Court final conclusions which, though differently formulated, concorded in that they asked to strike the case off the list and that
therefore the proceedings after the enactment of the Act of June 30,
1961, no longer had any purpose. It became fitting, on general principles, to strike the case off the list. The Court realized that, under
Article 19 of the Convention, it had the duty to insure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties to the Convention. Though there was no withdrawal by a Party
it should apply Rule 47 of the Rules of Court analogously after both
Parties had requested the striking of the case and therefore satisfy
itself as to "whether it should proceed with the case (a) as to
whether De Becker was the victim of a violation of the Convention
between its entry into force with respect to Belgium and the entry
into force of the Act of June 30, 1961" and (b) "as to De Becker's
"I At the final hearing the Delegate of the Commission elaborated on the question of
striking the case: (1) he submitted that the Court may have doubts as to whether the Act of
June 30, 1961, was wholly compatible with Article 10 of the Convention based upon any
finding that this Act did not totally exclude the possibility of a permanent loss of freedom of
expression on political matters; (2) he emphasized that De Becker's statement about the
withdrawal of his application was not binding upon the Commission or the Court and, therefore, should not be the only factor to be taken into account, though it was a factor of great
weight; and (3) he wished that in the event of its striking the case off its list the Court would
avoid giving the impression in its decision that the case had lost any purpose only because of
De Becker's withdrawal of his application. Id. at 21, 22.
"I Id. at 21.

1977]

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN

RIGHTS

freedom of expression in the light of the provisions of Article 123
sexies of the Penal Code, as worded in the Act of June 30, 1961."111
As to the first point the Court did not see any reason to deny the
concordant request of the Parties not to examine this question as to
its substance; it declared that the modification of Article 123 sexies
had rendered the original divergence of the Parties merely historic,
especially as De Becker did not request any compensation for the
past. As to the second point the Court considered it important that
both parties admitted that there was no longer any incompatibility
with Article 10 of the Convention even before De Becker's statement
of withdrawal; despite the legal irrelevance of the "withdrawal" by
the individual applicant, the case had originated from his complaint
that his rights were violated. Under these circumstances the Court
felt that there was no need to examine whether the implementation
of the new Belgian act would raise problems of interpretation as it
was not called upon, under Articles 19 and 25 of the Convention, to
give a decision on an abstract problem relating to the compatibility
of that act with the Convention. 20
In his dissenting opinion Judge A. Ross admitted that
[i]t could be argued that since, after the case was brought before
the Court the defendant State took steps to change the legislation
complained of and the applicant declared himself satisfied by the
steps taken, there was no longer ground for dispute between the
applicant and the defendant State and that, for this reason, the
proceedings should, according to generally recognised [sic] princi21
ples for the administration of justice, be terminated.
Yet, from the spirit of the Convention, the Judge concluded, the
result was that the applicant has a right to have a decision by the
Court on the question which the Commission put before it; even if
changes have occurred after the Court was seized by the case, the
applicant may have a legitimate interest in a decision, as to the
legal status before the change, possibly for the sake of indemnification. Regarding the withdrawal of the application, the Judge emphasized that the function of the Court under Article 19 of the
Convention, is "to insure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the present Convention"
"'

Id. at 23-25.
I Id. at 25-26.
' Id. at 30.
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and believed that after the case has proceeded beyond the Commission, public interest commands a decision regardless of the applicant's interest in it. He did not see in the withdrawal of the application a "friendly settlement" which under Rule 47(3) of the Rules of
Court would authorize the Court to strike the case off the list. He
considered the acceptance of a withdrawal by the Court as creating
unfavorable public opinion because to a person not acquainted with
the details of the case, it could easily appear that the withdrawal
might have been coerced upon the applicant by his own defendant
State. Therefore it could be inexpedient for the Court to strike the
case off its list. He also denied that the "general principles" of either
a private lawsuit or of criminal proceedings are applicable under the
22
Convention. 1
The opinion of the majority seems more convincing. The Belgian
government had stated that there was no longer a single person in
Belgium to whom the Article 123 sexies in its pre-1961 version was
applicable. 23 A judgment of the Court as to whether that version
made De Becker a victim of a violation of the Convention between
1955 and 1961 would therefore have referred not only to a merely
historical controversy but would have been as much in the abstract
as the Court said an examination of whether the implementation of
24
the Act of 1961 would raise problems of interpretation would be.
A pronunciation as to the merits would clearly have been in the
nature of an advisory opinion. The Court at the time of its judgment
of March 27, 1962, was certainly not authorized to render an advisory opinion. This prior inability was reaffirmed in the Second Protocol of May 6, 1963, to the Convention which in Article 1 confers
upon the Court the power to give advisory opinions if the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe so requests. 1 5 It may be well
to remember that "[sluch opinions shall not deal with any questions relating to the content or scope of the rights or freedoms defined in Section 1 of the Convention' 2 6 as would have been the case
here where the right to freedom of expression 7 was the substantive
issue.
'2

Id. at 30-33.

Text accompanying note 115 supra.
Text accompanying note 120 supra.
21 Second Protocol to the Convention, Article 1(1), COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 78, at 28.
126 Id. art. 1(2).
"3
2

I" See Convention, supra note 25, art. 10(1).
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The majority considers the striking of the case off the list justified
both on general principles'28 and in terms of analogous application
of Rule 47(1)-(2) of the Rules of Court." 9 The dissenting opinion
seems to be mistaken in its belief that the majority rejects completely any reliance on Rule 47.130 Its combination of reasons for
striking the case off the list seems more realistic than the somewhat
doctrinaire viewpoint of the dissent.
C.

Languages Case

In the case "Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use
of Languages in Education in Belgium ' ' 31 the Court dealt with several procedural aspects of bringing an action before the Court. 132 The
case originated from six applications by individuals against the
Kingdom of Belgium brought before the Commission under Article
25 of the Convention. These applicants, parents of Belgian
nationality, applied both on their own behalf and on behalf of their
minor children. Representing more than 800 individuals, the group
indicated they were French-speaking and expressed themselves
most frequently in French. They complained that various Belgian
laws provided for no or only inadequate French-language education
in the municipalities where they lived and in other ways directly or
indirectly obstructed the French-language education of their children in the municipalities where they lived, 33 thereby violating Articles 8, 9, 10, and 14 of the Convention and Article 2 of the Protocol
to the Convention of March 20, 1952.13 The Commission admitted
the six applications as to the alleged violations of Articles 8 and 14
of the Convention and Article 2 of the Protocol, but rejected them
to the extent they were based upon Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention. 135 Since the attempt at reconciliation failed, the Commission
De Becker Case, [19621 4 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 24.
iD Id. at 24, 25.
O2

I at 33.
Id.
case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in
C'
Belgium, [1966] 5 Eur. Ct. Human Rights, reprinted in [1966] Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 644-53 [hereinafter cited as Language Case]; see also [1967] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON
HUMAN RITrrs 140-162, 252-261 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights), as to the decision of the
Commission on admissibility.
,12
Language Case, supra note 131, at 3-5. The Court's preliminary decision was on May 3,
1966, and its judgment on preliminary objection was on February 9, 1967. Id.
"33 Id. at 7, 10, 11.
" COLLECTED TExTs, supra note 78, at 20-25 [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
Language Case, supra note 131, at 11.
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drew up the Report required under Article 31 of the Convention and
transmitted it to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on June 25, 1965. Basically denying that the Belgian legislation
was incompatible with either the Convention or the Protocol, the
Commission did find it violative of the Convention or the Protocol
on three counts. On the day the Commission submitted the Report
to the Committee of Ministers, it also brought the case before the
Court under Article 48(a) of the Convention.'35
Before a discussion of the controversial part of the preliminary
objection made by the Belgian government, two non-controversial
points of the procedure before the Court deserve some observations.
Mr. Rolin, the elected Judge of Belgian nationality, was to sit as an
ex officio member of the Chamber which was to consider the case
according to Article 43 of the Convention. However, he withdrew
because as a Senator he had taken part' 37 in the drafting of the Acts
of Parliament in dispute.' 38 The Belgian government thereupon appointed another person as an ad hoc Judge.' 31 The present case may
'I ld. at 12.

The following may bring a case before the Court, provided that the High Contracting Party concerned, if there is only one, or the High Contracting Parties concerned,
if there is more than one, are subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
or, failing that, with the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned, if there
is only one, or of the High Contracting Parties concerned if there is more than one:
(a) the Commission.
Convention, supra note 25, art. 48(a), 213 U.N.T.S. 246.
, Id. at 7; Rule 24(2) of the Rules of Court, COLLECTED TEXTS supra note 78, at 410.
' Rule 24(2) of the Rules of Court which the Judge cited expressly as the reason for his
withdrawal, reads:
A judge may not take part in the consideration of any case in which he has a
personal interest or in which he has previously acted either as the agent, advocate
or adviser of a Party or of a person having an interest in the case, or as a member
of a tribunal or commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity.
Id. Obviously, this rule deals with the exclusion by law of a judge from participating in an
individual case as distinguished from Rule 24(3) which states: "If a judge considers that he
should withdraw from consideration of a particular case or if the President and the Judge
shall consult together. In case of disagreement, the President shall decide." Id. at 411. This
latter paragraph contemplates not an exclusion by law but a discretionary disqualification
for reasons less stringent than those enumerated in paragraph two. The last phrase (of Rule
24(2)) "in any other capacity," must be read in connection with the words "in the consideration of any case . . . . in which he has previously acted." Does the participation in the
drafting of a disputed legislation amount to any previous acting in the case? The case does
not reveal whether Mr. Rolin had voted for or against the adoption of the contested legislation, nor whether he had voted at all. In any of these cases it could be doubtful whether
legislative activity as such would amount to acting in the case similar to the acting as an
agent for a Party as enumerated by the rule.
I" The appointment was pursuant to Rule 23(1). Id. at 410.
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not fall within the exclusion of Rule 24(2) of the Rules of Court but
the Judges's broad interpretation of the Rule is preferable to a restrictive application.4 0
A non-controversial point of procedure arose when the Chamber
relinquished jurisdiction to the plenary Court 4 ' because "the case
before it [raised] a number of serious questions affecting the interpretation of the Convention, especially its Articles 45, 8, and 14, and
Article 2 of the Protocol."'' The Belgian government had requested
this action claiming the judgment could "provoke extremely violent
political feelings in Belgium, which in turn could exert a substantial
influence on the structure of the Belgian State." The government
also wanted the Court to decide whether some of the applicants'
questions should be determined by the Contracting States, rather
than the Court, and that the Commission's interpretation of Article
14 of the Convention conflicted with some former decisions of the
Commission.4 3 The Commission declared that "considering the particular nature of the case," it would not object to relinquishment of
jurisdiction to the plenary Court.' In its first Memorial, the Commission unanimously referred the matter to the Court, basing its
decision on the legal importance and complexity of the case and its
"IA problem related to the one here under consideration is whether the participation of a
legislator in the enactment of a law will exclude him from a court that probes into the
constitutionality of the legislation. This question has been answered in the negative in the
Federal Republic of Germany:
A Judge of the Federal Constitutional Court is excluded from exercising his
judicial office if ....
(No. 2) he has been previously active in the case either in an official or professional capacity. . . . (Par. 3) The following is not to be considered as an activity
in the sense of paragraph 1, 2: ....
(No. 1) participation in the legislative process ...
Law concerning the Federal Constitutional Court of March 12, 1951, ((1951) BGBI. I, 243), §
18. The German Federal Constitutional Court has extended the effect of this provision to the
discretionary disqualification of its members. Judgment on May 13, 1953, 2 BVerfGE 295.
As to the general attitude of West German Law toward exclusion or disqualification of judges
see Cohn, Judicial Recusation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 18 (1973).
"' There is no need for discussion of a second exclusion that took place after the Chamber
relinquished its jurisdiction to the plenary court. One of the Judges of the plenary Court was
eliminated from taking part in the consideration of the case since he had dealt with it as a
member of the Commission before he had been elected a Judge of the Court, a clear application of Rule 24(2) of the Rules of Court. COLLEcTED TExTs, supra note 78, at 410.
"I Languages Case, supra note 131, at 9. The quoted words used by the Court paraphrase
the text of Rule 48(1).
"0 Id. at 8.
1l4 Id.
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human and social repercussions.
The Belgian Government made these points: 41 (1) the Convention
and its Protocol secure the rights and freedoms enumerated in Articles 2-13 of the Convention and Articles 1-3 of the Protocol; (2) the
idea of "national minority" within the meaning of Article 14 of the
Convention may benefit the members of a specified social group
where there is a violation of one of the rights or freedoms mentioned
above; (3) however, in the cases before the Court the Convention
offers no protection since (a) the right of education in one's own
language is not included among the rights and freedoms secured by
the Convention and the Protocol and subsidiarily (b) the applicants
do not belong to a "national minority" within the meaning of Article
14 of the Convention. The Memorial concluded that the Court is not
"' More in detail, the argument of the Belgian Government ran this way-the Court lacks
jurisdiction because there is no connection between the applicants' complaint and the terms
of the Convention and the Protocol; their complaint is that the State does not accord them
certain services in the field of education in the French language. The Convention and the
Protocol establish purely negative duties upon the contracting States, namely those not to
interfere and not to refrain from action. Article 14 of the Convention does not form part of
the enumeration of rights and freedoms in Articles 2-13 of the Convention and Articles 1-3 of
the Protocol but only prohibits any discrimination in the enjoyment of these rights; it neither
adds any further rights nor does it change the purely negative obligations resulting from the
Convention and the Protocol into duties to provide something. Therefore the complaints are
not covered by the Convention or the Protocol but refer so clearly to the reserved domain of
the Belgian legal order that there is no need for either an explicit clause in the Convention
or a reservation under its Article 64 to exclude the complaints from the Court's jurisdiction.
Consequently, the Court is faced with a preliminary question before pronouncing upon the
merits of the case even if to answer this preliminary question the Court should have to touch
on occasion, on the merits of the case; this position was implicitly taken already before the
Commission when the Belgian Government asked to reject the applications as manifestly illfounded in the sense of Article 27(2) of the Convention. Id. at 14-17.
The Commission argued for the rejection of the preliminary objection in this way: Commission and Court were set up to insure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the
Contracting States in the Convention; Convention, supra note 25, at art. 19. Under the
Convention, an objection ratione materiae should have been raised before the Commission
with regard to the admissibility of the applications; though the failure of the Belgian Government to do so should not have a preclusive effect. The Court, after the Commission had
referred the case to it, needs only a summary examination, without forming an opinion about
the views of the Commission on the merits, to enable it to verify that the complaints declared
admissible by the Commission concern the interpretation or application of the Convention
as prescribed in Article 45 of the Convention. Commission and Government here diverge as
to the interpretation and application of the Convention, especially of its Article 14; therefore,
the Court had jurisdiction under Article 45. After this is established the idea of the reserved
domain could have any place only to the extent that a Contracting State has availed itself of
a reservational option under Article 64 of the Convention which is not the case as to Belgium.
Language Case, supra note 131, at 17.
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competent ratione materiae to examine the merits of the case and
asked the Court to admit the preliminary objection and dismiss the
action brought against the Belgian Government or to join the preliminary objection to the merits.'4 6 The Commission also asked the
Court to reject the objection of the Belgian Government.'47 It did not
express an opinion about the alternative Belgian submission, but
left this point to the wisdom of the Court.'
The Court referring to Article 49 determined that "in the event
of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction the matter shall
be settled by the decision of the Court."' 4 9 The Court found authority for its decision on the preliminary objection in Articles 19 and
45 of the Convention. Article 19 established the Court "[t]o ensure
the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the present Convention," while Article 45
extended "[t]he jurisdiction of the Court . . . to all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the present Convention. . . . ,,50 The Belgian Government sought a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction but all the complaints raise questions concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention, thereby vesting
the Court with jurisdiction. The Court's examination of the rights
which applicants claim under Article 8 and 14 of the Convention
and Article 2 of the Protocol and whether these provisions place
obligations upon the Belgian State calls for an exploration of the
merits in conjunction with a decision regarding interpretation and
application inseparable from the merits. The Commission's decision
under Article 27 of the Convention finding the complaints admissible and its Report to the Committee clearly indicate the need for
an interpretation of the Convention. The problems now before the
Court are part of the merits and cannot be solved by a ruling on a
preliminary objection. The jurisdiction of the Court ratione
materiae is so evidently established that it must be affirmed at this
stage.
The Belgian Government's contention that certain questions are
the reserved domain of the Contracting States also concerns the
merits of the claims and cannot be resolved now. The Government
"

Id. at 13.

", Id. at 13.
"' Id. at 14.

i Id. at 18.
Convention, supra note 25, arts. 19, 45.

"'
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attempted to show the absence of any factor relating to the Convention, but failed to convince the Court. Both the Convention and the
Protocol relate to matters normally of the domestic legal order, but
they are international instruments designed to establish certain international standards to protect persons under the Contracting
States' jurisdiction (Article 1 of the Convention). This case concerned with the interpretation and application of those instruments
vests the Court with jurisdication which cannot be defeated by the
plea of reserved domain. The decision of the Court, procedural in
nature reads: "[The Court] [r]ejects unanimously the submissions, both principal and alternative, of the Belgian Government
[and] [diecides unanimously to proceed to the examination of the
merits of the case."' 5'
The cornerstone of this judgment is the Court's use of its power
to determine its own jurisdiction.'52 Once a High Contracting Party
recognizes the jurisdiction of the Court'5 3 as compulsory and therefore existing without special agreement, the only restriction which
that party may impose is the requisite reciprocity on the part of
several or certain other High Contracting Parties or a limitation on
the time period of jurisdiction.' The more general right to make
reservations when signing the Convention or when depositing the
instrument of ratification cannot be used to establish further restrictions on the jurisdiction of the Court. That right may only be
exercised in respect to "any particular provision of the Convention
to the extent that any law then in force in [a contracting party's]
territory is not in conformity with the provision. '' 5 Obviously, this
clause refers to the substantive provisions of the Convention, not to
the procedural provisions establishing the jurisdiction of the
Court.'" This result is reinforced by the provision: "Reservations of
a general character shall not be permitted under this Article."'5 7 A
High Contracting Party that has not recognized the jurisdiction of
the Court as compulsory ipso facto but consents to its jurisdiction
SI Language Case, supra note 131, at 18-20.
152Convention, supra note 25, art. 49.
' Id. art. 46 (1).

I' art. 46(2).
Id.
Id. art. 64(1), cl.1.
'' Text accompanying note 154 supra.
, Convention, supra note 25, art. 64(1), cl.2.
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in an individual case'5 8 may restrict its consent in some ways not
permitted when jurisdiction is compulsory.'59 After finding that the
Convention authorized the Court's jurisdiction to determine its own
jurisdiction over the subject matter,' 0 the Court could easily determine its jurisdiction in handling the present case. The breadth of
the Convention's mandate extending jurisdiction of the Court "to
all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the present Convention.

as discussed above, obviously includes this

2

case.'
In deciding the merits of the case,'6 3 the Court held in its judgment of July 23, 1968, by eight votes to seven, that Section 7(3) of
the Belgian Act of August 2, 1963, does not comply with the requirements of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with
Article 2 of the Protocol'6 4 in so far as it prevents certain children,
solely on the basis of the residence of their parents, from having
access to French-language schools existing in the six communes on
the periphery of Brussels. The Court reserved for the applicants the
right to apply for just satisfaction in regard to this particular point.
With regard to all other points at issue the Court unanimously
denied any violation of the Convention or the Protocol.' 65
Wemhoff Case
K. H. Wemhoff, a national of the Federal Republic of Germany
filed an application against the government of the Federal Republic
D.

' Id. art. 48.
'' The Convention's compulsory jurisdiction is far superior to that of the same topic in the

Statute of the International Court of Justice. Under the latter provision it was possible to
restrict the jurisdiction of that Court in the far reaching way in which this was handled with
regard to the United States under the so-called Connally Reservation. It takes away from the
Court to a large extent the decision as to its own jurisdiction by determining that in a dispute
involving the United States the question of whether the dispute concerns a domestic matter

is to be answered by the United States rather than by the Court. Statute of the International
Court of Justice, art. 36, U.S. Declaration of August 14, 1946. [1946-1947] I.C.J.Y.B. 21718.
, Called in German usage: "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" (jurisdiction as to jurisdiction).
'0, Convention, supra note 25, art. 45.
Seemingly any case which the Commission has declared admissible and as to which it
has rendered its Report necessarily falls within this broad definition. This is especially true
with regard to a case as to which a State concerned claims, in contrast to the applicant and
the Commission, that it involves a matter exclusively of domestic legal order.
"1 Languages Case [1968] 6 Eur. Ct. Human Rights.
,S, COLLECTED TEXTS, supra, note 78, at 20. "No person shall be denied the right to education."
'1 Languages Case, [19681 6 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 87.
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of Germany, alleging that the courts of West Berlin violated his
rights under Article 5(3) of the Convention to be brought to trial
within a reasonable time or released pending trial.' 6 He claimed an
unreasonable length of detention on remand during a criminal proceeding against him and sought compensation for the damage suffered, reserving the right to specify the exact amount of his claim
later. The Commission declared the application admissible in respect to Article 5(3) and also ex officio with reference to Article 6(1)
of the Convention.'" After the failure of an attempt to arrange a
friendly settlement, the Commission sent its report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on August 17, 1966. By
request, the Commission referred the case to the Court.' 8
The applicant Wemhoff was arrested under suspicion of breach
of trust on November 9, 1961, and a Berlin district court ordered his
detention on remand the next day. The court feared that, if left at
liberty, Wemhoff would abscond and attempt to suppress evidence.
The Berlin courts upheld the warrant under reexamination ex officio
and review of various applications and appeals of the applicant. The
complex case'69 required an indictment of 855 pages, which was filed
on April 23, 1964, about three and one-half months after the applicant approached the Commission on January 9, 1964.10 On the basis
of the indictment the Regional Court replaced the existing detention
order by a new one on July 7, 1964, citing grave suspicion of breach
of trust, complicity in breach of trust, fraud, offenses against the
Bankruptcy Act, and the danger of absconding due to the likelihood
of a grave sentence, and, on July 17, 1964, committed him to trial.'7 '
The trial lasted from November 9, 1964, until April 7, 1965, when
the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of prolonged abetment to breach of trust and sentenced him to 6 years and 6 months
of penal servitude and a fine of 500 DM, the period of detention on
remand being counted as part of the sentence. The court ordered
continued detention on remand for the reasons given in the earlier
"' Wemhoff Case, [1968] 7 Eur. Ct. Human Rights, reprinted in [1968] Y.B. EUR. CONY.
ON HuMAN RIGHTS 796-813. (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). See also [1964] Y.B. EUR. CONy.
ON HuMAN RIGHTs 280-289 as to the decision of the Commission about admissibility.

, Id. at 12.
'u Id. at 4, 13.
16 The complexity of the case was evidenced by 10,000 pages of investigative reports. Id.
at 10.
"70Id. at 6-10, 12.
"I Id. at 10.
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order. Further demands for release were rejected, as were appeals
from these decisions. The applicant then lodged an appeal on the
merits of the conviction with the Federal Court which rejected the
appeal on December 17, 1965, ordering that the time in detention
since the first judgment of April 1965, be counted as part of the
sentence in so far as it exceeded 3 months. On November 8, 1966,
after serving two-thirds of the sentence, the applicant was conditionally released by order of the Regional Court.'
The opinion of the Commission, expressed in its Report to the
Council of Ministers, held essentially that: the applicant, in violation of Article 5(3) of the Convention, had not been brought to trial
"within a reasonable time" or released pending trial; counting the
period of detention on remand as part of the sentence would not
affect that conclusion; the applicants continued detention on remand was a "lawful detention" within the meaning of Article
5(1)(c) of the Convention; the applicant's claim for compensation
under Article 5(5) could not be considered before the Court or the
Committee of Ministers had decided whether Article 5(3) had been
violated and the applicant had had an opportunity to exhaust, in
accordance with Article 26, the domestic remedies under German
law as to the compensation; and, even considering the period from
November 9, 1961, to December 17, 1965, Article 6(1) of the Conven73
tion had not been violated.
The German Government, after agreeing with the Commission's
counting of the period of detention on remand to be examined as to
its reasonableness but disagreeing with the Commission's opinion
that this period was unreasonable, 7' asked the Court to find "that
the decisions and measures taken by German authorities and courts
in the case are compatible with the commitments entered into by
"'

Id. at 10-12.

172

Id. at 13, 14.

"' Id. at 18-21. The arguments of the Commission before the Court dealt entirely with the

merits of the case, not with procedural matters and may therefore be omitted here. For some
future procedural discussion it should be mentioned that the Commission took into account,
as to the length of the applicant's detention on remand, the period from his arrest on November 9, 1961, up to the date of the opening of the trial on November 9, 1964 (exactly 3 years).
Id. at 16. It asked the Court to decide (1) whether or not Article 5(3) of the Convention has
been violated by the detention up to November 9, 1964 or any later date; and (2) whether
or not Article 6(1) of the Convention has been violated by the duration of the criminal proceedings between November 9, 1961 (or any later date) and the judgment of the Regional
Court of Berlin of April 7, 1965 (or any later date). Id. at 18.
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the Federal Republic under Articles 5(3) and 6(1) of the Convention."",5
The Court decided in its judgment of June 27, 1968, that there
has been no breach of Article 5(3) or Article 6(1) of the Convention;
therefore the question of compensation does not arise.' 8 Taking notice of the request of the Commission to decide about any violation
of Article 5(3) of the convention by the detention up to November
9, 1964 (or any later date), the Court judged that the reasonableness
of the detention is to be decided for the period from the arrest up
to the delivery of the first judgment, that is, up to April 7, 1965. The
Court rejected the idea that the requirement of a "reasonable time"
in Article 5(3) extends only to the beginning of the trial but concluded from the unambiguous French text, "jug6," as compared
with the less clear English text, "entitled to trial," that the period
extends to the end of the trial by judgment.'"
Though neither the Commission nor the government raised any
procedural questions in the arguments, some special procedural
qualifications of the Rules of Court were applied. The President of
the Court chose ex officio to draw names of three substitute Judges,
the first of whom later replaced one of the original Judges.' 8 The
Chamber, upon request of the German Government, authorized its
agent, counsel and advisors to use the German language in the oral
proceedings, giving the Government the responsibility of insuring
interpretation of the arguments into French or English.'
Procedural aspects of greater importance are touched upon in the
concurring opinion of Judge Terje Wold.'10 This Judge approached
the question of whether the applicant's rights under Article 5(3) of
the Convention to be brought to trial "within a reasonable time" or
released pending trial, were violated from what he calls a
Id. at 21.
"7 Id. at 27. It should be noticed that in denying a violation of Article 6(1), the Court
IS

implicitly approved the Commission's taking up this point ex officio. Text accompanying note
167 supra.
'" Id. at 22-24. On the other side the Court did not extend the period beyond the first
judgment up to the final judgment on appeal. Id. at 23.
"I' Id. at 5. See Rules 21(4) and 22 of the Rules of Court. COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 78,
at 409-10.

'" Wemhoff Case, [1968] 7 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 5. See Rule 27(2) of the Rules of the
Court, COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 78, at 412. Apparently no authorization to use the
German language in documents submitted was requested or granted.
1' Wemhoff Case, [1968] 7 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 28-32.
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"procedural" angle. He noted that the applicant claimed compensation for the damage suffered while being detained on remand. In his
final conviction the period of detention (except for 3 months during
the period of his appeal to the Federal Court) was counted as part
of the sentence. Given the fact that the applicant had been found
guilty of very serious crimes the Judge found it difficult to imagine
that he had any claims for compensation. These two points together
show that the case was purely theoretical in the Judge's opinion. He
admitted that he alone held this opinion, and therefore, did not
pursue his point. 8 ' The judgment of the Court, indeed, did not
consider this argument and rightly so. Neither the counting of detention time on remand toward the penalty nor the absence of sufficient grounds of compensation eliminates the applicant's interest in
the question of whether or not he was brought to trial within a
reasonable time.
Judge Wold's second point of a procedural nature affirmed the
Court's competence to deal with the period of detention from the
date of filing the application until the final judgment. Judge Wold
realized the application was directed against continued conduct of
the German authorities and that the applicant when claiming that
he was detained beyond a reasonable time implied the whole period
of the provisional detention. 8 Actually both the Commission and
the Court have pursued the same line of thinking without discussing
it expressly.
E. Neumeister Case
The length of the detention on remand was also the main issue
in the Neumeister case, decided by the Court in its judgment of
June 27, 1968. 81 The case was initiated by an application lodged
with the Commission on July 22, 1963, by Fritz Neumeister, an
Austrian national, against the Republic of Austria. 8' The Commission's Report was transmitted to the Committee of Ministers on
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
"s Neumeister Case, [1968] 8 Eur. Ct. Human Rights, reprinted in [1968] Y.B. EUR.
CONv. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 812-31 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). As to the decision of the
Commission about admissability see [1964] Y.B. EuR. CoNy. ON HuMAN RGHTS 224-51. This
judgment was rendered on the same date as that in the Wemhoff Case. The composition of
the two chambers was not indentical.
I" Neumeister Case, [1968] 8 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 4.
"'
"
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August 17, 1966."' Both the Commission and the Austrian Government referred the case to the Court on October 7 and 11 respectively.""
The facts of the case can be summarized briefly for the purpose
of examining the procedural aspects. On August 10, 1959, the
Vienna Revenue Office denounced Neumeister and several other
persons before the Vienna Public Prosecutor for having defrauded
the Exchequer between the years 1952 and 1958 by improperly obtaining reimbursement of millions of schillings of a sales tax which
was designed to assist exports. The possible punishment for the acts
involved was "severe imprisonment" from five to ten years. On the
following day, August 11, 1959, the Vienna Public Prosecutor requested the Vienna Regional Criminal Court to open a preliminary
investigation. Neumeister appeared on January 21, 1960, for the
first time as a "suspect" before the Investigating Judge at which
occasion he protested his innocence. The Investigating Judge
opened a formal preliminary investigation on February 23, 1961,
and ordered that Neumeister be taken into detention on remand,
which he was on the following day. After a number of interrogations
Neumeister was provisionally released on parole May 12, 1961, and
was not required to post security. During the ensuing period of
freedom Neumeister made two trips abroad with the Judge's permission.' 7
After strong implication by a codefendant who had fled abroad
(but who was arrested in the Federal Republic of Germany in June
1961 and extradited to Austria in December 1961) the Investigating
Judge ordered Neumeister's arrest on July 12, 1962, upon request
of the Public Prosecutor. Neumeister was arrested on the same
day'18 and remained in detention on remand until September 16,
1964. On that day he was released upon a guarantee of one million
schillings, his "solemn undertaking" and the deposit of his passport
with the court.' During this period Neumeister made a number of
attempts to be released by the Court.9 0 His first two attempts were
Id. at 22.
Id.at 4.
187Id. at 6-8.
185
"

8

Id. at 8-10. The date of 12th July 1961 given on page 9, number 12 is obviously a printing

error; the correct year is 1962.
88 Id. at 19.
"' Id.
at 10-19.
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rejected with finality by decisions of the Court of Appeal of Vienna
of September 10, 1962, and February 19, 1963, respectively. 91 Upon
the later rejection Neumeister reacted by lodging his application of
July 12, 1963, with the Commission.' The various decisions concerning Neumeister's detention on remand were all taken after a
hearing not open to the public during which the Public Prosecutor
was heard in accordance with the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, but in absence of the defendant and his legal representative." 3
The preliminary investigation was concluded on November 4,
1963. The Public Prosecutor after studying the voluminous file completed the 219-page indictment on March 17, 1964. The trial began
on November 9, 1964, but on June 18, 1965, the Court postponed
its completion indefinitely so that the investigation might be completed. 94 It was resumed on December 4, 1967, and was still continuing when the Court rendered its judgment of June 27, 1968.11
The Commission declared the application admissible in so far as
it was based on Articles 5(3), 5(4) and 6(1) of the Convention, the
last one under both viewpoints of "reasonable time" and "equality
of arms."'9 0 In its Report it expressed the following opinion: (1) by
eleven votes against six, the detention of the applicant lasted beyond a "reasonable time"' 97 (violation of Article 5(3) of the Convention); (2) by six votes against six votes with the President's casting
vote 9 8 the applicant's case was not heard within a "reasonable
time"; 9 and (3) with eight votes against two with two abstentions,
the proceedings regarding the applicant's release complied with Ar2
ticles 5(4) and 6(1) of the Convention. 0
In its judgment of June 27, 1968,201 the Court decided unani, Id. at 10, 11.
02 Id. at 12.
"'
194

Id. at 19.
Id. at 19, 20.

"I Id. at 20.
lBS

Id. at 21.

107Convention, supra note 25, at art. 5(3).
"' Rule 29(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note
78, at 307.
'"

Convention, supra note 25, art. 6(1).

Neumeister Case, [1968] 8 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 22, 23.
In the proceedings before the Court the Commission asked the Court to decide: (1)
whether or not Article 5(3) of the Convention had been violated by the applicant's detention
from July 12, 1962, to September 16, 1964; (2) whether or not Article 6(1) of the convention
had been violated by noncompletion of the criminal proceedings instituted against the appli-
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mously that there had been a breach of Article 5(3) of the Convention; by five votes to two, that there had been no breach of Article
6(1) regarding the length of the proceedings; unanimously, that
there had been no breach of Article 5(4) or Article 6(1) as to
"equality of arms" in the examination of the request for release. 202
In its opinion it dealt with the points of procedure 0 3 as follows: the
Court cannot consider whether the first period of detention (February 24 to May 12, 1961) in itself was compatible with Article 5(3) of
the Convention for the reason that the applicant approached the
Commission only on July 12, 1963, long after the 6-month time limit
of Article 26 in fine had expired. Yet this first period of detention is
to be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of the later
cant as from January 21, 1960, when he was first heard by the Investigating Judge as being
suspected of the criminal offenses concerned or from any other date; and (3) whether or not
Article 6(1) or Article 5(4) or the two provisions combined had been violated by the procedure
with respect to appeals lodged by the applicant against his detention pending trial.

The Austrian Government asked the Court to declare that the measures taken by the
Austrian authorities which were the object of the application and of the Report of the Commission did not conflict with the obligations arising from the Convention. Id. at 36.
m Id. at 44.
2 As far as questions of procedure are involved the Commission argued to point one of its
Report that the 6 months time limit for lodging an application under Article 26 in fine of the
Convention precludes it from expressing an opinion on whether the length of the applicant's
first detention of 2 months and 17 days (from February 24 to May 12 of 1961) was
"reasonable"; that, on the other hand, it had considered the entire period of 26 months and
4 days of the second detention (from July 12, 1962, to September 16, 1964), rejecting the
Government's contention that only the period up to the lodging of the application should be
relevant. Id. at 25. As to point two of its Report the Commission stressed that it did not attach
great weight to the fact that the applicant hardly complained at all on this score because it
believed that on the basis of Rule 41(1)(d) of its Rules of Procedure it is competent to consider
any point of law that seems to it to arise from the facts of an application also in relation to
an article of the Convention not expressly invoked by the applicant. Rule 41(1)(d) of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission reads: "The application shall mention ....
as far as possible the provision of the Convention alleged to have been violated." This pleading could
appear in conflict with what the Commission expressed, at the admissibility stage, with
regard to an alleged violation of Article 6(3) of the Convention: "[It did not consider it
necessary to pronounce upon the alleged violation of Article 6(3) as the Applicant had not
pursued this point." However, apparently the Commission distinguished this part from the
one regarding Article 6(1) by the applicant not having submitted any facts relating to Article
6(3). Id. at 28.
The Austrian Government argued with regard to procedural questions that the Commission
exceeded its competence conferred upon it by Articles 24-31 of the Convention when it
considered the period spent by the applicant in detention after lodging his application with
the Commission on July 12, 1963. Id. at 30. It claimed a further over-stepping of the Commission's competence when it considered a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention as, in the
Government's view, the applicant had made no complaint in this regard and the problem in
question played no part as to the admissibility of the application. Id. at 34.
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detention from July 12, 1962, to September 16, 1964, for the first
period also constitutes a departure from the principle of personal
liberty. In case of conviction, it too would normally be deducted
from the term of imprisonment, thus reducing its actual length. 0'
The Court agreed with the Austrian Government that the period of
detention after the second arrest on July 12, 1962, was to be taken
into account, although the application was filed with the Commission while the applicant was still in detention.0 5 It rejected the
government's view that the Court could not consider the applicant's
detention subsequent to the filing of his application with the Commission on July 12, 1963, because the application could relate only
to facts that had taken place before that day. The Court saw in the
application not a complaint about an isolated act but rather about
a situation which was to last until a provisional release; to demand
the filing of a new application with the Commission after each rejection of a request for provisional release would be excessively formalistic and cause a confusing multiplicity of proceedings.0 6
With regard to the question concerning the length of the proceedings the Court agreed with the Commission that the Commission
was competent to consider, even ex officio, whether the facts referred to in an application disclosed violations of the Convention
other than those of which the application complains and applied
this principle also to the Court itself. However, it was doubtful
whether the question arose in the present case as the applicant had
expressly mentioned Article 6(1) in the document filed on July 6,
1963. 107 It emphasized that the final point for establishing
I'reasonableness" had not yet arrived as no judgment has yet been
rendered, but even so it came to the conclusion that there had been
no breach in this regard. 0
Finally, as to the claim of violation of the principle of "equality
of arms" in the proceedings concerning the release, the Court viewed
the procedure followed as in general contrary to the principle of
"equality of arms" in the meaning of Article 5(4) or 6(1) or possibly
of these two Articles read in conjunction. However, the Court did
not consider this principle to be applicable to the examination of
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
m Id. at
20 Id. at

37.
37, 38.
38. This reasoning of the Court follows the one applied in the Wemhoff Case.
41.
41, 44.
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requests for provisional release. The Court held the remedies relating to retention on remand to be a matter of criminal law and not
of "civil rights and obligations" in the sense of Article 6(1)-as some
members of the Commission had found-and that the text of Article 6(1) as to criminal matters expressly limits the requirement of a
fair hearingto the determination of any criminal charge which does
not include the remedies in question; furthermore, the Court noted
that Article 6(1) does not merely require that the hearing be fair but
also that it should be public and that publicity in such matters is
in general not in the interest of accused persons. The Court also
denied that the application of the principle of equality of arms to
the proceedings against detention on remand resulted from Article
5(4) of the Convention which only demands that such proceedings
be allowed and have to be taken before a "Court." This term, the
Court decided, only required an authority of a judicial character
that is independent both of the executive and of the parties to the
case, without relating to the procedure to be followed, except that
against full
the provision requires a speedy procedure which speaks
20 9
written proceedings or oral hearings of the parties.

The most interesting point of the Judgment seems to be the
Court's well-taken attitude toward the Convention's requirements
regarding the equality of arms in proceedings against the detention
on remand. The five to two split as to the question whether the total
length of the proceedings violated the "reasonable time" requirement of Article 6(1) centered around the problem of whether the
extraordinary complication of the investigation justified the unusual length of more than seven years of the proceedings. Judges
Holmbdck and Zekia denied this question in their separate opinions.210

The decision that there was a violation of Article 5(3) led to a
proceeding under Article 50 of the Convention. The judgment in it
was rendered only in 1974 and will be treated in connection with
other judgments regarding this article, rendered in 1972 and 1973.211
F. St6gmailler Case
A third case dealing with a possible violation of Article

5(3)212

is

Id. at 43, 44.

"

"0 Id. at 46-48.
'
2

Text accompanying note 421 infra.
Article 5(3) states that "Everyone arrested or detained . . .shall be entitled to trial
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the case of St6gmiller v. Austria, which was decided by the Court
in its Judgment of November 19, 1969.213 The case, which originated
in an application against the Republic of Austria lodged with the
Commission on August 1, 1962, by Ernst Stgmdller, an Austrian
national, was referred to the Court both by the Commission and the
Austrian Government."' St6gmfiller's activities consisted of real
property transactions including the advancing of loans secured by
real property, especially to property owners threatened with foreclosure.215 St6gmfiller was arrested, under a decree of the Linz District
Court, on March 3, 1958, under the suspicion of having violated the
Usury Act. He was held in custody because of the danger of absconding and the danger of suppression of evidence. St6gmfiller did
not object but asked for a transfer to the Investigating Judge at
Wels. The Wels Court opened a preliminary investigation on March
10, 1958. He was again held in custody because of the danger of
suppression of evidence. St6gmiller, did not object or withdraw an
application for release made earlier, but protested his innocence. At
his request the case was transferred to the Regional Court of Linz.
On April 21, 1958, St6gmfiller was released on parole upon his solemn undertaking. In June 1958 new information alleging fraud, misappropriation and profiteering by St6gmiiller and others reached
the Public Prosecutor in Linz. The Investigating Judge in Linz had
just begun extensive inquiries when St6gmfiller, in October 1958
requested and obtained a transfer of the case to the Regional Court
in Vienna. This Court decided in November 1960 to continue or
extend the preliminiary investigation so that it embraced some 78
cases of aggravated fraudulent conversion, fraud, usury or embezzlement. St6gmailler was informed on February 10, 1961, of the facts
being held against him."'6
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial .
2,1

Convention, supra note 25, at 226.

St6gmfiller Case, [19691 9 Eur. Ct. Human Rights. See [1969] Y.B. EuR. CoNV. ON

168-92 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights), for decision by the Commission about
admissibility.
"I,
Id. at 4. Both referrals were made in time. The President of the Court referred the case
to the Chamber set up to hear the Neumeister Case. Id. at 4, 5.
2I Contrary to the Regulation on usury which allowed commissions up to 2 percent, St6gm(iller usually obtained from 6 to 7 percent and sometimes even 15 percent. A proceeding
connected with these activities for aggravated fraud on five counts ended with a sentence of
May 28, 1963, to imprisonment for 5 months on one count and acquittal on the other counts;
the penalty was on March 5, 1964, reduced to 4 months. St6gmdiller's application to the
Commission was not directed against these proceedings. Id. at 7-8.
HUMAN RGHTS

" Id. at 8-10.
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In summer 1959, St6gmiller began to take flying lessons to
become a professional pilot. He took flights to many airports within
and outside Austria. The Public Prosecutor obtained several extensions of the scope of the preliminary investigation and upon his
request, the Investigating Judge ordered St6gmfiller's arrest on August 24, 1961, because he had broken his undertaking by traveling
abroad and had committed further offenses in 1960 and 1961 at the
expense of borrowers (danger of repetition of offenses). He was held
in custody because of the danger of absconding and of the danger
of suppression of evidence. On August 29, 1961, St6gmfiller lodged
his first appeal against this decision; it was rejected on October 19,
1961, by the Judges' Chamber of the Regional Court of Vienna
which held that there was both danger of absconding and danger of
repetition of offenses. St6gmfiller attacked this decision on October
25, 1961, yet his further appeal Was rejected by the Court of Appeal
in Vienna on November 10, 1961. It denied the presence of a danger
of absconding but upheld that of a danger of repetition of offenses." 7
A second application for release was refused by the Investigating
Judge on January 3, 1962; his appeal from this decision was rejected
by the Judges' Chamber on January 25, 1962, and his further appeals of January and February 1962 were refused by the Court of
Appeal on March 14, 1962. In April and May 1962, St6gmfiller
lodged several disciplinary complaints against the conduct of the
Investigating Judge. Then followed, on August 1, 1962, his application to the Commission. Further disciplinary, recusational and constitutional complaints brought forward between October and December 1962 were without success. On August 9, 1963, St6gmfiller
lodged a third application for provisional release, offering a substantial security. The Investigating Judge released St6gmfiller on bail
as the danger of repetition of offenses had ceased and the danger of
absconding could be overcome by the making of a solemn undertaking and deposit of security. St6gmfiller had been in detention from
March 3 to April 21, 1958, and from August 25, 1962 to August 26,
1963. After completion of the preliminary investigation in July 1966
and indictment on August 1, 1967, Stfgm~iller's trial took place
from April 17 to May 9, 1968, on which day he was sentenced to four
and one half years severe imprisonment and to the repayment to the
victims of over 315,000 schillings. The periods spent in provisional
211

Id. at 12-18.
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detention or in detention on remand were counted toward the sentence. St6gmfiller started serving his sentence on September 4,
1968.21 s

The Commission declared the application admissible on October
1, 1964, as to a violation of Article 5(3) of the Convention, the only
claim maintained by the applicant, and decided not to avail itself
of this competence to examine further ex officio the applicant's
original complaint as to a violation of Article 6(1) and (3) of the
Convention which had later been dropped by him. It stated in its
opinion that Article 5(3) had been violated.2" '
In the arguments of the Commission its Delegates, besides elaborating on the method to be applied in establishing "reasonable
time" within the meaning of Article 5(3) of the Convention, replied
to various objections of the Government22 concerning the counting
Id. at 18-28.
Id. at 28-30.
'
The Government claimed that the Commission could deal only with facts that existed
before lodging of the application on August 1, 1962, so that the detention on remand from
that date up to the release on August 26, 1963, should not have been considered by the
Commission, but only the detention from August 25, 1961 to August 1, 1962. It argued further
that the Commission had erred when it declared the application admissible and in this regard
had acted contrary to Article 26 of the Convention which provides that the Commission may
only deal with the matter after the exhaustion of all domestic remedies and within 6 months
from the date of the final domestic decision. It considered it contrary to Article 26 were one
to adopt the view that an application alleging a violation of Article 5(3) is related to a
situation and not to an isolated act; for under such a doctrine it would be enough for the
person concerned to have exhausted the domestic remedies immediately after the beginning
of his detention on remand in order to be entitled to question the legality of the whole period
of detention by applying to the Commission. This would prevent the responding State from
remedying under its domestic law a supposed violation of Article 5(3) which might very well
have occurred only after lodging of the application. This result, the Government claimed,
would be contrary to a rule of customary international law of which Article 26 is only a
reproduction. It insisted that the time factor was of capital importance for the determination
of the subject of the dispute which was not so much a continuing situation as a definite fact,
namely the length of the detention which in itself complied with Article 5(1)(c) of the Convention. The Government did not believe that its interpretation of Articles 26 and 5(3) would
oblige a person to introduce a series of successive applications. He should apply to the
Commission when he considered that he had been in detention too long. He would be successful if that were the case; otherwise the application would be rejected on the ground that the
applicant was complaining of a violation which had not yet occurred. The Government
claimed that the Commission's decision on admissibility was subject to review by the Court.
It admitted that it had not raised before the Commission the objection based upon Article
26 but that neither a rule forbidding the introduction of new matter nor any rule of an
obligation to raise certain matters at the beginning of the proceedings was to apply in the
present situation. It asked the Court to declare that the length of detention of the applicant
was not in conflict with the obligations of the Convention and, in case it should hold that
'

360
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of the period of detention to be examined
and the relevance of
22
Article 26 of the Convention in the case. 1
The Court, in its judgment of November 10, 1969, rejected the
Government's contention that only the detention on remand up to
the lodging of the application with the Commission can be counted
in determining whether the detention went beyond a reasonable
time as laid down in Article 5(3) of the Convention. It rather followed the Commission's reference222 to the reasoning of the Court in
the Neumeister case 2 3 and besides found that in accordance with
national and international practice a Court should be competent to
consider facts that occurred during the proceedings and appear only
as a mere extension of the facts complained of at the outset. Thus,
courts deciding about release from detention on remand take their
decisions in the light of the situation which exists at the time of their
decision and international judicial bodies have often granted compensation for damage resulting from an illegal act of a State that
was suffered by the applicant party after the institution of
international proceedings. 4
The Court examined the Government's contentions as to Article
26 of the Convention relating to the rule of prior exhaustion of
domestic remedies. It noted that the Government did not rely on
there was a violation, to indicate the point of time when this violation commenced. Id. at
34-38.
21 Id. at 30-33.
22 The counter arguments of the Commission as to the time of detention on remand to be
considered and as to the importance of Article 26 of the Convention ran this way. It agreed
that the detention from March 3 to April 21, 1958, could not be taken into consideration as
the Convention entered into force for Austria on September 3, 1958. The Government's claim
that the present case could deal with the detention from August 25, 1961 only up to the
lodging of the application on August 1, 1962, the Commission rejected by reference to the
Neumeister judgment in which the Court had rejected a similar objection. Id. at 32.
As to the argument based upon Article 26 the Commission's Delegates pointed out that the
applicant was released on August 26, 1963, i.e., before the Commission's decision on October
1, 1964 on admissibility; that the Government at that time had not raised any objection based
upon Articles 26 and 27(3) of the Convention; that before the admission decision of October
1, 1964, the applicant had on two occasions asked to be released and had exhausted all
domestic remedies as to these requests; that, though Austrian law does not limit the number
and frequencies of such requests the Commission could not accept the Government's contention as to the necessity of such repetition which would likely be considered as an obstruction
of the proceedings or even as an abuse of the right to appeal. It requested the Court to decide
whether the Convention had been violated by the applicant's detention from August 25, 1961
to August 26, 1963. Id. at 32, 33.
Id. at 41; text accompanying note 206 supra.
2
Id. at 41.
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this provision before the Commission but, on the contrary, during
the whole proceedings before the Commission considered the period
of detention between the lodging of the application and the release
of the applicant. The Court, however, did not hold the Government
estopped to assert this position, although it had not been proposed
before the Commission. It noted further that the application was
admitted by the Commission on October 1, 1964; that this decision
had not been contested; that, however, the Government claimed
that Article 27 also prevents the organs mentioned in Article 19, the
Commission and the Court from handling subsequent facts as to
which there was no exhaustion of domestic remedies. Yet, the Court
stated, international law to which Article 26 refers explicitly only
imposes the use of remedies which are not only available, but are
also sufficient to redress the complaint. 25 The question of detention
on remand is to be answered in light of the circumstances whether
and to what extent, pursuant to Article 26, the detained applicant,
who has exhausted the domestic remedies before the Commission
declared his application admissible, must make later appeals to the
domestic courts so as to make it possible to examine, on the international level, the reasonableness of his continued detention. Yet, the
Court concluded, that the whole question of Article 26 arises only if
the examination by the Court had not led to the result that at the
date of the lodging of the application the detention had exceeded a
reasonable time. On the other hand, the detention on remand, held
to have exceeded a reasonable time on that day, must as a rule
necessarily be found excessive throughout the time for which it was
continued. The Court decided, after a thorough analysis of the facts,
that on the day of lodging the application, August 1, 1962, the
detention exceeded a reasonable time. Consequently, the Court
said, there was no need to examine separately the applicant's complaints concerning the detention beyond this point of time.226 In its
judgment, the Court held unanimously that there had been a breach
of Article 5(3) of the Convention and reserved for the applicant the
right, should the occasion arise, to apply for just satisfaction.2 7
Judge Verdross, the elected judge of Austrian nationality, 2 8 together with Judge Bilge filed a separate concurring opinion. Accord221
'a
2

Id. at 42.
Id. at 41-45.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 4. Judge Verdross sat ex officio by virtue of Article 43.
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ing to them the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is a preliminary question relating principally to the admissibility of the application which, on its side, is a prerequisite for the jurisdiction of the
Court if one reads Article 48 together with Articles 26, 27(3), 28, 32,
45, and 47 of the Convention. They believe that according to the text
of Article 26 the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies must
be previously raised before the Commission. The Government had
not done so. Under the division of the tasks and powers between the
Commission and the Court in the general plan of the Convention it
is not open to the Court to entertain the question of exhaustion of
domestic remedies
which has not been previously submitted to the
2 91
Commission.
The case is on the one side a clear confirmation of the Neumeister
doctrine to consider also as to reasonableness that period of a detention on remand which lies after the lodging of the application with
the Commission. On the other hand, the Court has spoken only a
form of dictum as to the question of dealing with the exhaustion of
domestic remedies for that period of detention for the reason that
it had already reached the decision that the detention on remand
had been excessive. In two later cases the Court had occasion to
meet this issue more squarely.2" The reservation in the judgment for
the applicant of his right to apply for just satisfaction is an innovation as compared with the judgment in the Neumeister Case which
only stated that there had been a violation.2 3' Rule 47 bis of the
Rules of Court and the new text of Rule 50(3) cannot have been the
reason for this express pronouncement as both were adopted only on
November 8, 1972.132
G.

Matznetter Case

The judgment in the Matznetter Case23 3 was rendered on the same
day as in the StbgmiallerCase, November 10, 1969, and by the same
Chamber of the Court, composed of the same Judges. The case
originated in an application against the Republic of Austria lodged
12

Id. at 46, 47.

230 Infra, text accompanying notes 246-48 (Matznetter Case), notes 294-97 (Vagrancy

Cases), and note 346-48 (Ringeisen Case).
"I Text accompanying note 202 supra.
n2 COLLECTED TExTS, supra note 78, at 419-21.
23 Matznetter Case, [1969] 10 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 4, reprinted in [1969] Y.B. EUR.
CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 406-37 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). As to the decision of the
Commission about admissibility see [1964] Y.B. Eua. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTs 330-49.
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by Matznetter with the Commission on April 3, 1964. Both the
Commission and the Austrian Government brought the case before
the Court within
the time provided on July 13 and August 8, 1967,
34
respectively.1
The involved facts can for the purpose of examining the procedural aspects of the case be condensed as follows. The Court was
called upon to decide whether Articles 5(3) and 5(4) in connection
with Article 6(1) of the Convention had been violated by the
Austrian authorities.135 Matznetter had been active, in a leading
capacity, in a group of enterprises, the so-called Schiwitz Group,
which dealt in cereals, flour, animal foodstuffs, etc. On May 13 and
15, 1963, the Economic Branch of the Vienna police asked the Regional Criminal Court in Vienna for an order of arrest against several persons, among them the applicant who was suspected of having abetted the others in the crime of aggravated fraud. On May 14
and 15, 1963, the Public Prosecutor's Office applied to the Court for
the opening of a preliminary investigation and also the immediate
arrest of the persons indicated by the police. The Investigating
Judge granted these applications immediately. In his warrants of
arrest, the judge cited danger of absconding, danger of suppression
of evidence and danger of repetition of offenses. The applicant was
arrested on May 15, 1963.3
On December 27, 1963, the applicant made his first application
for release, which was refused by the Investigating Judge on January
17, 1964. The applicant's appeal of January 28, 1964, was dismissed
by the Judges' Chamber of the Regional Criminal Court of Vienna
on February 10, 1974. A further appeal against this decision was
rejected by the Court of Appeal on March 4, 1964, which adopted
the conclusion of the Investigating Judge and the Judges' Chamber
23
that danger of absconding and of repetition of offenses persisted. 1
Shortly afterwards the applicant approached the Commission. 238 On
November 13, 1964, the applicant applied again for release, offering
bail and citing in his favor Articles 5(3) and 6(2) of the Convention.
The Investigating Judge without pronouncing his own decision or
opinion handed the appeal to the Judges' Chamber which dismissed
2'4

Matznetter Case, [1969] 10 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 4, 5.

"2Id. at 22, 36.
2m
2
2N

Id. at 8, 9.
Id. at 9-12, 14.
Text accompanying note 234 supra.
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the application on December 3, 1964. It considered the danger of
absconding and that of repetition of offenses as continuing the latter
danger, making it superfluous to examine the guarantee proffered.
Again the applicant lodged a further appeal on December 14, 1964.
The Court of Appeal refused this appeal on January 20, 1965, adopting the conclusions of the Judges' Chamber. In the meantime the
Commission had on December 16, 1964, declared the application
admissible.2 9 On April 21, 1965, the applicant applied again for
release on bail, this time without offering guarantees. He referred
to the admission of his application by the Commission and added
the assertion that he was sick and that further life in prison would
endanger his life. On the basis of a report of the Institute of Forensic
Medicine'of the University of Vienna, the Judges' Chamber ordered
the applicant's release on parole on July 8, 1965. It followed the
applicant's assertion that by then the danger of repetition of offenses had ceased-in part because of his serious illness-and also that
there was no longer any danger of absconding, especially on the
basis of the medical report according to which the applicant appeared unfit to serve sentence in case of conviction and therefore
there were no special grounds why he should abscond. He was released on the same day.4 0 In the various proceedings before the
Judges' Chamber and the Court of Appeals regarding the applicant's release the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure was followed; the decisions were reached after hearings not open to the
public in the course of which the Public Prosecutor's Office had
24
been heard in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer. '
After the preliminary investigation had been closed on May 11,
1965, the very voluminous records were studied by the Public Prosecutor, who submitted his indictment of more than 350 pages to the
Regional Criminal Court on April 13, 1966. The various acts of fraud
for which the applicant was indicted had caused damages of more
than 83 million schillings. The Regional Criminal Court found him
guilty on February 6, 1967, of various forms of aggravated fraud and
sentenced him to 7 years' severe imprisonment and to a fine of 5,000
schillings. The period of the applicant's detention on remand was
counted as part of the sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the
23' Id. at 14, 16, 22.
240

Id. 17-18.

"I Id. at 19.
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applicant's plea in nullity in 1969, but allowed his42 appeal in part
and consequently reduced the sentence to 6 years.
In his application of April 3, 1964, to the Commission the applicant complained of the decision of the Judges' Chamber of February
10, 1964, and of the Court of Appeal of March 4, 1964. He claimed
two violations of the Convention: first, of Article 6(1) and (2) and
Article 5(3) by the Court's not hearing him "within a reasonable
time," holding him in detention longer than reasonable, and not
relieving him "pending trial;" and second, of Article 5(4), by the
hearings about release not being conducted in the presence of both
parties. The Commission examined the first complaint in the light
of Article 5(3) alone, the second in the light of Article 5(4) and 6(1).
It declared the application admissible and reported to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on June 28, 1967. The
Commission found that the applicant's detention had exceeded a
"reasonable time" and that the release proceedings had been in
conformity with Article 5(4) and 6(1).243
The Court dealt in its judgment of December 10, 1969, first with
the question of a violation of Article 5(3) of the Convention by the
detention of the applicant beyond a reasonable time. As to the
procedural part of this issue, namely, the Government's contention
that only the detention up to the lodging of the application with the
Commission (April 3, 1964) or only up to the last final domestic
denial of release before that date (March 4, 1964) should be considered, " the Court referred to the reasons given in judgment in the
,' Id. at 19-22.
2-

Id. 22, 23.

" The arguments of the Commission and of the Government before the Court as to questions of procedure were these: The Commission argued that the total period of detention, i.e.,
from May 15, 1963 to July 8, 1965, was to be considered as to its compatibility with Article
5(3) of the Convention, while the Government claimed that the Commission could consider
only the period up to the lodging of the application with the Commission, i.e., from May 15,
1963 to April 3, 1964. Id. at 25, 28. The Government insisted on this viewpoint in spite of the
contrary ruling of the Court in the Neumeister Case. The Commission countered by pointing
out that this question concerned the competence of both the Court and of the Commission
and should therefore have been raised before the Commission. It also referred to the Court's
judgment of March 20, 1962, in the De Becker Case where the Court had taken into consideration a matter-the Belgian Act of June 30, 1961-which was subsequent to the original
application of De Becker, to the adoption of the Commission's Report and even to the commencement of the proceedings before the Court. Id. at 25. The Government considered that
judgment as not relevant for the present case, which differed from the situation of which De
Becker complained, as the situation of a person in detention on remand was not of a permanent nature but varied from second to second until his release. Id. at 25, 28. Without disputing
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Neumeister Case. 2 5 The Court found, moreover, that it is in accordance with national and international practice that a court should
find itself competent to examine facts occurring during the proceedings and which constitute a mere extension of the facts complained
of at the outset; that international judicial bodies have frequently
the admissibility of the application, the Government relied strongly on Article 26 of the
Convention claiming that it prevented the Commission from dealing with facts with regard
to which the domestic remedies had not been exhausted before the lodging of the application.
It considered the "matter" referred to in Article 26 to be the length of the detention on remand
prior to the lodging of the application while the subsequent period had not given rise to
domestic remedies, the refusal of which might have caused the applicant to lodge one or more
new applications. The Commission, the Government claimed, relied mistakenly only on the
English text of Article 26 ("deal with") without finding a solution which was compatible with
the French text ("tre saisie"); the only way of reconciling the two texts should be to base
one's interpretation on the French text, especially as Article 26 merely confirmed a traditional
rule of international law. The Government admitted that its arguments based on Article 26
led logically to the conclusion that the period of detention to be examined did not extend
beyond March 4, 1964, the date of the last decision (by the Court of Appeals) prior to the
lodging of the application. It also conceded that it had not raised the question of the period
to be considered in the proceedings before the Commission; yet it considered this point
harmless as this attitude did not imply that the Government accepted that the examination
should relate to the whole period of the applicant's detention but was only a sign of the
generous spirit of cooperation by which the Government was inspired when it drew up a
complete information from which the Commission could learn the progress of the Court's
proceedings against the applicant. Id. at 28, 29.
The Commission replied with regard to Article 26 of the Convention that the applicant had
the right to apply to the Commission before exhausting the domestic remedies provided this
condition has been fulfilled when the Commission decides on the admissibility of the application. The applicant applied April 3, 1964, id. at 4, and the Commission admitted the application on December 16, 1964, id. at 25. It claimed that both the English text and the purpose
of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies supported this opinion; that the words "deal
with" and "tre saisie" related to the consideration of the merits of the case which could not
be undertaken before exhaustion of the domestic remedies but that this did not prevent the
Commission from taking into account facts subsequent to the application which could very
well speak in favor of a government concerned if in the meantime the measures taken had
satisfied the demands of the applicant. The words in Article 27(3) of the Convention, "[tihe
Commission shall reject any petition referred to it which it considers inadmissible under
Article 26," implied that the Commission must be satisfied as to the admissibility of the
application which necessarily presumed that an application had been lodged. Although Article 26 referred to "the generally recognized rules of international law," there was no complete
parallelism between the doctrine of diplomatic protection and the new system inaugurated
by the Convention, at least in regard to applications by private persons. It reminded the Court
that in the present case the domestic remedies with respect to the applicant's first demand
of release were exhausted with the Appeal Court's decision of March 4, 1964, i.e., a few weeks
before lodging the application with the Commission and several months before the
Commission's decision about the admissibility. The Commission doubted whether demands
after a long period of detention on remand amounted to true domestic remedies in the
meaning of Article 26. Id. at 25, 26.
"I'Id. at 31; see text accompanying note 209 supra.
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held that compensation for damage resulting from an illegal act of
a state must also cover damage suffered after institution of the
international proceedings; that matters of detention on remand are
typically of this nature. As to the Government's argument based
upon Article 26 of the Convention, the Court followed the position
taken in the Stbgmaller Case that it would not refuse to consider
this argument for the mere reason that quite clearly it had not been
presented by the Government in the proceedings before the Commission and accepted it to the extent indicated in the Stdgmiiller
judgment. 26 However, the examination as to the merits in the
Matznetter Case did not lead to the result that the detention on
remand had exceeded a "reasonable time" already on the day of
lodging the application to the Commission.2 17 Therefore, before examining the latter detention the Court ascertained whether the continuation of the detention was due to any failure of the applicant
to make further requests to the Austrian judicial authorities. The
Court came to the conclusion that up to the time of making the
successful requests for release the rule of exhaustion of domestic
remedies was observed. The Court then extended its examination
of the merits to the detention up to the very release of the applicant
on July 8, 1965, and found by five votes to two that there had been
2
no breach of Article 5(3) of the Convention. 1
As to the issue of "equality of arms" in the examination of requests for release, 29 the Court referred to its decision as to this point
in the Neumeister Case and held unanimously that there had been
250
no breach of Article 5(4) and 6(1) of the Convention.
Of the various concurring or dissenting opinions of individual
" Matznetter Case, [1969] 10 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 32. See as to the judgment in the
St6gm~iller Case, text accompanying note 226 supra.
',7 Matznetter Case, (1969] 10 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 33.
,, Id. at 32-36.
2,1 With regard to the violation of Articles 5(4) and 6(1) of the Convention asserted by the
applicant for the reason that the hearings on the release were not held in the presence of both
parties both the Commission and the Government referred to the judgment of the Neumeister
Case. Id. at 30. As to the judgment in ihe Neumeister Case see text accompanying note 209

supra. The Commission requested the Court to dismiss the claim of violation of Article 5(4)
and to determine whether the applicant's detention on remand from May 15, 1963 to July 8,
1965, was or was not consistent with Article 5(3) of the Convention. The Government asked
the Court to declare that the measures taken by the Austrian authorities did not conflict with
the obligations arising from the Convention. Matznetter Case, [1969] 10 Eur. Ct. Human
Rights 30.
'1 Id. at 35, 36.
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Judges only one deals with procedural matters, the concurring opinion of Judges Verdross and Bilge.25 According to them the Court
should not consider the arguments regarding exhaustion of domestic
remedies which were raised by the Austrian Government before the
Court but not before the Commission. Though admitting the broadness of the text of Article 45 of the Convention concerning the
Court's jurisdiction they refer to Articles 47, 28 26, and 27(3) for the
real and somewhat more restricted meaning of Article 45. They find
competence to accept an application and to check its admissibility
only in the Commission and therefore believe that the Court may
not entertain a question of exhaustion of domestic remedies not
previously submitted to the Commission.252
The Matznetter judgment is a confirmation and extension of principles established in previous judgments as to the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies. The opinion of Judges Verdross and
Bilge seems well founded. Yet the attitude of the Court not to be
deterred from examining this problem only because it had not been
raised before the Commission is more satisfactory. These are not
proceedings depending on the procedural correctness of the pleadings by the "parties." Rather the Court rightly takes an investigatory attitude under which it is supposed to find and consider facts
independently from the pleadings.
H. Delcourt Case
The main issue of the Delcourt Case53 is one of procedure in the
State Court of Cassation, not in the European Court of Human
Rights. Yet it is closely related to a question of procedure of the
latter Court, namely its jurisdiction to deal with the procedure in
state cassation proceedings, and is of fundamental importance as to
any kind of judicial procedure. The Delcourt Case originated with
an application lodged by Emile Delcourt, a Belgian national, with
the Commission on December 20, 1965, against the Kingdom of
Belgium.2 54 The Commission referred the case to the Court within
the time prescribed in Article 32(1), 47 of the Convention on Febru15 Judge Verdross, an Austrian, was sitting ex officio according to Article 43.
"I Matznetter Case, [1969] 10 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 38, 39.
'3 Delcourt Case, [1970] 11 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 4, reprinted in [19701 Y.B. EUR.
CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1098-135 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). As to the decision of the
Commission about admissibility, see [19671 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 282-320.
Delcourt Case, [1970] 11 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 4.
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ary 5, 1969.55 The applicant was, at the time of lodging his application with the Commission, in prison at Louvain. After the Procureur
du Roi at Bruges had instituted proceedings against him for obtaining money by menaces, fraud and fraudulent conversion, he was
arrested on November 23, 1963, and later charged with various offenses of a character similar to those advanced by the Procureur du
Roi. On September 21, 1964, he was convicted by the Bruges Court
of Summary Jurisdiction of 36 out of 41 counts and sentenced to 1
year's imprisonment and a fine of 2,000 Belgian francs. Upon his
and the prosecution's appeal, the Court of Appeal in Ghent found
all charges to be established, including those of which the applicant
had been acquitted in first instance and it increased the principal
sentence to 5 years' imprisonment and further decided that on serving his sentence he should be placed at the disposal of the Government for 10 years. The applicant appealed further to the Court of
Cassation and lodged a Memorial with that court. The Procureur
G~n6ral's department (parquet) at the Court of Appeal did not avail
itself of this right to file a counter-memorial. At the public hearing
of the Court of Cassation on June 21, 1965, the applicant was present but his counsel was not. After hearing the report of one judge
and the submission of the Avocat G~n6ral to the effect that the
appeal be dismissed, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal
2 56
on the same day after private deliberation.
The Avocat G6n~ral was present at these deliberations in accordance with a Decree of March 15, 1815, which provides ". . . in
cassation proceedings the Procureur G~n~ral has the right to be
present, without voting, when the Court retires to consider its decision ."2157
The applicant complained of the three judgments rendered
against him and alleged a violation of Articles 5, 6, 7, and 14 of the
Convention. His complaints were declared inadmissible by the
Commission except for the one relating to the question of whether
the presence of a member of the Procureur G~n6ral's department at
the deliberations of the Court of Cassation was compatible with the
principle of "equality of arms" of Article 6(1) of the Convention.
Later on, in observations to the Commission of December 8, 1967,
m Id. at 8,4.
Id. at 6, 7.
u Id. at 7. This provision has been reenacted, in substance, in Article 1109 of the new
Judicial Code of Oct. 10, 1967, i.e., more than 2 years after the Court of Cassation dismissed
the applicant's appeal.
"'
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the applicant further complained that he had not been able to reply
to the submissions of the Procureur Gdndral's department at the
Court of Cassation, that he had not been informed of this submission before the hearing of June 21, 1965, nor had the right to the last
word at the hearing been given to him. The Commission expressed
in its Report, by seven votes against six, the opinion that Article
6(1) of the Convention was not violated in the present case."'8
The Court stated in its judgment of January 17, 1970, that Article
6(1) orders that "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law." It examined this
provision under three viewpoints: first, whether it is applicable at
all; second, whether there was a violation of it according to the
principal complaint of the applicant, referring to the participation
of a member of the Procureur G6ndral's department in the deliberations of the Court of Cassation on June 21, 1965; and finally,
whether there was a violation according to the "new" complaints of
the applicant-that he could not reply to the Procureur Gdndral's
final submissions because they were not communicated to him before and that he did not have the right to say the last word at the
hearings on June 21, 1965.259
260
As to the first point, following the opinion of the Commission,
' Id. at 7, 8.
-9'

Id. at 12, 15, 19.

In arguing the case before the Court the Commission pleaded that Article 6(1) of the
Convention is applicable to the proceedings in cassation. Its majority, however, saw no violation of this article in the presence of a member of the Procureur Gdndral's department
attached to the Court of Cassation at that Court's deliberations. The Court does not deal with
the merits of cases; save in certain exceptional cases irrelevant here, its sole function is the
decision of questions of law and the Procureur Gdndral's department only assists the Court
in the exercise of this function. The department does not ordinarily prosecute and does not
have the character of a party. In almost all cases it is completely independent of the Minister
of Justice and has no right of direction of the Procureur Gn6ral's department attached to
the lower courts which is the prosecuting authority in normal cases. For all these reasons the
participation of the Procureur Gdndral's department at the deliberation of the Court of
Cassation did not conflict with the principle of "equality of arms." The Commission did not
express an opinion on the "new" complaints of the applicant which, in its opinion, were only
presented as special aspects of the principle of "equality of arms." The Commission asked
the Court to decide whether there was a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention in so far
as this provision requires a fair trial, by reason of the participation of the Representatives of
the Procureur General's department in the deliberations of the Court of Cassation. Id. at 9,
10.
20
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the Court rejected the Government's viewpoint"' that where the
Court of Cassation gives judgment on an appeal in cassation by one
of the parties challenging a judicial decision, it does not make a
determination either of civil rights or obligations or of a criminal
charge within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Convention. Recognizing the difficulty of defining exactly the field of application of
Article 6(1), the Court called attention to some of its former decisions concerning the question. It referred to its ruling in the
Neumeister and Matznetter Cases26 2 that Article 6(1) does not apply
to the procedure which regulates in Austria the examination of applications for provisional release. It recalled that it considered but
",1The Government argued that Article 6(1) of the Convention is not applicable in the
present case to the proceedings in cassation and that, in any case, the fact that a member of
the Procureur G~n~ral's department at the Court of Cassation, after submitting in an open
court that the applicant's appeal should be dismissed, was present in a consultative capacity
at the deliberations of that court, did not violate Article 6(1). Elaborating on the arguments
of the Commission it explained that the Court of Cassation, in spite of its judicial nature,
fulfilled a function which has some relation to the work of the legislature, that it was established in the interest of the law itself and judges judgments, not persons (except for some
matters irrelevant to the present case). It is not its function to decide disputes concerning
civil rights and obligations or to determine criminal charges within the meaning of Article
6(1) of the Convention. The Government emphasized that the Procureur G~nLral's department at the Court of Cassation must be distinguished fundamentally from the Procureur
G~n~ral's department attached to the Courts below; in the very rare cases where under the
relevant law the department assumes the position of a party and institutes prosecution the
Procureur G~n~ral is not present at the deliberation. As the Procureur G~n~ral is not concerned with the question of guilt of the accused, he is neither their adversary nor the tool of
the prosecution. Statistics show that often he submits to the Court of Cassation that an
appeal in cassation brought by the Procureur G~n~ral's department at the Court of Appeal
should be dismissed or puts forward on his own initiative grounds for setting aside a conviction; therefore, the Procureur G~n~ral's department at the Court of Cassation is not in
alliance with that attached to the courts below. The former one exercises, in practice, over
the latter one supervision of a purely doctrinal and scientific nature without any power of
direction, and it is entirely independent in its relations with the Minister of Justice. The
Government characterized the position of the Procureur G~n~ral attached to the Court of
Cassation as part of the Court, to be identified with it like the judges. It felt, therefore, that
the procedure attacked by the applicant did not upset the "equality of arms;" any inequality
in this case rather worked to the applicant's advantage, for unlike the applicant, the Procureur Gtn~ral's departments attached to the lower courts did not have an opportunity to put
forward their arguments in open court before the Court of Cassation and did not even avail
themselves of their right to reply in writing to the memorial of the applicant to the Court of
Cassation. The Government called attention to the fact that the procedural provision in
dispute is more than a century and a half old and had never been criticized but, on the
contrary, had been explicitly maintained by Parliament, once without change (1949) and the
second time in substance (1967) and after examination of the question from the viewpoint of
the Convention. Id. at 10, 11.
22 Id. at 13. See text accompanying notes 209 and 250 supra.
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did not find it necessary to decide in the Wemhoff and Neumeister
Cases the question whether cassation proceedings ought to be taken
into account in appreciating the duration of a hearing for the purpose of applying the provision of Article 6(1) which requires a hearing within a reasonable time.21 3 The Government invoked the provision of the Belgian Constitution that the Court of Cassation "does
not deal with the merits of the cases submitted to it" as showing
that there is not, strictly speaking, a prosecution or a defense before
the Court and that the Court judges not persons, but judgments,
and therefore does not determine criminal charges as required by
Article 6(1) of the Convention. The Court, however, pointed out
that judicial decisions always affect persons. Especially in criminal
matters, accused persons do not disappear with an appeal in cassation; this is true because the confirming or quashing of the lower
court's decision-the only way in which the Court of Cassation can
act-may influence the accused person's position, changing his
status as a convicted or an acquitted person provisionally if a lower
decision is set aside and the case is referred back to trial court or
with final effect if the appeal in cessation fails or if the Court of
Cassation decides without sending the case back that the facts
that lead to the conviction do not constitute an offense of any law.
Contemplating the French text of Article 6(1) "bien-fonde'de toute
accusation" the Court interpreted it as referring not only to the
accusation being well-founded in fact, but also in law, which may
lead the Court of Cassation to hold that the lower courts when considering the facts have acted in breach either of criminal law or of
essential forms of procedure. Thus, even the literal interpretation
by the Government of Article 6(1) cannot, in the view of the Court,
put the proceedings in cassation completely outside its scope.
Examining the much broader English text of that Article ("determination of. . . any criminal charge"), the Court again concluded
that a criminal charge is not really "determined" as long as the verdict of acquittal or conviction has not become final and that the
proceedings in cassation are one special stage of the proceedings
whose consequence may prove decisive for the accused and which,
therefore, cannot fall outside the scope of Article 6(1). Admitting
"I'Delcourt Case,
and 208 supra.

[1970] 11 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 13; see text accompanying notes 177
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that the Convention does not oblige the Contracting States to set
up courts of appeal or of cassation, it found that once such courts
are instituted they must insure that the persons before them enjoy
the fundamental guarantees of Articles 6.64
Having established that Article 6(1) is applicable to proceedings
in cassation the Court proceeded to the second point, i.e., whether
the special features of these proceedings in the case before it violate
that Article. The Court acknowledged that the presence of a member of the Procureur Gdndral's department attached to the Court of
Cassation at the deliberations of this Court after he had made his
submission in open court conforms with the legislation of Belgium
in force at that time, namely with Article 39 of a Decree of March
15, 1815. The question before the Court was therefore the compatibility of that article with Article 6(1) of the Convention. While the
Commission and the Government dealt with the problem mainly as
one of "equality of arms," the Court examined it by reference to the
whole of Article 6(1) whose contents, the Court declared, is not
exhausted by that principle in which the Court saw it as only one
feature of the wider concept of fair trial by an independent and
impartial tribunal.2 11 It examined the positions of the various departments of the Procureur Gdn6ral and found that the respondent
party to the applicant's appeal in cassation was not the department
at the Court of Cassation but those at the lower courts. As to them
the Court found that the applicant did not suffer from any discrimination as to the full equality of treatment; that the departments of
the lower courts had not availed themselves of their right to reply
in writing to the applicant's memorial in cassation; and that the
relevant legislation did not even permit them to appear at the hearing before the Court of Cassation or to be present at its deliberations. As to the department of the Procureur G6ndral at the Court
of Cassation the Court found that in general it did not conduct
public prosecutions nor bring cases before that court nor did it have
the character of a respondent and therefore "cannot be considered
as a party. ' 2 66 Yet, the Court considered necessary a more careful
examination of the real position and functions of the Procureur
Gdndral's department attached to the Court of Cassation. It admitted that a clear distinction between the department at the Court of
2"' Delcourt

Case, [19701 11 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 12-14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15, 16.
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Cassation and those at the lower courts is not always very evident
from the legislative text as often the same names such as Procureur
G6n6ral's department (Ministre Public), are used. All the departments seem to constitute, in certain aspects, one single corps; moreover, certain legislative texts provide that the Procureuer G~n~ral
at the Court of Cassation shall exercise supervision over the Procureurs Gn6raux attached to the Court of Appeal, which power, according to an examination of the practice, does not involve the
power to intervene in the conduct of individual cases but merely to
give general opinions on matters of doctrine. In addition, the Court
conceded, the Procureur G~n6ral's department at the Court of Cassation sometimes does act as a moving party, for example in disciplinary proceedings against judges, and its members are sometimes
recruited from among the members of the lower departments so that
some litigants may view as an adversary a Procureur G6n6ral who
submits that their appeal in cassation should be dismissed and that
a litigant could have a feeling of inequality if after such a submission such member withdraws with the judges to attend the deliberation in privacy. The Court stated that the Belgian legislation to the
last point does not seem to have any equivalent, at least in criminal
cases, in the other member States of the Council of Europe and that
the Avocat General of the Court of Justice of the European Communities-in spite of some analogies-does not take part in the
deliberations.
Though recognizing the axiom that justice must not only be done
but also must be seen to be done, the Court did not see, when
looking at the realities behind the appearances in the preceding
considerations, enough proof of a violation of the right to a fair
hearing. The Procureur G6n~ral's department at the Court of Cassation is-except in matters not relevant here-independent of the
Minister of Justice, who cannot compel him to make his submissions one way or the other while he has the power to direct the
institution of proceedings by the lower Procureurs G~n~raux. The
Procureur G~n6ral at the Court of Cassation exercises supervision
over the lower Procureurs only with regard to doctrine without giving them instructions or injunctions. Nor is he the virtual adversary
in cassation of the accused, even when he submits in open court that
the appellant's argument should not be accepted. The Court also
admitted that the officers of the lower departments do not have the
character of public accusers as they are bound to serve in all objectivity and thus are to be considered parties only in the formal proce-
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dural meaning of the term. Still, the Court said, their task is, before
all else, to investigate and prosecute criminal offenses, while the
Procureur G~n6ral at the Court of Cassation upholds a different
interest, the one concerned with the observance by the judges of the
law and not with the establishment of guilt or innocence of the
accused, a position held by him also in civil matters where nobody
could ever seriously suggest that he becomes the opponent of a
litigant with whose case his submissions do not agree. In practice,
the Court said, the Procureur G~n6ral's department at the Court of
Cassation is that of an adjunct and advisor of the court; he discharges a quasijudicial function by assisting the court through his
opinions given according to his legal conscience to supervise the
lawfulness of the decision attacked and to insure the uniformity of
judicial precedent. The Court referred to statistics according to
which the Procureur G6n6ral's department at the Court of Cassation
frequently either submits that appeals by the lower departments
against an acquittal should be dismissed, that appeals by convicted
persons should be allowed, or even raises ex officio grounds which a
convicted person has not put forward in an adequate way. It denied
that the Court of Cassation's independence and impartiality could
be affected by the presence of a member of the Procureur G6n~ral's
department at its deliberations after the Procureur Gen~ral himself
had been shown to be independent and impartial. Finally, the Court
emphasized that the challenged system dates back for more than a
century and a half; though such a longstanding domestic legal rule
could not justify a failure to comply with the present requirements
of international law, the Court thought that it might provide supporting evidence that there has been no such failure. The Court
believed that this was the case, especially since the system has been
maintained twice by a parliament chosen in free elections, the second time after studying the question in the context of the Convention, and as, furthermore, it appeared that the system has never
been questioned by the legal profession or public opinion in Belgium. Therefore, the Court concluded that the challenged system as
applied in practice was not incompatible with Article 6(1) of the
Convention; it also found that in the case at court there were no
grounds for holding that the Procureur G~n~ral's department at the
Court of Cassation failed to observe, to the applicant's detriment,
its duty to be impartial and independent at the hearing or at the
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deliberations .257
Regarding the third point (the "new complaints" of the applicant),2 8 the Court did not accept the Government's view that these
"new complaints" were not admissible for the reason that they had
not been raised before the examination of the merits of the case by
the Commission. 29 Though not mentioned explicitly in the applica-

tion or the first memorials of the applicant, those complaints had
an evident connection with those contained therein, namely the
violation of Article 6(1) through the role of a member of the Procureur Gn6ral's department at the Court of Cassation, the subject of
the original application as accepted by the Commission. The Court,
therefore, thought it would be unduly formalistic and unjustified
not to take these elements into account. However, the Court rejected the new complaints as ill-founded. It considered the expression of the Procureur G~n~ral's department at the end of the hearing
without prior communication of it to the parties as in the very
nature of the department's task with regard to the principal complaint. It stated that Article 6 of the Convention does not require,
even by implication, that an accused should have the possibility of
replying to the purely legal submissions of an independent offical
attached to the highest court in Belgium as its assistant and advisor. The Court held unanimously that there had been no violation
of Article 6(1).270
The Court's judgment to points one and three seems perfectly
justified. It is important that the Court cleared up in the affirmative
the question of whether Article 6(1) of the Convention is applicable
to proceedings in cassation. While seemingly only questions of law
are resolved in the abstract, the Court rightly looked at the effect
and concluded that judicial decisions always affect persons and do
amount, in criminal matters, to a determination of a criminal
charge in the meaning of Article 6(1). The Court also showed practical common sense when it refused to reject the examination of the
Id. at 15-19.
Text accompanying note 259 supra.
"e The Government considered the "new" complaints as inadmissible because not included
in the original application and, in any event, as unsustainable, for it is because the Proceureur
Gen~ral's department is not a party that its submissions are made at the end of the oral
proceedings without being communicated in advance to the parties. Delcourt Case, [19701
11 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 11. It asked the Court to hold that the procedure in dispute did
not violate Article 6(1) of the Convention. Id. at 12.
17 Id. at 19, 20.
2
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''new complaints" only for the reason that they had not been spelled
out clearly in the applicant's first application and its supplements.
As to the main point, however, the decision appears unsatisfactory. The Court in a way confirmed that the challenged proceedings
are "unusual" by stating that they seem to be unique among criminal cases in the Member States of the Council of Europe and to this
it may be added that they appear unique also beyond this group of
countries. Once the Court had not rejected the axiom that "justice
must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done," the same
principle that prevails in questions of recusations of judges,27 it is
difficult to see how it could not consider it a violation of this axiom
in the challenged proceedings. No degree of emphasis on the quality
of the Procureur G6n~ral at the Court of Cassation as an objective
advisor of that court can wipe out at least the appearance that he
becomes a party when he is allowed to repeat and possibly reinforce
the submission he has made in open court in the privacy of the
court's chambers to which the accused has no access. The argument
of the old age of these proceedings deflates rather than enhances the
Court's position, as it puts in the foreground the autocratic atmosphere from which they sprang; also the point that the proceedings
in question have apparently never been challenged before can be
rebutted by the fact that probably only the Convention and the
creation of the Court under it have opened the way for an effective
challenge. It seems surprising that no dissenting or at least a concurring opinion discussing these viewpoints has been filed by any member of the Court. 72
Vagrancy Cases
23
The cases of De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp (Vagrancy Cases)
originated from applications lodged in 1966 with the Commission by
I.

271See Cohn, Judicial Recusation in the Federal Republic of Germany, 3 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 18, 19 (1973).
2 As to an elaborate and strong critique of the case see Nadelmann, Due Process of Law
before the European Court of Human Rights: The Secret Deliberation,66 AM. J. INT'L L. 509
(1972).
27 De Wilde, Ooms, and Versyp Cases, [1970] 12 Eur. Ct. Human Rights [hereinafter
cited as 12 Vagrancy Cases]; De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp Cases, [1971] 1 EUR. CT. HUMA!
RIGHTS, reprinted in [1971] Y.B. EU. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 788-837 (Eur. Comm. on
Human Rights); De Wilde, Ooms, and Versyp Cases, [1972] 14 Eur. Ct. Human Rights,
reprinted in [19721 Y.B. EuR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTs 662-78 [hereinafter cited as 14
Vagrancy Cases]; see, as to the decision of the Commission about admissibility, [19671 Y.B.
EuR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 420-59.
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three Belgian nationals concerning certain aspects of the Belgian
legislation on vagrancyY4 After ordering in 1967 the joinder of these
7" Under the Belgian Criminal Code vagrants are persons who have no fixed abode, no
means of subsistence and no regular trade or profession. All of these three requirements must
be fulfilled cumulatively. Vagrancy is now dealt with in an Act of 1891. Under it every person
picked up as a vagrant shall be arrested and brought before the police court composed of a
magistrate, where, after ascertaining "the identity, age, physical and mental state and manner of life," the magistrate considers whether the person is a vagrant. Section 13 deals with
"able-bodied persons, who, instead of working for their livelihood exploit charity as professional beggars" and those "who through idleness, drunkeness or immorality live in a state of
vagrancy." Section 16 deals with "persons found begging or picked up as vagrants when none
of the circumstances specified in section 13 . . . apply." In the case of section 13 the court
shall place the vagrant at the disposal of the Government to be detained in a vagrancy center
for not less than 2 and not more than 7 years; he may be released before the time fixed by
the court if the Minister of Justice considers that there is no reason to continue the detention.
In the case of section 16 the court may place the person at the disposal of the Government to
be detained in an assistance home for an indeterminate period, not to exceed 1 year. Section
13 was applied to De Wilde and Versyp, section 16 to Ooms. The distinction between
"vagrancy centers" and "assistance homes" has been practically overcome by a system of
individual treatment of persons detained. Magistrates form part of the judiciary and have
the status of an officer vested with judicial power with the guarantees of independence. The
Belgian Court of Cassation, however, considers the decisions rendered under section 13 and
16 of the 1891 Act as administrative acts and not as judgments and, therefore, not as subject
to appeal or to cassation proceedings. The Conseil d'Etat had dealt only with two appeals
for the annulment of detention orders for vagrancy. In the first case (the Vleminckx case) the
Conseil d'9tat held in its judgment of December 21, 1951, that the decision of the police court
in pursuance of section 13 of the 1891 Act against which the appeal was brought was only a
preliminary decision followed by the Government's decision to detain the applicant in a
vagrancy center; the appellant therefore had not established that he had any interest in the
amendment of the court's decision which merely allowed the Government to detain him while
the actual detention decision of the Government had not been appealed. However, in the Du
Bois case the Conseil d' tat on June 7, 1967, 2 months after the Commission had declared
admissible the applications of De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp, annulled a decision by which the
police court had placed the appellant Du Bois at the disposal of the Government in pursuance
of section 16 of the 1891 Act. The Conseil d'Atat considered the police court's decision to be
not the finding of a criminal offense but an administrative security measure not open to
appeal before the ordinary courts. It is not only a preliminary measure enabling the Government to make the effective decision on the matter of detention, but itself the effective decision
placing the person concerned in a different legal position and therefore capable of constituting
a grievance, the person concerned being immediately deprived of his liberty. The Belgian
Government was preparing, as the Court mentioned, a bill opening the way for an appeal from
the magistrate's decisions to the court of first instance. Detained vagrants are required to
work and are liable to disciplinary measures if they refuse to do so without good reason. They
are entitled to daily wages, part of which are to form release savings which, normally, had to
amount to at least 2,000 BF as a prerequisite for release. The minimum hourly allowance,
actually paid to detainees was 1.75 BF, later 2 BF. The correspondence of detained vagrants
may be subjected to censorship, except with their counsel and with certain authorities and
with the Commission. Vagrants detained in an assistance home as Ooms may not be kept
against their will for more than 1 year. They regain their freedom as of right before the end
of one year if their release savings have reached the minimum amount or the Minister of
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applications in so far as they had been declared admissible, the
Commission adopted its Report to the Committee of Ministers on
July 19, 1969, and sent it to the Committee on September 24, 1969.
The Belgian Government referred the cases to the Court on October
24, 1969.175 The Chamber of the Court entrusted with the case by a
unanimous preliminary decision of May 28, 1970, relinquished jurisdiction to the plenary Court.?8 Unlike the Language Case the narration of the events during the preliminary proceedings before the
Court as given in the Court's judgment of June 18, 1971,21 does not
reveal that the Belgian Government or the Commission had asked
that the jurisdiction be relinquished to the plenary Court. Apparently the Chamber acted sua sponte and after referring to Rule 48
of the Rules of Court, gave as a reason that the Commission had
raised in a memorial certain questions on which it was desired that
the Court should be able to rule in plenary session.rn
Another preliminary and procedural issue, this time controversial, was dealt with by the Court in its judgment of November 18,
1970.279 At a hearing on the day before, the Principle Delegate of the
Commission announced to the Court that the Delegates intended to
20
avail themselves, according to Rule 29(1) of the Rules of Court,
of the assistance of Mr. Magude, a member of the Brussels Bar, who
would furnish the Court, under the control and responsibility of the
Delegates, fuller explanation on certain points relating to Articles 7
Justice shall release them if he considers their retention no longer necessary. Vagrants detained in a vagrancy center as De Wilde and Versyp leave it either at the expiration of the
period fixed by the court-between 2 and 7 years-or earlier if the Minister of Justice considers that there is no reason for further detention. Accumulation of release savings or other
means does not suffice for this purpose. 12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 24, 25.
ul Id. at 12, 13.
71 Id. at 4; see a similar move of a Chamber of the Court in the Language Case, text
accompanying notes 142-45 supra.
7 12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 12-14.
" Id. at 13, 14.
=" Id. at 6-10. It is noteworthy that in this judgment Judge Maridakis of Greek nationality
took part, although Greece had denounced the Convention on December 12, 1969, and according to Article 65(1) of the Convention, had ceased to be a Party to it on June 13, 1970. [19691
Y.B. EuR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 78-85 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights); [1970] Y.B. EUR.
CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 4, 26. See note 93 supra. Yet, according to Article 40(6) the Members
of the Court serve until they are replaced and, even after this, they continue to deal with such
cases as they have already under consideration. But see note 290 infra.
12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 6, 7. Rule 29(1) of the Rules of Court reads: "The
Commission shall delegate one or more of its members to take part in the consideration of
the case before the Court. The Delegates may, if they so desire, have the assistance of any
person of their choice." CoLLEcTED TExTs, supra note 78, at 413.
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and 6(3) of the Convention. The Belgian Government objected to
this on the grounds that the Commission ought to be taken as sufficiently informed on the points in question as it had drawn up its
final Report with its findings of fact and that Mr. Magu~e had been
counsel for the three applicants and that, therefore, the application
of Rule 29(1) would defeat Article 44 and the whole spirit of the
Convention under which individuals may not plead before the
Court."8 ' The Court called attention to Rule 37 of the Rules of Court
according to which any person appointed by the Delegates according
to Rule 29(1) may be called upon to speak in the hearings before the
Court;"8 ' it emphasized that Rule 29(1) does not limit the choice of
the Delegates of persons to assist them and therefore does not preclude them from having assistance of the lawyer or former lawyer
of an individual applicant. It referred to its judgment of April 7,
1961, in the Lawless Case where it held that the Commission may
ask the applicant to nominate a person to be available to the Commission's Delegates but that it did not follow from this that such a
person has any locus standi in judicio;m it renewed its statements
in the judgment of November 14, 1960, in the Lawless Case that the
role of such a person is to assist the Delegates of the Commission
whose main function is to assist the Court and that, in any event,
it is for the Court whose President directs the hearings to insure that
the Convention is respected; it underlined that the person assisting
the Delegates must only present to the Court explanations on points
indicated to him by the Delegates subject to the Delegates' control
and responsiblity that any situation inconsistent with Article 44 of
the Convention be avoided.28
The Court took notice of the intention of the Delegates of the
Commission to entrust Mr. Magu~e with the task of assisting them
"1 12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 287, at 7. For the text of Article 44, see text accompanying
note 100 supra.
2n 12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 287, at 7. Rule 37 of the Rules of Court reads: "The
President of the Chamber shall direct the hearings. He shall prescribe the order in which the
agents or advisors of the Parties and the Delegates of the the Commission as well as any other
person appointed by them in accordance with Rule 29(1) shall be called upon to speak."
CoLLEcT TEXTS, supra note 78, at 416. In proceedings before the plenary court the President
of the Court takes over the tasks of the President of the Chamber according to Rule 48(3)
which reads: "Any provisions governing the Chambers shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the
proceedings of the plenary Court." Id.-at 420.
12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 7.
"u Id. 7-8; see also note 102 supra.
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at the hearing of November 18, 1970, and decided to proceed with
the examination of the merits of the case. 8 5
Judge Rolin of Belgian nationality sitting ex officio86 filed a concurring opinion in which he expressed that Mr. Magu~e could not
address the Court "in the name of the Commission" as one Delegate
of the Commission appeared to have suggested and that to hear Mr.
Magu~e can be justified only if he confines himself to those new
points raised before the Court on which the Commission considered
that it was not sufficiently informed previously and with which
therefore it could not deal in its Report. 8 '
A dissenting opinion was filed by Judge Favre. He declared that
Rule 29 of the Rules of Court must be interpreted in the light of
Article 44 of the Convention according to which only the High Contracting Parties and the Commission can bring a case before the
Court; that the Commission's task is to defend that public interest
and that therefore it cannot be represented, even in part, by the
applicant's lawyer who acts on his behalf and cannot speak at the
Court's hearing on behalf of the Commission or in order to submit
an opinion different from that of the Commission. Judge Favre
thought that the person named by the Commission could be heard
by the Court only under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court and that in
such a case the Court would say on what facts it desired explanations. He considered the Court's judgment as incompatible with
Article 44.288
The Court's judgment which follows the trend of its judgments of
November 14, 1960 and April 7, 1961, in the Lawless Case appears
more satisfactory than the minority opinion. It tries to open the way
as far as possible to an accurate finding of facts and law.""9 As long
as the statements of a person assisting the Delegates of the Commission are received by the Court only as an assistance and not as a
"

Id. at 8.

2 Id. at 13. See Article 43 of the Convention, supra note 25.
a7 12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 9.
Id. at 10. Rule 38(1) of the Rules of Court reads: "The Chamber may, at the request of
a Party or of Delegates of the Commission or proprio motu, decide to hear as a witness or
expert or in any other capacity any person whose evidence or statements seem likely to assist
it in carrying out its task." CoLLEcTED TEXTs, supra note 78, at 416.
2" Under this approach also the suggestion in Judge Rolin's concurring opinion that only
new points could be touched upon by the assisting person seems unjustified. The Commission
could, for example, wish that points on which its own opinion was divided should be cleared
up with the help of the assisting person.
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pleading by a person who cannot be a party to the proceedings, there
seems to be no conflict with Article 44. The Court could and should
rebuke that person as well as the Delegates if that borderline is
overstepped. If Rule 29 were in conflict with Article 44 the same
could well be claimed with regard to Rule 38.
The main judgment in these cases was rendered on June 18,
1971.290 The main facts underlying the judgment are these. The
applicant De Wilde served for more than seven years in the French
Foreign Legion. He drew from French authorities as war disablement and military retirement pension a quarterly sum of 3,217
Belgian Francs (BF) and worked, at least from time to time, as an
agricultural laborer. On April 18, 1966, he reported to the police
station at Charleroi and declared that he could not find work and
had no roof over his head and had no money as the local French
Consulate had refused to give him an advance on his next pension
payment due on May 6. He added that he had never been dealt with
as a vagrant. The deputy superintendent of the police considering
De Wilde as in a state of vagrancy put him at the disposal of the
local public prosecutor and held him. De Wilde made an attempt
to escape but was captured immediately. He disputed the right of
I" Even before rendering the Judgement of November 18, 1970, as to the procedure, the
Court adopted on September 29, 1970, the following resolution:
The Court,
Having regard to Articles 38 and 39 of the Convention and Article 7 of the Statute
of the Council of Europe; Finds that, as the withdrawal of Greece from the Council
of Europe becomes effective on December 31, 1970, the office for which Mr. Maridakis was elected by the Consultative Assembly on the nomination by the Greek
Government cannot continue to operate beyond that date.
The Court considers that if the De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp Cases which are
pending before the plenary Court have not been concluded by December 31, 1970,
Mr. Maridakis cannot continue to deal with them.
[19701 Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 42 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). Judge Maridakis did not participate in the judgment of June 18, 1971. 12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note
273, at 12. While the Judges need not be nationals of a Party to the Convention (see, notes
93, 279 supra), the Court now interpreted Articles 38, 39 of the Convention as demanding that
all of its Judges be nationals of the Members of the Council of Europe. Though these articles
do not say so expressis verbis this is clearly in the spirit of these provisions. This result is
reinforced by the provision of Article 60 according to which the Convention is open for
signature only to the Members of the Council of Europe. See note 279 supra. It should be
noted that Greece after rejoining the Council of Europe in 1974 again ratified the Convention
and Protocols 1, 2, 3, 5 with effect as from November 28, 1974. [1974] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON
HuMAN RIGHTS 2 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights); [1975] Y.B. EUR. CONv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS
2. In the same year also France and Switzerland, for the first time, joined the Convention.
[1974] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2-9.
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the police to keep him under arrest for 24 hours. An information
note solicited by the police indicated that De Wilde had had between 1951 and 1965, 13 convictions by courts of summary jurisdiction or police courts and that contrary to his allegations, he had
been placed at the Government's disposal five times as a vagrant.
On April 19, 1966, the local police court decided at a public hearing
and after giving De Wilde an opportunity to reply that vagrancy was
established and according to Section 13 of the Act of November 27,
1891 "for the suppression of vagrancy and begging" (hereinafter
referred to as the 1891 Act) placed him at the disposal of the Government to be detained in a vagrancy center for 2 years and directed
the public prosecutor to execute the order. He was interned in
various institutions, and he was sentenced on August 19, 1966, to.3
months imprisonment for theft from a dwelling house. On May 3,
1966, De Wilde wrote the Commission and on June 17, 1966, he
lodged an application with it invoking Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention. He complained of his "arbitrary detention" in the absence
of any offense of his part, without any conviction and in spite of his
having financial resources. He also protested against "slavery" and
"servitude" which, in his opinion, resulted from his being obliged
to work for absurdly low wages and under pain of disciplinary action. On May 31 and June 6, 1966, he wrote the Minister of Justice
invoking Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention. He mentioned that on
May 6 he had received 3,217 BF as pension and wondered why he
had not been released; he complained about low wages and about
some disciplinary action taken against him. He complained again
on June 13 and July 12, 1966. On July 15, the Ministry notified him
that his release before expiration of the prescribed period could be
considered if his conduct at work was satisfactory and adequate
arrangements for rehabilitation had been made. In a further letter
of August 8, 1966, De Wilde argued that he had sufficient money
from his pension and earnings of more than 4,000 BF and that his
detention made rehabilitation impossible; his request was denied by
the Ministry on August 12. On August 13, De Wilde announced to
the Minister that he could find board, lodging, and work on a farm.
On October 25 and 26 the Ministry decided that upon serving the
sentence of August 19, De Wilde could be released once his rehabilitation seemed insured by the Social Rehabilitation Office of Charleroi (section 15 of the 1891 Act). De Wilde was released on November
16, 1966; his detention lasted slightly under 7 months of which 3
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months were spent serving the prison sentence. The Commission
declared the application admissible on April 7, 1967, after having
29
ordered the joinder of the case with those of Ooms and Versyp. '
The applicant Ooms reported on December 21, 1966, to the deputy superintendant of police at Namur in order to be treated as
vagrant unless one of the social services could find him employment
with board and lodging while waiting for regular work. He explained
that he had lost his job and could not find another one, that he had
no means for subsistance and that he had been "convicted" in 1959
for vagrancy by a police court. On the same day the police court at
Namur satisfied itself of his vagrancy at a public hearing, after
giving Ooms an opportunity to reply, and had him detained according to Section 16 of the 1891 Act in an assistance home. On April
12, 1966, Ooms petitioned the Minister of Justice for his release
alleging that he suffered from tuberculosis and that his family had
agreed to take him with them and to place him in a sanitarium. On
May 5, the Minister after receiving unfavorable opinions from the
physician and the director of the institution in which Ooms was
detained considered the request premature. In a further petition of
June 6, directed to the Prime Minister, Ooms repeated his request,
adding that he had been ill since his detention and for this reason
was unable to earn the 2,000 BF needed as release savings. The
Ministry of Justice to which the petition was transferred declared
it again premature on June 14. On the following day Ooms supplemented an original application to the Commission of May 20 in
which he made the same statements as in his petitions of April 12
and June 6, adding that it would take him at least a year to earn
the release savings of 2,000 BF at the hourly pay of 1.75 BF. In the
supplemental application to the Commission he stated that at present he was cured from his disease caused by ill treatment and undernourishment but still could not perform heavy work. He considered
himself entitled to release and invoked Article 6(3)(b) and (c) of
the Convention, complaining also that he had asked in vain for free
legal aid, a fact contested before the Court by the Belgian Government's Agent. On July 1, Ooms sent a declaration by the welfare
department of the Salvation Army in Brussels to the director of the
welfare settlement at Wortel, which stated that on his release he
would be given work and lodging in their establishment but this had
"' 12 Vagrancy Case, supra note 273, at 15-17.
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no result. Upon receiving a letter from Ooms' mother, confirming
her son's declarations in his letter of July 15 to this director, the
director asked her on July 22 to produce a certificate of employment for her son, showing that at the time of his release he would
have a resting place and a definite job insuring his upkeep. Ooms'
mother also asked the Minister of Justice on July 16 for a "pardon"
for her son. On August 3, the Ministry informed her that her son
would be freed when he had earned through prison work the sum
required in the regulations as release savings of vagrants interned
for an indefinite period at the disposal of the Government. On August 31, the director of the Wortel settlement reported to the Ministry of Justice that Ooms had received several criminal convictions,
that this was his fourth detention for vagrancy, that his conduct was
not exemplary, that he had earned only 400 BF and that according
to a medical certificate a physical examination had not revealed
anything wrong. Thereupon the Ministry let Ooms know that his
complaints had been found to be groundless. Once more, on September 26, Ooms petitioned the Prime Minister. He complained
about the negative attitude of the Department of Justice and stated
that he considered himself a victim of "monstrous injustices" which
he attributed to his being a Walloon. He alleged mistreatment that
had caused pneumonia and tuberculosis for which he had to spend
3 months in the sanitarium of one of the institutions. He stated that
he was ready to take action, if necessary, before a "national authority" in the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. The letter was
transmitted to the Department of Justice. Ooms was released on
December 21, 1967, exactly 1 year after being taken into detention.
On February 11, 1967, the Commission declared some parts of
Ooms' application inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded, but on
April 7, 1967, declared the remaining part admissible after having
ordered its joinder with the applications of De Wilde and Versyp.9 2
On November 3, 1965, the applicant Versyp presented to the deputy superintendent of police at Brussels a letter from the Social
Rehabilitation Office requesting that he be given a night's shelter.
He stated that he had no fixed abode, no work, no resources and
asked to be sent to a welfare settlement, admitting that he had been
there previously and did not wish any other solution. After spending
the night in the municipal jail he was put at the disposal of the
"I Id. at 17-20.
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public prosecutor's office. The Social Rehabilitation Office had expressed no objection to this as Versyp was well known to it and
attempts to rehabilitate him had failed due to his apathy, idleness
and weakness for drink. The police court in Brussels confirmed his
vagrancy at a public hearing and after giving Versyp an opportunity
to reply, placed him at the disposal of the Government, according
to section 13 of the 1891 Act, to be detained in a vagrancy center
for 2 years. On February 7, 1966, he petitioned the Minister of
Justice to be transferred to the solitary confinement division at
another place. The visiting inspector general granted his request on
the next day. On May 10, he requested his transfer to a prison near
Brussels where the Head of the Social Rehabilitation Service could
get him outside work. He complained that living with the other
vagrants had shattered his morale and twice caused his hospitalization, and he promised to work better outside. A report by the institution indicated that Versyp had nine criminal convictions and four
detentions for vagrancy, that he had spent the greater part of his
detention in solitary confinement and could not adapt himself to
communal life. His transfer to solitary confinement, at his request,
was recommended and carried out.
On August 16, 1966, Versyp lodged an application with the Commission and supplemented it on September 6. He invoked Articles
4, 5 and 6(3)(c) of the Convention. He complained of his detention
though he had a fixed abode near Brussels and had never begged.
He alleged that he had no chance to defend himself before the
Brussels police court on November 4, 1965, as the hearing had lasted
scarcely two minutes and he had not been granted free legal aid. He
also complained that to prevent him from accumulating the 2,000
BF required as release savings, he had been left for several months
without sufficient work; that the directors of the various institutions
cooperated in prolonging the detention of vagrants as much as possible as did the Government, a fact which provided it with a labor
force almost without cost (1.75 BF hourly wage); that his numerous
letters to the competent authorities were returned to the director of
the institution concerned who filed them away without further action and that one, directed to the Minister of Justice by registered
mail, had been opened by the director and held back.
In a further petition of August 19, 1966 to the Minister of Justice,
Versyp asked to be granted a chance for rehabilitation in society
through the help of the Brussels Social Service. He was informed
that his case would be examined when his release savings proved
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that he was capable of doing suitable work. Again, he asked for a
transfer to a place where the Social Rehabilitation Service would
find him a suitable job and accomodation. He was informed that the
letter would be filed without action. On August 1, 1967, the institution gave a favorable opinion upon a request by Versyp to be released soon as this would make it easier for him to find a job than
at the regular release time in November. He was released on August
10, 1967, upon a ministerial decision of August 3, based upon section
15 of the 1891 Act. He had been detained 1 year, 9 months and 6
days.29 The Commission declared the application on April 7, 1967,
to be admissible and ordered its joinder with the De Wilder and
Ooms applications.
The Court proceeded to answer three questions: (1) whether it
had jurisdiction to examine the alleged failure to comply with Article 26 either with regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies or
"I Id. at 20-23. Before the Commission the applicants invoked Articles 4, 5(1), 5(3), 5(4),
6(1), 6(3)(b) and (c), 7, 8, and 13 of the Convention. De Wilde and Versyp also invoked Article
3. In its Report of July 19, 1969 the Commission expressed this opinion:
that there was a violation of Article 4 (nine votes to two), 5(4) (nine votes to two)
and 8 (ten votes to one); that there was no violation of Articles 3 (unanimous) and
5(1) (ten votes to one); that Articles 5(3) (unanimous), 6(1) (ten votes to one) 6(3)
(ten votes to one) and 7 (unanimous) were inapplicable; that it was no longer
necessary to consider Article 13 (unanimous).
In a memorandum of the applicants which the Commission appended to its memorial for the
Court, De Wilde and Versyp no longer claimed a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Id.
at 23-27.
Regarding the procedural aspects of the cases the Government requested the the Court to
declare that the applications were not admissible as the applicants had failed to exhaust the
domestic remedies and that, therefore, they should have been rejected by the Commission
under Articles 26 and 27(3) of the Convention. Id. at 27.
The Commission asked the Court:
in the first place: to hold the Government's request inadmissible on the ground that
the Court has no jurisdiction to pronounce on decisions by the Commission concerning the admissibility of applications;
alternatively: to declare the Government's request inadmissible on the ground
that it is debarred from making it since it did not raise the objection of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies before the Commission when the admissibility of the
applications was considered;
in the further alternative: to declare the Government's request ill-founded since,
at the time when the application was lodged with the Commission, there was no
effective remedy in Belgian law against magistrates' decisions in vagrancy cases.
The Government countered by requesting the Court to find that it is competent as to the
admissibility of the applications in cases before it and in particular to verify whether the
applicants had exhausted the domestic remedies and to find the applications inadmissible
since the applicants failed to observe the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention in general
and, in the case of Versyp, also with regard to the six month time-limit. Id. at 28.
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with regard to the six month time-limit; (2) if so, whether the Government was precluded from raising the question of inadmissibility
of the applications; and (3) if the Government is not precluded,
whether its contentions as to inadmissibility were ill-founded.
As to point (1) the Court referred to Article 45 of the Convention
which reads: "The Jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all
cases" (in the French text "toutes les affairs") "concerning the interpretation and application of the present Convention which the
High Contracting Parties or the Commission shall refer to it in
accordance with Article 48;" it recalled its stand in the Language
Case that "the basis of the jurisdiction rationemateriaeof the Court
is established once the case raises a question of the interpretation
or application of the Convention." 29 ' It emphasized the broadness of
the wording of Article 45 ("cases concerning the interpretation and
application of the . . . Convention") and remarked that Article
46(1) confirms the very general meaning of Article 45 by using the
term "all matters" which is even wider than "all cases" used in
Article 45. It concluded from this that once a case is referred to the
Court under observation of the prerequisites of Articles 47 and 48,
the Court is endowed with full jurisdiction and may take cognizance
of all questions of fact and law which may arise in the course of the
consideration of the case. Questions of interpretation and application of Article, 26 raised before the Court must fall within the jurisdiction especially for the reason that exhaustion of domestic remedies delimits the area within which the contracting States have
agreed to answer for wrongs before the organs of the Convention and
that the Court has to ensure the observance of these provisions as
well as of the individual rights guaranteed by the Convention. The
Court emphasized that the rule as to the exhaustion of domestic
remedies is one of the generally accepted principles of international
law to which Article 26 refers expressly. The 6-month rule, the Court
said, results from a special provision in the Convention and constitutes an element of legal stability.
Finally, the Court rejected the idea that its conclusions are invalidated by the power conferred upon the Commission in Article 27 of
the Convention as to the admissibility of applications. The Commission's decision to reject an application as inadmissible are without appeal; those which accept a petition, the Court argued, are
2,

Text accompanying note 151 supra.
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without appeal in the sense that they have the effect of leading the
Commission to perform the functions under Articles 28-31 of the
Convention which open up the possiblity that the case may reach
the Court. In this regard the Court referred back to its judgment of
November 14, 1960, in the Lawless Case in which it recognized the
complete independence of the Commission from the Court.295 This,
however, the Court concluded, does not mean that the Court is
bound by the acceptance of an application by the Commission any
more than it is bound by an opinion of the Commission as to the
merits as expressed in the Commission's final Report rendered
under Article 31 of the Convention.rn Thus, the judgment answered
in the affirmative the question of whether the Court has jurisdiction
to examine the Commission's decision to accept an application as
admissible with regard to the prerequisites of Articles 27(3), 26 of
the Convention. The Court had already come to this conclusion
implicitly in the Matznetter Case.2 97
Judge Zekia, concurring, emphasized that a ruling of the Commission admitting an application does not and ought not to have the
effect of finality of a ruling denying admissibility and thus exclude
its questioning by any authority whatsoever, including the Committee of Ministers and the Court. Otherwise, he concluded, the Court
could be handicapped in the exercise of its jurisdiction and precluded from arriving at conclusions contrary to the way in which the
Commission dealt with any of the prerequisites for admission under
Articles 26 and 27; this could not have been the intention of the
Parties to the Convention, who are, as a rule, especially jealous of
the observance of the prerequisite of exhaustion of municipal remedies, recognized in general by international law. He did not think
that the ruling on admissibility by the Commission was actually an
issue before the Court as its effect, the investigation under Article
31, was fulfilled before the case ever reached the Court.9 5
Judges Ross and Sigurjonsson in their dissent argued that "case"
in Article 45 means the facts found by the Commission in its Report;
that a "case" does not exist until the Commission's Report has been
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers; that if the "case" has
been referred to the Court its jurisdiction consists in interpreting
n'
2
21

Text accompanying
12 Vagrancy Cases,
Text accompanying
12 Vagrancy Cases,

note 96 supra.
supra note 273, at 29, 30, 46.
notes 246-48 supra.
supra note 273, at 61.
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and applying the Convention to all the "matters," i.e., to all the
facts found by the Commission in its Report and in rendering a final
judgment (Article 52) as to whether those facts found by the Commission disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations
under the Convention. According to them a final judgment can only
be one that deals with the merits of the "case," i.e., whether the
facts found by the Commission disclose a violation of the Convention. They considered the admissibility or inadmissibility of an application to be a preliminary (procedural) question left to the power
of the Commission as contrasted with the question of whether the
facts found in the Commission's Report disclose a breach of the
Convention which would be a matter for the jurisdiction of the
Court or, if the case is not brought before the Court, of the Committee of Ministers. They believed that the question of admissibility or
inadmissibility is, as a matter of logic, indivisible. It would be illogical if the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to reject an application but not if it accepted it so that the Court or, if the Court was
not invoked, the Committee of Ministers, could have jurisdiction as
to the preliminary (procedural) question of whether the Commission
rightly or wrongly interpreted and applied Article 27 of the Convention. They then considered Article 29 of the Convention"' and believed that the Commission's power to resume at any time its consideration of admissibility proved that it had sole jurisdiction on
this point and that, unless there is a unanimous decision to reject a
petition formerly accepted, the Court has no jurisdiction to consider
the preliminary question, thus freeing the Court from questions
300
which do not relate to the facts found in the Commission's Report.
Judge Bilge in his dissent discussed first the argument of the
Court regarding the broad meaning of "cases" in Article 45 of the
Convention.30 ' He noted that for the word "affairs" in the French
text uses three different expressions, namely
text, the English
"iquestion,'' 0 "cases,' '303 and "matters.''304 Given such divergencies
2" Article 29 as amended by the Third Protocol to the Convention of May 6, 1963 reads:
"After it has accepted a petition submitted under Article 25, the Commission may nevertheless decide unanimously to reject the petition, if, in the course of its examination, it finds
that the existence of one of the grounds for nonacceptance provided for in Article 27 has been
established. In such a case the decision shall be communicated to the parties." COLLECTED
TExTs, supra note 78, at 36, 9.
"'
12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 49-51.
3" Text accompanying notes 152-62 supra.
32 Convention, supra note 25, art. 32(1).
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one ought to go to the source of the Court's jurisdiction to harmonize
the expressions used. Judge Bilge thought that what is referred
by the Commission as an "affair" (as used in the French text of
Article 32(1)) to the Committee of Ministers or to the Court is the
''question" (as used in the English text) of whether there has or has
not been a violation of the Convention. This meaning of "affair"
seemed to him to be confirmed by the general plan of the Convention that set up in Article 19 two organs, the Commission and the
Court, each with defined powers: competence to decide about the
admissibility in the Commission, jurisdiction to decide as to violations in the Court. The Court's attitude to allow it to supervise the
admissibility causes an enormous waste of time if the Court finds
that Article 26 has not been observed. The rule of exhaustion of
domestic remedies is also not concerned with the internal organization of a given international jurisdictional body. Judge Bilge also
shared the argument of the dissent by Judges Ross and Sigurjonsson
that the question of admissibility and inadmissibility appears indivisible so that a treatment of one differently from the other would
30 5
be illogical.
Judge Wold in his dissent saw in the task of the Commission to
consider admissibillity of applications (exhaustion of domestic remedies, compatibility with the Convention, and not being manifestly
ill-founded) to be one of sifting and screening to prevent a flood of
cases, a task to be handled only by the Commission. While under
Article 19 both the Commission and the Court have the duty to
ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting States, this task, according to Judge Wold, is divided between these two organs. He thought that the question of domestic
remedies is not part of the "case," as this question had already been
finally decided by the Commission exercising a judicial function
against which no appeal lies and that, therefore, the interpretation
and application of Article 26 is outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
The Court, though it can decide about its own jurisdiction, cannot
do so with regard to the jurisdiction of the Commission. Denial and
affirmation of the exhaustion of domestic remedies should be on the
same footing, as both should be considered final judicial decisions.
Id. art. 45.
' Id. art. 46.

30 12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 52-54.
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As the Contracting States must accept negative decisions by the
Commission about exhaustion of domestic remedies, why should
they be allowed to challenge affirmative ones? If the Court can
decide against the admission by the Commission, inequality between the applicant and the State in the proceedings would become
more aggravated. According to Judge Wold the proceedings according to Articles 28-31 show.that the State shall abide by decisions of
admissibility. If after the strenuous work of the Commission either
it or the State exercises its right to refer the case to the Court, the
Court must deal with it and cannot decide that it will not go into
the merits of the case. As the State has ample opportunity to discuss
and plead the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies and to
work toward a reversal of the admission during the consideration of
the Commission, Judge Wold thought it unreasonable to allow the
State to pursue the question further and take it up before the Court.
The term "case" in Article 45 of the Convention should mean the
Report of the Commission on the facts and its opinion as to whether
the facts disclose a breach of the Convention. In other words, the
Court should try only the merits. Judge Wold believed that it is
"generally understood" that the Ministers should not deal with the
question of admissibility; then the Court too should have only the
same competence, namely to deal with the merits only. If the Court
assumes jurisdiction as to admissibility it might well happen that
no final decision on the merits is reached although a majority of the
Commission thought that a grave violation of the Convention had
3 06
occurred.
It is satisfying that the Court has rendered a decision in depth
about the question of whether it has jurisdiction to reexamine the
admissibility of an application under Article 26 either as regards the
exhaustion of domestic remedies or as regards the 6-month time
limit. The reasoning expressed in the judgment and in the concurring opinion of Judge Zekia is more convincing than that of the
dissenters. It should be kept in mind that the Commission is not
conceived in the Convention as a judicial organ. It is therefore logical to apply this concept to both its "opinions" and its "decisions"
on admissibility which are only preliminaries to its opinions. The
denial of an admission means that its mechanism toward forming
an opinion as to the merits of the case will not be started, the
- Id. at 55-58.
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contrary "decision" to admit the application will put this mechanism in motion. Though in the first case this amounts practically
to finality, in the sense that the case will not reach the Court, it is
the Court alone that can make judicial decisions and, because of the
broad wording of Article 45 of the Convention, its jurisdiction to do
so extends to the whole array of subjects covered by the Convention,
including the limitations which the Contracting States have put
upon their subjecting themselves to the international adjudication
provided for in the Convention. Entrusting the Commission with
making the preliminary "decision" of admissibility does not necessarily mean that, if the case reaches the Court, the Court would be
precluded from dealing judicially with the issue. The possibility
that the Commission, under Article 29, may reconsider its previous
admission and, by a unanimous decision, reject it does not prove
that it has sole jurisdiction on this point. The argument of Judge
Wold that as the Contracting States must accept a negative decision
by the Commission, they should not have the right to challenge an
affirmative one, overlooks that, at least as to applications brought
under Article 25 of the Convention (a vast majority of all cases
initiated) no Contracting State is likely to have any interest to fight
a negative decision. On the other hand, circumstances may arise
only after the opinion of the Commission was rendered that could,
in the interest of the applicant, make it mandatory for the Court to
decide upon admissibility, as it happened in this case with regard
to the Versyp application under the viewpoint of failure to observe
the 6-month time limit. 07 Judge Wold's last argument that a reversal by the Court of an admission of an application may happen in a
case where the Commission has found grave violations of the Convention, and thus be detrimental to the cause of human rights, is
impressive. Yet it too cannot wipe out the limitations which the
Contracting States have imposed in the Convention and, under
general international law, to international adjudication. Besides, it
must be kept in mind that the Commission itself may reject a petition as inadmissible even if at that moment of time it is already
convinced that violations of the Convention have occurred.
As to the question whether the Government was estopped from
raising the point of inadmissibility, the Court arrived at unanimous
decisions. As will be seen, it dealt with the issue under three aspects.
- Text accompanying notes 313, 318 infra.
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The Court ruled that it has to take into consideration the problem
of estoppel for procedural reasons; that international and national
law as well as Rule 46(1) of the Rules of Court 38 required that
objections to admissibility should as a general rule be raised in
limite litis; and that though the proceedings before the Commission
and the Court are not identical and usually even the parties are not
the same, objections to jurisdiction and admissibility must on principle be raised before the Commission to the extent that this is
possible. The Court referred back to its attitude in the St6gmiller-WI
and Matznettert0 Cases. It added that states may, under international practice, waive the benefit of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies and in case of waiver may not withdraw it at will after
the case has been referred to the Court. Reviewing the events in the
proceedings before the Commission the Court acknowledged that a
Member of the Commission at a certain point asked the Agent of
the Government about the possibility of challenging before the Conseil d'Etat decisions of magistrates in vagrancy matters and decisions of the Minister of Justice refusing to release a detained vagrant. The Agent of the Government thereupon described the attitude of the Conseil d'Etat that it had no jurisdiction to hear an
appeal in the former situation (Vleminckx judgment of 1951), tat
however at least one case was pending before the Conseil d'Etat
concerning this question (Du Bois case)31 I and that, in his opinion,
the decision of the Minister of Justice could be set aside by the
Conseil d'itat on a pure point of law. However, the Agent of the
Government did not use all this as an argument either to reject the
applications for nonexhaustion of domestic remedies or at least to
adjourn the decision on admissibility. Two months after the Commission admitted the petitions, upon the conclusion that there were
no domestic remedies, the Conseil d'Etat rendered in June 1967 the
Du Bois judgment that allowed an appeal from the magistrate's
order whereupon the Government requested the Commission to reject the petition as inadmissible for nonexhaustion of domestic remedies. Counsel for the applicants objected that at that stage the
3
Rule 46(1) reads: "A preliminary objection must be filed by a Party at the latest before
expiry of the time-limit fixed for the delivery of its first pleading." COLLECTED TEXTS, supra
note 28, at 419.
I" Text accompanying note 226 supra.
310 Text accompanying notes 245, 246 supra.

3" See note 274 supra.
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Government could not dispute the admissibility that had been finally determined by the Commission. The Commission refused the
Government's request in its final Report for the reason that an
applicant need not, under international law as referred to in Article
26 of the Convention, exhaust a remedy if, in view of the existing
case law of the domestic courts, this remedy had no reasonable
chance of success. This was the case before the Du Bois judgment
which therefore was not a new factor justifying the reopening of the
admissibility issue. The Court concluded that under these circumstances the Government was not precluded from raising before it the
objection of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies as regards the
magistrates' orders2 2
Next, the Court took up the Government's alternative submission
that Versyp's application was out of time. It recalled that Versyp
applied to the Commission on August 16, 1966, or more than 6
months after the magistrate's decision against him and that the
Government argued before the Court that if the Court believed that
the magistrate's decision was not at the time subje t to any appeal,
Versyp's application to the Commission should be held inadmissible
as out of time under the last part of Article 26. The Court found that
this submission was never made before the Commission nor in the
written pleadings before the Court but, for the first time, in an
address of November 16, 1970, i.e., more than 3 years after the
Commission's decision to admit the petition and more than 1 year
after the case reached the Court and it concluded therefore that the
Government was precluded from submitting that Versyp's applica313
tion was out of time.

The third aspect of the estoppel issue was the question whether
the Government was estopped from submitting before the Court the
argument of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies as regards the
decisions of the Ministers of Justice rejecting the applicants' release. The applicants argued that their detention by the Minister
violated Article 5(1) of the Convention. The Government replied
th t they could have contested those decisions before the Conseil
d' tat alleging a violation of Article 5 which is directly applicable
in Belgian law. But the Court concluded that as the Government
never relied on Article 26 on this point before the Commission it was
312 12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 30-32.
"

Id. at 32-33.
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precluded from doing so before the Court.3 14
None of the separate opinions of individual judges deals with the
estoppel issue on which the Court's judgment was unanimous.
Judge Zekia, in his concurring opinion, briefly stated that according
to him all domestic remedies had been exhausted as none of the
applicants, throughout the material time, could reasonably anticipate the Du Bois judgment.3 15 The effect of this part of the judgment
was that only the objection of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies
as regards the orders of the three magistrates had to be examined
as to its substance.
To this point the Court recalled that under international law, as
referred to in Article 26 of the Convention, the requirement demands only the use of such remedies as are available to the persons
concerned and are capable of providing redress for their complaints.316 It emphasized that the Government must indicate the
remedies which it considers available and which it thought they
should have exhausted. The Government never contested that these
orders were of an administrative nature and thus not subject to
appeal or proceedings in cassation. It also acknowledged at the first
hearing before the Commission, apparently on the basis of the
Vleminckx judgment of 1951, that the Conseil d'ttat also would not
have allowed an appeal against these orders. After the Du Bois
judgment of June 7, 1967, the Government's Agent admitted before
both the Commission and the Court that the old case law was somewhat unrealistic in the sense that, after the magistrates' orders,
there was actually no further administrative decision but simply an
administrative measure of execution of the magistrates' orders, i.e.,
a purely physical execution.31 7 Though the Minister of Justice could
intervene under the 1891 Act and stop the execution of the detention
orders, he generally did not do so. Yet, the Government's Agent
argued before the Commission and before the Court, that the applicants were not excused from attempting a remedy before the Conseil
d'Etat for the reason that the Du Bois judgment opened a challenge
of the magistrates' orders before the Conseil d' Etat, that the Du
Bois case was already pending before the Conseil d'Etat at the time
when the magistrates' orders of detention against the applicants
Id. at 33.
"'

Id. at 61; see text accompanying notes 317-18 infra.

",

The Court referred back to the St6gmfiller Case, text accompanying note 225 supra.
Text accompanying note 308 supra.

"7
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were issued, and that therefore a possibility of a reversal of the
Vleminckx rule existed at that time.
The Court, however, found that without going into the question
whether a recourse to the Conseil d'tat
could have satisfied the
complaints under the settled case law, recourse to the Conseil
d'Etat was thought to be inadmissible and that the Government
itself had argued this position in the Du Bois case; therefore the
applicants should not be blamed for following this view in 1965 and
1966 which the Government Agent continued to express early in
1967 at the hearings on admissibility before the Commission. The
Court added that at the time of the Du Bois judgment in June 1967
the applicants could no longer benefit from a possible remedy, as
the 60-day, time limit prescribed in Belgian law for invoking the
Conseil d'Etat had expired long before. In conclusion, the Court
rejected the submission of inadmissibility of the complaints concerning the magistrates' detention orders on the ground of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies.31 s
The second part of the judgment dealt with the merits of the case.
It arrived at a holding against the Belgian government that there
had been a breach of Article 5(4) of the Convention in that the
applicants had no remedy (against the decision ordering their detention) open to them before a Court arrives at its decision at the
close of judicial proceedings.3 19 This point is based strictly on the
interpretation of Belgian State procedures, not of procedures before
the Court. Suffice it to say, therefore, that the Court found that
where the decision depriving a person of his liberty is taken by an
administrative body, Article 5(4) requires it to make available to the
person detained a right of recourse to a court, but that there is
nothing to indicate that the same applies when the decision is made
by a court at the close of judicial proceedings. The Court examined
whether the proceedings before the police courts were genuine judicial proceedings; it arrived at a negative answer to this question and
concluded that no judicial remedies were open against the detention. It therefore held against the Government as to this point.
The Court held for the Belgian Government as to all other points,
including the denial of any violation of Article 5(4) as to the rejection of the applicants' request for release addressed to the adminis" 12 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 34-35.
=" Id. at 39-42 and 47; as to point II, id. at 4.
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trative authorities and the denial of any violation of Article 5(1); as
to the last point the Court found neither irregularity nor arbitrariness in the placing of the applicants, as vagrants, at the disposal of
the government nor incompatibility of the resulting detention with
Article 5(1)(e) which restricts the right of liberty of-among other
30
categories-vagrants .
The Court concluded its judgment by reserving, in accordance
with Article 50 of the Convention, the right of the applicants to
apply for just satisfaction on the issue of the breach of Article 5(4) .321
J.

Vagrancy Reparation Cases

On the basis of its holding against the Belgian Government the
Court was called, for the first time, to enter into a proceeding based
upon Article 50 of the Convention. 312 Out of the narration of the
procedure in the Court's judgment of March 10, 1972, the following
points are of interest on this issue. The President of the Court after
consultation with its members directed that the examination of this
aspect of the cases should be conducted by the Judges who had
taken part in the judgment of June 18, 1971, which, in this case,
meant the plenary court.32 3 This procedure appears to be an application of Rule 48(2) of the Rules of Court under which the plenary
court having been seized of the case may retain jurisdiction over the
whole case. The novelty in the proceedings under Article 50 of the
convention probably was what raised "a serious question affecting
the interpretation of the Convention" in the sense of Rule 48(1) of
the Rules of Court. It is also noteworthy that the court apparently
considered the Article 50 phase of the proceeding to be within the
same case as the proceedings regarding the violation of the Conven32 4
tion.
The present proceedings started with letters directed to the Minister of Justice by Mr. Magu6e, the legal counselor of the three
applicants, the first one of June 22, 1971, for Versyp, the second of
3

Id. at 43-44, 37-39, 47; as to point II, id. 5, 2.

311Id. at 47; as to point 11, id. at 13.

14 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 5.
Judge Bilge could, however, not exercise his function as he had been appointed a member of the Turkish Government. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note
78, at 404.
3 14 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 5. This viewpoint was later incorporated into Rule
50(3) of the Rules of Court by amendment of this Rule of November 8, 1972, COLLECTED
TEXTS, supra note 78, at 420, 421, 447.
3
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June 30 for Ooms, the third of August 2 for De Wilde. In them Mr.
Magude asked on the basis of the judgment of the Court of June 18,
1971, for damages of 300 BF per day for "unlawful detention." The
Minister answered on July 12 as to the first two letters that the
Government could only apply the law as it then stood, awaiting the
outcome of a bill on "social misfits" which it had submitted to the
Parliament on June 17, 1971, to replace the 1891 Act. According to
the Government, it had caused the Parliament to pass an interim
act, on August 6, 1971, in order to comply with the Court's judgment, which provided that decisions taken under sections 13 and 16
of the 1891 Act were subject to remedies under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, including appeal, and that vagrants or beggars in detention under Section 13 or 16 of the 1891 Act on the day of entry into
force of this act should have 1 month to avail themselves of the new
remedy. Mr. Magu6e, considering the Minister's reply to be a refusal, informed him that he proposed to bring the matter before the
"competent authorities" and to notify the Commission. He did in
fact write first on July 16 to the Committee of Ministers, alleging
that the Minister of Justice's reply was a violation of the Court's
judgment, and on July 23 to the Commission, referring to Articles
5(5), 48 and 50 of the Convention and requesting the Commission
to bring before the Court the claims of these three clients. On August 12, the Minister acknowledged the receipt of counsel's third
letter of August 2 referring to De Wilde, noting that all three letters
had, by then, been communicated by Mr. Magu6e to the Commission. The principal Delegate of the Commission transmitted on July
27, to the Registrar of the Court the letter of July 23 in which the
applicants' counsel had asked the Commission to request the Court
112
to award his clients damages for "unlawful detention.
The judgment of the Court of March 10, 1972, in this matter was
divided into two parts: I. "As to the admissibility of the applicant's
claim;" and II. "As to the merits of the applicant's claims. ' 32 6 Regarding the admissibility of the applicant's claims, the Belgian Government requested the Court to rule that the applications for compensation lodged with the Commission were not admissible since
domestic remedies had not been exhausted. The Government
argued that Article 26 of the Convention applied not only to the
14 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 4-7.
I" Id. at 7-9.
'2
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original petition lodged with the Commission under Article 25 but
also to a claim made after the Court had held that the case showed
a violation of a right guaranteed by the Convention. The Commission opposed this view. According to the Court, Article 27(3) defines
the condition to which the Commission's dealing with the petition
lodged with it is subjected and therefore relates to the institution
of proceeding under Section III of the Convention. The Court continued that the present cases no longer relate to such proceedings
but relate to the final phase of proceedings brought before the Court
under Section IV at the conclusion of those brought before the Commission; the claims for compensation are not new petitions since
they relate to the reparation to be decided by the Court in respect
to the adjudged violation and have nothing to do with the introduction of proceedings before the Commission under Articles 25-27.
Their transmission by the Commission to the Court without any
accompanying Report is only a technical assistance which the Commission is to lend to the court under Rule 71 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.32 The Court concluded that Article 26 is
not applicable in the present matter.
The Government also used as an argument against admissibility
the text of Article 50 of the Convention. The applicants, not having
exhausted domestic remedies, had not established that the Belgian
internal law "allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences" of the violation found by the Court's judgment and
therefore their claims for damages were inadmissible. The Court
considered the text quoted to be a rule going to the merits but not
one of procedural admissibility of claims for "just satisfaction,"
subordinate to prior exercise of domestic remedies for a lack of
provisions of the type of Articles 26 and 27(3) in connection with
Article 50. It compared Article 50 with similar clauses in other treaties that show no connection with the rule of exhaustion of domestic
remedies. It finally emphasized that if the victim after unsuccessfully exhausting domestic remedies before appealing to the Commission had to do so again before obtaining just satisfaction from
the Court, the total length of the proceedings would lead to a situation incompatible with the aim and object of the Convention. The
Court therefore declared that the claims for damages were admissi328
ble.
COLLECTED TEXTS, supra note 78, at 318.
14 Vagrancy Cases, supra, note 273, at 8, 9, 11.
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The "(a)s to the merits" part of the judgment deserves some
consideration here because, actually, it is partially concerned with
procedural aspects. The Government requested the Court to rule
that the conditions required for the application of Article 50 of the
Convention had not been fulfilled in the present cases and that it
is not necessary to afford satisfaction to the applicants. The Commission asked the Court to grant the applicants appropriate satisfaction, bearing in mind that a new remedy had been introduced
into Belgian law following the Court's judgment and thus indirectly
heeding the applications lodged with the Commission. The Government argued that Belgian domestic law enabled the national courts
to order the State to make reparation for damage caused by a situation illegal under internal or international law for which it is responsible, so that the applicants must approach the national courts and
as they had not done so, their claims were not only inadmissible but
also without foundation.
The Court thought differently. It admitted that treaties, which
the text of Article 50 follows, had in mind those cases where the
nature of the injury would make it possible to wipe out entirely the
consequences of a violation but where the internal law of the State
involved precluded this from being done. The Court thought that,
nevertheless, in recognizing the Court's competence to grant the
injured party a just satisfaction, Article 50 covers also the case
where the very nature of the injury makes impossible a restitutio in
integrum and that common sense suggests that this must be so a
fortiori. It saw no reason why, in the latter case just as in the former,
it should not have the right to award the injured persons the just
satisfaction that they had not obtained from the Government of the
respondent State. This, the Court decided, was the situation in the
present cases; for no legal system, including that of Belgium, can
wipe out the consequences of the fact that the applicants did not
have available the right guaranteed by Article 5(4) to take proceedings before a court in order to have the lawfulness of their detention
decided. Furthermore, the Belgian government had denied the compensation which they claimed. The Court concluded that the mere
facts that the applicants could have brought and could still bring
their claims before a Belgian court does not require the Court to
dismiss the claims as ill-founded any more than to declare them
inadmissible.
The Court examined more closely the situation where the consequences of a violation are only capable of being partially wiped out.
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It stated that the affording of "just satisfaction" under Article 50
requires: (1) that the Court find "a decision or measure taken" by
an authority of a Contracting State to be "in conflict with the obligations arising from the . . . Convention;" (2) that there is an
"injured party;" and (3) that the Court considered it "necessary"
to afford just satisfaction. Upon the Government's pleading that
none of these conditions had been fulfilled in the present cases, the
Court decided that the first two prerequisites were fulfilled, as no
distinction could be made between acts and omissions of a Contracting State and "injured parties" in Article 50 should be equated
with "victim" as used in Article 25. Regarding the third prerequisite
the Court said that the Government correctly questioned the existence of damage. For the claim of 300 BF per day of detention to be
successful it would be necessary to show that the deprivation of
liberty had been caused by the violation of Article 5(4). This was
not the case here as the Court did not find either irregularity or
arbitrariness in the detention that could have resulted in a violation
of Article 5(1)(e). The Court therefore did not see how the taking of
proceedings to test merely the point of lawfulness dealt with in
Article 5(4) could have enabled the applicants to obtain release any
sooner. The Court also denied the presence of any moral damage
that could have resulted from the violation of Article 5(4). Furthermore, it was noted that the applicants had the benefit of free legal
aid before the Commission and later with the Commission's delegates, and had never made any point concerning costs. The Court
therefore found that it had to refuse to grant the compensation
claim and noted that Belgium had taken legislative measures to
correct the violation of Article 5(4) of the Convention. Thus, the
Court in its judgment of March 10, 1972, declared as to the merits
that the applicants' claims for damages were not well founded. 39
Judge Zekia disagreed with the concluding declaration of the
judgment disentitling the applicants to damages altogether. He
agreed that once the Court had decided that there was no violation
of Article 5(1)(e), any claim for damages relating to the detention
and its duration was unjustified and therefore the claims calculated
on the basis of detention-per diem or otherwise-were rightly
rejected. However, that still left the inconvenience caused to the
applicants in their attempt to vindicate their right under a judicial
"I

Id. at 9-11.
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decision in violation of Article 5(4). Their endeavors in this regard
extended from their applications to the Commission filed in 1966 up
to the judgment of the Court of June 1971. They had to incur all
expenses and inconvenience connected with their pursuit before the
Commission and the Court. Instead of knowing from a domestic
judicial authority within a short time from the order of detention
whether they were rightly or Wrongly detained under the magistrates' decisions, they had to go through a cumbersome and very
long procedure before two international bodies. According to Judge
Zekia they would be entitled to be reimbursed for the expenses
connected with this. Even if the Court did not know whether they
incurred such expenses, and if so, to what extent, this could be
easily ascertained through the Registry of the Court. Surely the
Court could be competent to award costs if it thought that the
circumstances of the case warranted such costs.- °
Judges Holmbdck, Ross and Wold concurred in their joint separate opinion but disagreed as to the interpretation of Article 50.
They recalled the fact that Article 50 was modeled on clauses in
various arbitration treaties which were meant to deal with the situation in which a State, though willing to fulfill its international obligations, is unable to do so without changing its Constitution, and
therefore conferred on the arbitral tribunal the power to transform
this obligation into an obligation to pay the injured party an equitable satisfaction of another type. These Judges, assuming that Article 50 served the same purpose and should be interpreted accordingly, concluded that on this basis the Article does not apply to the
present cases according to its wording, but rather only applies under
the condition that the internal law of the Party that had violated
the Convention "allows only partial reparation to be made." As to
this point these Judges thought that the applicants have afforded
no proof that Belgian law does not allow full reparation to be made,
contrary to the statements of the Belgian Agent. They recalled the
reasoning of the judgment that though the wording of Article 50
covers only the situation where full reparation is made impossible
through the internal law, common sense suggests that the Article a
fortiori must apply also where the impossibility of the restitutio in
integrum results from the very nature of the injury. They disagreed
with this argument for the reason that it presupposes an absolute
14 Vagrancy Cases, supra note 273, at 21, 22.
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obligation of the State to restore to the applicants the liberty of
which they have been deprived, which cannot be done because of
the maxim impossibilium nulla est obligatio. They admitted that
the Court would award just satisfaction in both cases, the one where
the nature of the injury would make it possible to wipe out the
consequences of a violation and the other where the nature of the
violation makes restitutio in integrum impossible. But, according to
them, the competence of the Court depends in both cases on the fact
that internal law does not allow full reparation. As the consequences
of a violation can never be wiped out entirely, they considered this
criterion as alien to Article 50 and objected to the Court in fact
assuming jurisdiction in respect to claims for reparation in all cases
where full restitutio is impossible regardless of the status of the
internal law. Their viewpoint, the Judges said, was in harmony with
Articles 5(5) and 13, both of which direct the injured party to seek
redress in the courts of the State. It would be incongruous if Article
50 instituted a concurrent means of redress by direct application to
the Court. The Judges concluded that the general idea of the Convention, as results also from Articles 53 and 54, is that the Contracting Parties are expected to fulfill their obligations, and therefore,
that an injured party must seek redress before the national courts.
The one exception would be where a national law prevents the State
from making full reparation. In that case Article 50 confers upon the
Court the power to afford just satisfaction. For these reasons they
held that Article 50 did not apply in the present cases, from which
it resulted that the Court lacks jurisdiction to deal with the applicants' claims. 3 '
Judge Verdross in his separate concurring opinion added some
general remarks about the interpretation of Article 50. From its text
he concluded that the Court, before making a decision on just satisfaction, must inquire whether the injured person can obtain adequate satisfaction under the internal law of the State concerned. If
this question is answered in the affirmative, then according to the
spirit and general system of the Convention, the Court must allow
the State to grant adequate compensation under its own procedure
while retaining its jurisdiction to see that the satisfaction is provided in an adequate manner and within a reasonable time to be
fixed by the Court. For the Court to give the State a chance to afford
' Id. at 13-15.
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just satisfaction through its own courts first is especially important
at the initial stage of the application of Article 50, as its interpretation by the Court will determine the legislative measures which the
3
States will have to take to comply with the Court's interpretation. 1
Judge Mosler in his separate concurring opinion wished to explain
his own interpretation of Article 50. He first remarked that the
Court rightly rejected the Government's claim that the applicant
should first apply to the internal courts. He said that the Court did
not state whether it concluded this merely from the twofold fact that
in the present cases restitutio in integrum was impossible and that
no pecuniary loss or moral damage could be found or whether it
considered generally that Article 50 in referring to the internal law
covers only the cases in which restitutioin integrum is possible and'
those where it is excluded by the very nature of the violation. This,
he said, leaves it uncertain whether the Court should consider internal law in situations where neither of these two last hypotheses
applies. The Judge explained his interpretaton of Article 50 as follows:
(1) Article 50 is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in all
cases-including those under Article 5(4), where just satisfaction
is claimed by an applicant whose case has lead to a decision by the
Court finding that the State in question has violated the Convention.
(2) In all of these last described cases the Court must inquire
whether the internal law allows reparation for the consequences of
the violating decisions or measure.
(3) By implication from Article 50 it follows that the duty
under Article 53 to abide by the decision of the Court includes a
duty to make reparation for all the consequences of the violation.
Beyond putting an end to the violation the duty extends to making
good the damage suffered by the applicants. Though this duty
derives from international law it was necessary to confer expressly
upon the court jurisdiction to grant satisfaction since, the applicant not being a party before the Court, the object of these proceedings is not the damage suffered by him but the violation of the
convention alleged against the respondent State. Therefore, the
effects of the judgment relate only to the finding of a violation, not
to the consequences which the violation has caused to the person
concerned. This made it necessary to confer upon the Court addi31 Id. at 16.
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tional jurisdiction to afford, in special circumstances, just satisfaction.
(4) In applying Article 50 the Court must first determine exactly what the consequences of the violation are as from the answer
to this question will depend the measures to be taken to assure as
complete a reparation as possible.
(5) These measures will vary according to the nature of the
damages:
(a) If restitutio in integrum is possible the state has to
bring it about. For example, unlawfully expropriated property must be restored. The Court has neither jurisdiction
nor practical means to do this. Yet if internal law allows
only a partial restitutio the Court must assess the effectiveness of the internal law and afford just satisfaction for
what is not covered by the State reparation.
(b) If any restitutio in integrum is impossible because of
the nature of the injury that excludes a retroactive removal
of its effect there still may be other consequences of a
nature that makes reparation possible, like loss of an employment opportunity or lawyers' fees or a case where equity calls for compensation for moral damage. Thus, if in
vagrants cases the primary consequences cannot be made
good either by internal law or by the Court, the national
legislature or administration can still provide for reparation for secondary consequences. As to them the Court has
jurisdiction no matter whether the internal law allows or
does not allow or only partially allows reparation. Whatever is the interpretation of arbitration treaties that have
served as a model for Article 50 the special wording of this
Article and the special nature of the Convention which is
designed to protect the individual [the judge referred here
mutatis mutandis to the language interpretations in the
Wemhoff judgment33 ] extends the Court's jurisdictions to
every kind of damage, not only to cases invoking restitutio
in integrum or to those involving compensation for an irreversible act causing damage.
(c) The result is the same if the injury can only be made
good by pecuniary compensation, for example where an
unlawfully requisitioned object is destroyed or lost.
(6) Under Article 50 the Court in considering what satisfaction
is just shall take into account the existing internal remedies, i.e.,
3

Text accompanying note 177 supra.
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whether internal law allows total, partial or no reparation, and if
necessary the Court can afford such satisfaction as it considers fair.
If national law were not to be considered with regard to all the
other consequences of the injury the substantive right to damages
and the implementation of this right would not affect the Court's
deliberations. The State would lose the option to comply by its own
means with the Court's judgment and be discouraged from adopting into the internal law provisions ensuring such satisfaction.
(7) This does not imply that the Court should require an applicant to exhaust domestic remedies. Rightly the judgment exluded
such a new procedural hurdle resembling that in Article 26. Still
the Court cannot decide until the applicant has attempted to obtain using the means available under internal law to obtain satisfaction from the national authorities. The Court has jurisdiction
to assure itself that this can be done within a reasonable time and
with fair results. If difficulties are encountered the Court can, considering the long proceedings before the Commission and then before the Court, grant suitable compensation without having to wait
for the completion of national proceedings. It may lay down time
limits after the expiration of which it will decide on the satisfaction.
(8) In the present cases the placing in detention was lawful
(Article 5(1)(e)). The primary injury was not the detention as such
but the absence of any right to take proceedings before a "court"
as defined in the judgment. The new Belgian Act establishing a
remedy could not put this matter right retroactively. The violation
rather is of a nature as to make restitutio in integrum impossible.
Though conceivably secondary consequences to be made good
might exist, the Court inquired about this but found none.334
As this is the first case in which the interpretation of Article 50
was before the Court every phase of the judgment is an important
precedent.3 1 It should be observed that in both parts of its judgment-admissibility and merits-the Court strictly followed the
"1 14 Vagrancy

Cases, supra note 273, at 17-20.
In the judgment to the merits in the Language Case of July 23, 1968, discussed briefly
in text accompanying notes 163-65 supra, and in the St6gmfiller judgment of November 10,
1969, text accompanying note 227 supra, the Court reserved for the applicants the right to
apply for just satisfaction should the occasion arrive. But apparently no reparation proceedings have been initiated before the Court in these two cases. In the Neumeister Case (text
accompanying note 202 supra), the Court found a violation but did not expressly reserve the
right to apply for just satisfaction. A reparation judgment in that case was rendered only on
May 7, 1974, long after those in the Vagrancy and Ringeisen Cases (text accompanying note
211 supra and 421 infra.
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principle that only the States Parties to the Convention and the
Commission can be Parties before the Court in spite of the wording
of the Judgment of June 18, 1971, that the Court "[r]eserves for
the applicant the right should the occasion arise, to apply for just
satisfaction" on the issue of a breach of Article 5(4) of the Convention.3 36 The "just satisfaction" proceedings were established by a
request of counsel of the applicants directed to the Commission to
bring the claims before the Court 33 and the Court, implicitly, approved of this way of handling the matter. The unanimous decision
as to admissibility of the claim based upon the rejection of the idea
that Articles 26 and 27(3) should be applicable in the proceedings
before the Court appears convincing. Rightly the Court considered
the words "and if internal law of said Party allows only partial
reparation. . ." to be a rule going to the merits and in interpreting
the spirit of the Convention abhorred the idea of duplicating the
38
necessity of exhausting domestic remedies.
K.

Ringeisen Case

The Ringeisen Case331 originated in an application by Michael
Ringeisen, an Austrian citizen, lodged with the Commission on July
3, 1965.340 In it he complained about violations by the Republic of
Austria of Articles 5, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention and of
Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the First Protocol with reference to criminal
procedures brought against him and to administrative and civil
cases which he had brought before the Austrian authorities.3 4 ' The
Commission, in a lengthy decision of July 18, 1968,342 while rejecting
the rest of the claims, declared admissible the allegations in respect
to Articles 5(3) and 6(1), of the Convention, regarding the length of
applicant's detention on remand and the length of the criminal
proceedings against him, and allegations as to Article 6(1) regarding

3"Text accompanying note 321

supra.
3" Text accompanying note 325 supra.
u" Text accompanying note 328 supra.
331 Ringeisen Cases, [1971] 12 Eur. Ct. Human Rights, reprinted in [1971] Y.B. EU.
CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 838-67 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights); [1972] 13 Eur. Ct. Human
Rights, reprinted in [1972] Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 678-93 [hereinafter cited as
Ringeisen Case]. See as to the decision of the Commission as to admissibility, [1968] Y.B.
EUR. CONV. ON HuMAN RIGHTS 268-321.
34

Ringeisen Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 4.

",1Id. at 34.
3,2

Ringeisen Case, [1968] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 268-321.
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noncriminal proceedings. After failure to reach a friendly settlement
the Commission adopted its Report according to Article 31 of the
Convention, which was transmitted to the Committee of Ministers
on April 29, 1970. 313 The case was referred by the Commission to the
Court on July 24, 1970.
During the years 1958 to 1963 Ringeisen was an insurance agent
in Linz, Austria; he also negotiated loans and dealt in real estate.
In May and November 1961, Ringeisen obtained general powers of
attorney from a Mr. and Mrs. Roth in consideration of a loan made
by Ringeisen to them that enabled him to act in their name in
dividing, selling, leasing and encumbering land owned by them in
upper Austria. Ringeisen also was given an option to purchase the
land. On February 6, 1962, Ringeisen made a contract with the
Roths to purchase the land for 400,000 Austrian Schillings (AS). On
March 30, 1962, the contract was submitted to the local District
Real Property Transactions Commission for approval. The Upper
Austrian Real Property Transactions Act subjects to approval by
the District Commission every transfer of ownership in respect to
land wholly or partly used for agriculture or forestry. For such an
approval, the Act establishes requirements which encourage the
maintenance of the above mentioned uses of the land. Also, among
other cases where the requirements are not fulfilled, the Act lists
those where there is a reason to fear that the purpose of the purchaser is to resell the land as a whole or in lots for profit. Refusal of
the approval renders the transaction null and void. The District
Commission refused on September 28, 1962, to approve the RothRingeisen sale contract citing circumstances that clearly revealed
the picture of land speculation. Yet even from January 1962 and up
to April 1963 Ringeisen sold parts of the land in building sites; he
obtained an expert opinion from the Provincial Planning Office, on
the basis of which he had the land surveyed and marked out, and
he obtained the permission by the local District Administration to
build on the property. Yet the actions of these two bodies were
expressly given subject to the decision of the District Commission.
At first, the contracts between Ringeisen and his buyers stated that
the District Commission's approval was necessary to implement
them, but Ringeisen informed his purchasers that this was a mere
formality and that under the building permits they could start
"' Ringeisen Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 34.

GA. J.

INT'L & COMP.

L.

[Vol. 7:315

building at once.
Ringeisen appealed from the District Comission's refusal to
approve the Roth-Ringeisen contract to the Regional Real Property
Transaction Commission. The law regarding the Regional Commission assures the independence of its members from interference by
the administration and provides that the Commission shall consist
of eight members, including a judge appointed by the Provincial
Government as president, and seven other persons to be appointed
by various governmental agencies. Among these members are two
representing the interests of "townspeople and residents in housing
estates" and another two apparently representing the rural interests
as they are appointed by the Chamber of Agriculture for Upper
Austria, and so forth. On May 13, 1963, the Regional Commission
dismissed Ringeisen's appeal, fearing that he would withdraw land
from agricultural use on a large scale without adequate reason and
that he intended to make a speculative investment.
From this decision Ringeisen made an appeal on July 5, 1963, to
the Constitutional Court. He alleged among other things that at the
meeting on May 13, 1963, two members took part and voted who
had not been present at one or both of the previous meetings at
which the Regional Commission had examined the appeal. On June
20, 1964, the Constitutional Court decided that under its own precedents dealing with the questions of proper legal composition of a
Board, there was a violation of the right to have proceedings held
before a judge established by law. It accordingly set aside the decision of the Regional Commission.
Thus the Regional Commission had to decide again on Ringeisen's appeal from the District Commission's decision of September 28, 1962. At the opening of the proceedings Ringeisen challenged five members of the Regional Commission on the grounds of
bias for various reasons. Ringeisen based his challenge on a section
of the General Administrative Procedure Act under which administrative officials shall refrain from performing their duties in cases
in which they have been or are agents of a party, or when other serious grounds give rise to doubt as to their complete impartiality.
The Regional Commission decided on February 3, 1965, that though
Ringeisen was not entitled to a right of challenge under this act, it
would nevertheless examine his allegations ex officio; his allegations
proved, however to be unfounded. It also rejected his appeal on the
merits finding from a variety of circumstances that Ringeisen's
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plans were incompatible with the principles of the Real Property
Transactions Act.
On April 2, 1965, Ringeisen appealed this decision to the Constitutional Court. Among other grounds he reiterated the bias charges.
The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal on September 27,
1965. The Court did not find it necessary to deal with the bias
challenges for the reason that even if those allegations were correct
and were refused by the Court, Ringeisen was not affected in his
right to be judged by the judge established by law. The Court stated
that a board does not cease to be competent because a biased member takes part in the proceedings, nor does the participation of a
biased member affect the proper composition of a board. 3"
The Commission with which Ringeisen had lodged his application
on July 3, 1965, expressed in its Report under Article 31 of the
Convention, its opinion that Article 6(1) had not been violated in
the proceedings for approval of the contracts of sale because these
proceedings did not involve the determination of "civil rights or
obligations." The Court formulated its task as to this point as follows: "Was Ringeisen the victim of a violation of Article 6, paragraph (1) of the Convention in the proceedings he introduced before
the competent authorities for approval of a transfer of real property
consisting of farmland?"34 5
The Court in its judgment of July 16, 1971, took the following
position.3 41 On the one hand it held that it certainly would be con3'
3

Id. at 6-12.
Id. at 35.

14 The Government raised a plea of inadmissibility of the petition on the ground of Article
26 of the Convention, but the Commission opposed the plea since only the Commission, not
the Court, had jurisdiction to decide about admissibility. Both the Government and the
majority of the Commission contended that Article 6(1) was inapplicable for the reason given
by the Commission in its Report, as mentioned above. The Court proceeded to judge this part
of the case under the following four aspects: (a) whether it has jurisdiction to deal with the
admissibility; (b) if so, whether the complaint was admissible under Article 26; (c) if the
answer to (b) is affirmative, whether Article 6(1) is applicable to the proceedings in question;
and (d) if the answer to (c) is affirmative, whether the complaint is well-founded.
The Court disposed swiftly of point (a) by reference to the judgment of the plenary court
of June 18, 1971, in the Vagrancy Cases and answered the question unanimously in the
affirmative. See text accompanying notes 294-97 supra.
As to point (b) the Government's Representatives observed that Ringeisen's application
with the Commission was lodged on July 3, 1965, i.e., after Ringeisen had made his second
appeal to the Constitutional Court on April 2, 1965, while the Constitutional Court rendered
judgment only on September 27, 1965. From this the Government concluded that at the time
of lodging the application all domestic remedies had not been exhausted and, consequently,
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trary to the spirit of Article 26 to allow a person to lodge an application with the Commission before attempting any domestic remedies. On the other hand, it stated that international courts have
held that international law regarding matters of form cannot be
applied in the same way as is sometimes necessary in the application of national law. Emphasizing that Article 26 refers expressly to
the generally recognized rules of international law, it agreed with
occasional findings of the Commission that there was a need for a
certain flexibility in the application of that Article. It cited as an
example the Commission's admission of the application by Lawless
in his complaint against Ireland. 347 It also observed that the original
the Commission was not competent to deal with the application. The Government relied on
the French text "peut 6tre saisie" of Article 26 which indicated that the the Commission
could not be seized with a case before fulfilling the first condition of Article 26; it saw in the
second condition "within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision
was taken" together with the words "the Commission may only deal," a clear sign that the
article puts a limit on the time within which the Commission may deal with the cases
submitted to it. The Commission's Delegates relied on the English text "the Commission may
only deal with," which is equally authentic with the French text and which, they submitted,
showed that nonexhaustion of domestic remedies did not prevent the lodging of the application, but solely its examination by the Commission. They recalled that the experts of a
drafting subcommittee first translated the French, in which language the article had been
drafted, with the words: "The Commission may only be petitioned after all domestic remedies
have been exhausted," reflecting literally the French text, but they changed the English text
into the present words: "The Commission can only deal with the matter.
... Ringeisen
Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 35-36, 46. They further argued that even without
reference to the English text common sense showed that Article 26 cannot oblige the applicant
to do more than exercise all remedies open to him; he should hardly be bound to wait for the
final disposition of his remedy at the close of a procedure, the length of which he could not
command, before approaching the international organs. Only this interpretation satisfies the
ratio legis of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, i.e., the protection of States against
being held responsible for an international obligation without their own authorities having
been seized in order to remedy the situation where necessary. This, they argued, showed that
no international decision should be given before the final decision of the domestic courts, but
this final decision does not have to precede the lodging of the international application.
Finally, they argued that the 6-month requirement of Article 26 had nothing to do with the
above broad interpretation, but that its only purpose was to fix clearly the time limit beyond
which matters finally decided by domestic courts could no longer be brought before the
Commission. Id. at 36-37.
"I Id. at 37. In Lawless v. The Republic of Ireland, Application No. 332/57, [1957-1959]
Y.B. EUR. Cosv. ON HuMAN RiGHTS 308, 324-26 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights); the Commission admitted Lawless' application which was lodged on November 8, 1957, while Lawless
was still in detention and his case was still under consideration by the Internment Commission. After his release on December 11, 1957, Lawless wrote the Commission on December
16, 1957, amending his claim so as to limit it to compensation and damages while dropping
it as to his demand for release. The Irish Government made the same objection as was made
in the Ringeisen Case. The Commission emphasized that, as an international tribunal, it was
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applications are often followed up by additional documents to clear
up points which are indicated to the applicant by the Commission's
Secretary during his preliminary examination of the application.
Such supplements might contain proof that the applicant has complied with the conditions of Article 26, even if this was done after
lodging the application. Thus, while upholding the duty of the applicant to use the domestic remedies before applying to the Commission, the Court thought that it must be left open to the Commission to accept that the last stage of such remedies may be reached
shortly after judging the application but before the Commission
pronounces itself as to the admissibility. As a great majority of
applications come from laymen without legal assistance the Court
rejected a formalistic attitude. The Court denied that any legitimate interest of the respondent State could have been prejudiced
by the fact that the application was lodged and registered shortly
before the final decision of the Constitutional Court. It rejected as
3
unfounded the submission of inadmissibiliy under Article 26. 11
The question of whether Article 6(1) of the Convention was involved was answered by the Court unanimously in the affirmative.
It found that, although the Regional Commission applied administrative law, its decision was to be decisive for the relations in civil
law between Ringeisen and the Roth couple.Y5
The substantive aspect of whether or not the complaint under
Article 6(1) was well founded refers mainly to procedural questions
of Austrian law. Suffice it to say in this regard that the Court found
not bound to treat questions of form with the same degree of strictness as might be the case
in municipal law; it therefore regarded the letter of December 16 as in substance a resubmission of the application as amended and it rejected the Government's objection. For its more
liberal attitude it cited the Mavromatis Palestine Concessions Case, [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A,
No. 2, at 34. The Permanent Court of International Justice had to interpret Article 26 of the
Palestine Mandate which provided that disputes between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation of the Mandate should be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. That Court saw in the dispute one
between two States within the meaning of Article 26 of the Mandate as Greece had taken up
the claim of her citizen Mavromatis in order to protect him. In this way Greece had in reality
asserted its own rights. As to the treatment of the Lawless Case see notes 88-108 supra.
3
Ringeisen Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 36-38, 46. It recalled the following
dates: April 2, 1965, lodging of the Constitutional appeal; July 3, 1965, lodging of the application with the Commision; Sept. 24, 1965, registration of the application; Sept. 27, 1965,
judgment of the Constitutional Court; May 13, 1966, letter of the applicant informing the
Commission of, and complaining about, this decision; June 2, 1967, partial decision on admissibility; and, July 18, 1968, final decision about this point.
"I Id. at 39, 46.
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that the Regional Commission was an independent tribunal in the
meaning of Article 6(1) and, upon an examination of the claim of
bias against five members of the Regional Commission, that it was
an impartial tribunal. In one point, procedural aspects concerning
the Court itself were involved, namely regarding the question of
whether the Court should have verified, even proprio motu whether
the District and Regional Commission had heard the case and pronounced the judgement in public as required in Article 6(1). The
Court refused this examination because Austria's ratification of the
Convention had made a reservation that Article 6 should be applied
without prejudice to an Austrian constitutional provision which
reads "[h]earings in civil and criminal cases by the trial court shall
be oral and in public. Exceptions may be prescribed by law." The
Court admitted that this reservation does not refer expressly to
administrative proceedings but thought that the reservation covers
a fortiori proceedings before administrative authorities where the
subject matter is the determination of civil rights and where, consequently, such authorities are considered to be a tribunal in the sense
of Article 6(1). In conclusion the Court denied unanimously any
35
violation of that Article.
As the second aspect of the case (criminal proceedings against
Ringeisen) has little connection with the first part (noncriminal
proceedings), it appears adequate to deal here with the separate
opinions as far as they are concerned with the first part. Of the four
separate opinions only two have reference to it. Judges Wold and
Sigurjonsson briefly referred to their dissent in the Vagrancy Cases
as to the Court's jurisdiction in the field of admissibility but felt
obliged to submit to the majority of the Court.3 5' Judge Verdross
(the Austrian Judge sitting ex officio under Article 43 of the Convention) dissented in his separate opinion from the judgment of the
Court as to point (b) regarding the lodging of the application before
the Austrian Constitutional Court had reached its decision.12 He
made the following points: (1) in the case of two equally authentic
texts ("saisie" and "deal with") it is not permissible to select a text
that seems to be most practical, but the interpretation must, in the
sense of Article 33(4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of TreatId. at 39-41, 46.
"I Id. at 48.
311 Text actompanying notes 347-48 supra.
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ies, reconcile the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of
the treaty; (2) to "deal with"-the wider version-covers every act
of an authority in a case brought before it, even the registration of
a case by the Commission, and from this it results that only the
French version can be reconciled with the two texts; (3) as "deal
with" in Article 26 refers to both the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the 6-month time limit, the wider meaning of "concern
itself with an application" would lead to the absurd result that the
Commission could concern itself with an application only within 6
months from the date of the final domestic decision; (4) also, Article
27(3) speaks for the strict interpretation as it indicates that the
Commission must decide about the admissibility ex tunc, i.e.,
whether the application as such fulfilled the conditions of Article 26,
and not ex nunc, i.e., at the time when it begins the examination
of the case. The analysis of general international law by the Commission and the Chamber of the Court is irrelevant because the
reference to it in Article 26 is made within the special rules of that
Article, which must prevail over general international law that is
not jus cogens in regard to exhaustion of domestic remedies; (5) this
interpretation of Article 26 fulfills its purpose as all its provisions
which delimit international jurisdiction aim at protecting the States
from being arraigned on the international level before they are able
to correct a violation possibly committed by an organ of lower
rank-therefore, every provision in this category must be applied
strictly; and (6) though it may perhaps be appropriate to amend
Article 26 in favor of the interpretation by the Chamber, the Commission and the Court must apply the Convention as drafted and
cannot revise it.
It appears unlikely that a discrepancy between "saisie" and "deal
with" can be solved through linguistic acrobatics. Both the Court
and the dissenter want to protect the States' legitimate interest
which the dissenter defines extensively in the way described above
in point (5). Even under this wide interpretation the State seems
not to be prejudiced if, upon an application lodged after putting in
motion the last domestic remedy allowed, no substantive step is
taken by the Commission before the definitive domestic decision is
rendered. The following reflections seem to reinforce the conclusion
that in such circumstances the application should not be rejected
under Articles 26 and 27(3). Suppose that in a criminal case a person had been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment and is held
in detention on remand because he had absconded for a long time
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and is likely to become a fugitive again. He has appealed from the
judgment to the highest court of the land, claiming his innocence.
The total time of his detention on remand approaches the length of
the prison term imposed by the judgment. The highest court of the
state is overloaded with appeals and, according to past experience,
it will take months before this court will handle the appeal. Should
an application based upon Article 5(3) and (4), and lodged after
making the appeal to the highest domestic court but before the
domestic decision is rendered be rejected under Articles 26, 27(3)?
It is submitted that such a rejection would be contrary to the main
purpose of the Convention, the protection of human rights.
An analogous situation appears in the Greek Case which was dealt
with by the Commission and the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe.35 3 There, the Commission stated in its Report:
Where. . .there is a practice of nonobservance of certain Convention provisions, the remedies prescribed will of necessity be sidestepped or rendered inadequate. Thus, if there was an administrative practice of torture or ill-treatment, judicial remedies prescribed would tend to be rendered ineffective by the difficulty of
securing probative evidence, and administrative inquiries would
either not be instituted or, if they were, would be likely to be half354
hearted and incomplete.
The Commission then noted that evidence of an administrative
practice of torture in violation of Article 3 of the convention had, at
the admissions stage, not yet been produced. Yet it held the allegations of the applying Government admissible; it could not find,
regarding the measures taken by the Greek Government with respect to the status and functioning of the courts of law, that the
domestic remedies indicated by that Government were effective and
sufficient. From this it concluded that the allegations under Article
3 could not be rejected for nonexhaustion of domestic remedies
under Article 26. The Committee of Ministers decided that there
was, among others, a violation of Article 3. 315
31 Norway, Sweden, Denmark & the Netherlands v. Greece, Report of the Commission,
Nov. 5, 1969 and Resolution of the Committee of Ministers, April 5, 1970, [1972] [1969]
Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HuMAN RIGHTS (Supplement, The Greek Case)(Eur. Comm. on Human
Rights).
31 Id. at 194.
11 Id. at 23, 512. This topic is dealt with in detail in McGovern, The Local Remedies Rule
and Administrative Practices in the European Convention on Human Rights, 24 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 119 (1975).
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The application lodged with the Commission also should be considered as self-perpetuating up to the moment of its being disposed
of by the decision of the Commission regarding its admissibility.
Then, even if defective under Article 26 at the time of lodging, the
application would be cured as of the time when the last domestic
remedy is exhausted by a decision rendered upon the domestic appeal and before the decision by the Commission. This may be the
underlying thought of both the majority decision when it referred
to additional documents submitted to support the original application, 356 and the Commission's decision about admissibility of the
Lawless application. 57 This point, too, speaks for the correctness of
the majority decision.
Two criminal proceedings were brought against Ringeisen. The
subject of one was acts of fraud and fraudulent conversion while the
other was concerned with fraudulent bankruptcy. Both grew out of
the land transactions described above 358 in which Ringeisen did not
deliver valid title to the lands he sold. They ran separately but at
the same time.
The fraud case started in February 1963.1 9 Ringeisen was held in
detention on remand in the fraud case from August 5 to December
23, 1963, on the ground of danger of further offenses and of danger
of suppression of evidence. His release was granted by the Court of
Appeal, subject to giving a solemn undertaking, for the reasons that
the original grounds for detention had ceased to exist.3 0 The indictment in the fraud case was filed in April 1965. Ringeisen was
accused (I) of having falsely pretended to be an honest real estate
seller and agent with the view to induce (A) 78 persons to make
payments of some 1,400,000 AS, and (B) two other persons, (1)
Widman and (2) Schamberger, to grant loans which were largely not
repaid; (II) of having misused the power of attorney given and later
revoked by the Roth couple, by encumbering their land.36 ' On JanuText accompanying note 348 supra.
= Text accompanying note 348 supra. Because of this curing effect it should not make any
difference that Ringeisen notified the Commission of the final decision of the domestic court
more than 6 months after it was taken (supra note 348), while Lawless' representative informed the Commission of Lawless' release within a few days after that event. Lawless Case,
[1961] 3 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 42.
3" Text accomanying note 344 supra.
' Ringeisen Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 12.
30 Id. at 22-24.
ml Id. at 15.
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ary 14, 1966 he was found guilty on counts IA and IB(1) (Widman)
and acquitted as to the other charges. He was sentenced to 3 years
severe imprisonment. The Court reckoned as part of the sentence
the time spent in custody on remand from August 5 to December
23, 1963, and from March 15, 1965, to January 14, 1966, the latter
period to be explained shortly.32 Upon Ringeisen's and the prosecutor's pleas of nullity and. appeal, the Supreme Court on July 27,
1966, set aside the decision and referred the case back to the Regional Court for rehearing with regard to the conviction under IB(1)
(Widman), the acquittal under I (Roth couple) and the sentence;
the convictions under IA (78 purchasers) and the acquittal as to
IB(2) (Schamberger) were upheld. The Regional Court discontinued, on the prosecutor's application, the cases under IB(1) (Widman) and II (Roth couple) and rendered sentence as to IA (78 purchasers) on October 18, 1966. Since the Court could pronounce a
heavier sentence on the basis of the prosecutor's appeal against the
first judgment, the Court increased the severe imprisonment from
3 to 5 years; it reckoned as part of the sentence also the time spent
in detention on remand from the first to the new judgment of October 18, 1966.33 Considering a new plea of nullity by Ringeisen, the
Supreme Court dismissed the plea on February 15, 1968, but reduced the sentence to 2 years and 9 months severe imprisonment.
On April 24, 1968, the Regional Court supplemented the sentence
by reckoning the entire time spent in detention on remand as part
of it. As will be seen, the detention had ended on March 20, 1967.31
The fraudulent bankruptcy case started in August 1964. While
it was progressing a receiver was appointed in March 1965 over
Ringeisen's property in Linz, and on May 14, 1965, Ringeisen was
adjudged bankrupt. Notice thereof was given, according to law, to
an extensive list of public authorities and was published in the local
official gazette.3 1 In March 1966 an irldictment was filed. Ringeisen
was accused of having intentionally defeated or curtailed the satisfaction of his creditors by concealing assets or alleging a nonexisting
liability. In September 1968 the prosecution announced the withdrawal of the charges of fraudulent bankruptcy, in view of Ringeisen's final conviction and the sentence imposed in the fraud case
312

Id. at 17.
at 18, 19.
Id. at 19, 20, 33, 34.

33 Id.

-

ml Id. at 20, 21.
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on February 15, 1968. The Linz Regional Court thereupon ordered
36
the discontinuance of the prosecution for fraudulent bankruptcy.
Ringeisen was held in detention on remand for two periods. The
first one, in the fraud case, lasted from August 5 to December 23,
1963, as was mentioned above. 317 On March 15, 1965, the prosecution asked the investigating judge in the fraudulent bankruptcy case
for an order of arrest and detention on remand on the basis of danger
of collusion and committing further offenses. The order was granted
and Ringeisen was arrested on the same day. It is noteworthy that
throughout both criminal proceedings Ringeisen made innumerable
requests and appeals not only for his release but also for the transfer
of the proceedings because of the alleged prejudice of local and
regional judges and other officials involved; he also challenged directly or indirectly, through the threat of criminal prosecution,
many of the judges involved in the proceedings. In his various applications or appeals regarding his release from detention on remand,
Ringeisen' emphasized that the danger of committing further offenses of the type involved could no longer exist after he had lost the
power of disposing of any of his assets through adjudication as a
bankrupt.3 8 Nevertheless, the ground of danger of further offenses
was upheld while the other one (danger of collusion) was dropped.6
When filing the indictment in the fraud case in April 1965,170 the
prosecution requested the Regional Court to remand Ringeisen in
custody in that case too, for danger of absconding and committing
further offenses. The court complied with this request on May 12,
1965, giving detailed reasons why the grounds for detention existed
in spite of Ringeisen's former release in the fraud case in December
1963. The Regional Court of Appeal upheld this decision in May
1965. In both criminal cases, further applications for release were
rejected in September 1965. An appeal in the fraudulent bankruptcy
cage was rejected by the Court of Appeal in December 1965, while
no decision was rendered on an appeal in the fraud case.37 After
Ringeisen's conviction in the fraud case on January 14, 1966, the
Regional Court granted an application for release. However, this
3,1
3h

"

Id. at 21, 22.
Text accompanying note 360 supra.
Ringeisen Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 28-32.
Id. at 25, 28.

370 Note
371

361 supra.

Ringeisen Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 26, 27.
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was reversed on the basis of the prosecution's appeal allowed by the
Regional Court of Appeal on March 2, 1966, for the reason that both
grounds for detention, danger of absconding and of further offenses,
were not removed. 3 2 Further applications followed in both cases but
were rejected. In a decision of November 30, 1966, the Court of
Appeal denied a release in the fraudulent bankruptcy case and
noted, solely for the sake of completeness, that Ringeisen would not
gain any substantial advantage by a release in these proceedings,
since he was also provisionally detained in the fraud case. 7 3 Upon a
later application and appeal in the fraud case, the Court of Appeal
decided on March 15, 1967, that Ringeisen should be released on his
giving a solemn undertaking. The Court thought that after 2 and
one-half years in detention, there was no longer any danger of
Ringeisen absconding in order to avoid prosecution, even considering the sentence of October 18, 1966, of 5 years imprisonment. The
danger of further offenses had ceased since several counts of the
indictment had been eliminated and Ringeisen could no longer deal
with the property still involved in the proceedings. Furthermore, the
length of the past detention would deter him from committing further offenses.37 On the basis of this decision, Ringeisen also obtained a favorable decision in the fraudulent bankruptcy case and
was released on March 20, 1967. His second detention on remand
had lasted from March 15, 1965, to March 20, 1967.
The Commission accepted Ringeisen's application with regard to
the criminal proceedings as far as it concerned Article 5(3) of the
Convention in reference to the length of the detention and Article
6(1) in reference to the length of the proceedings in both cases. In
its report according to Article 31 of the Convention, the Commission
stated this opinion: The applicant's detention lasted beyond a reasonable time so that there was a violation of Article 5(3). Neither
in the fraud case nor in the fraudulent bankruptcy case did the
length of the criminal proceedings exceed a reasonable time, so
there was no violation of Article 6(1).1 71
The Court was called upon to decide, as far as the criminal proceedings are concerned, whether Articles 5(3) or 6(1) were vioId. at 29.
Id. at 32.
31, Id. at 33. As to the judgment of October 18, 1966, see note 363 supra.
"s Ringeisen Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 34.
'"
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3
lated7.
It disposed briefly and unanimously of the issue of Article

6(1). It agreed with the opinion of the Commission that the length
of both proceedings resulted from the complexity of the cases and
from the innumerable requests and appeals brought by Ringeisen
for his release, challenging many of the judges involved and seeking
transfer of the proceedings to other courts. It concluded that there
3 7
was no violation of Article 6(1). 1

As to Article 5(3) the Court stated that the detention had lasted
altogether nearly 2 years and 5 months. It admitted that the first
detention in the fraud case (from August 5 to December 23, 1963)
could in itself not be considered because the last unfavorable decision about a release was rendered far more than 6 months before
lodging the application with the Commission on July 3, 1965. Yet,
the Court said, this period of about 4 and one-half months was to
be added to the later periods of detention for judging the reasonableness of the whole period of detention in the fraud case. As to this
point the Court referred to its reasoning in the Neumeister Case.3 8
Because the whole second period of detention (from March 15, 1965
to March 20, 1967) occurred only in the proceedings for fraudulent
bankruptcy, while in the fraud case it lasted for a somewhat shorter
time (from May 12, 1965 to March 15, 1967), the Court first examined the reasonableness of the detention in the fraudulent bankruptcy case. It found the order of arrest of March 15, 1965 in the
latter case somewhat surprising, as the facts involved in it had
already been investigated thoroughly in the fraud case; it found also
that in the fraudulent bankruptcy case no measures of investigation
(except for interrogation of Ringeisen) were taken for 3 years.
Though the arrest was as such justified under Article 5(1)(c) of the
Convention, the Court had to assess the reasonableness of the period
of detention under Article 5(3), which would involve examining the
reasons given by the Austrian courts for the rejection of Ringeisen's
requests for release. Remarking that in the fraudulent bankruptcy
case detention was never based upon danger of absconding, it held
unjustified the danger of collusion as a ground for detention, since
during the time of freedom (up to March 15, 1965) Ringeisen would
have had ample opportunity to influence witnesses; the other
-1 Id. at 34, 35.
31

Id. at 45, 46.

3"

Text accompanying note 204 supra.
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ground, danger of further offenses, the Court rejected as unreasonable from the date of adjudication as bankrupt (May 14, 1965), since
Ringeisen then had lost any power to dispose of assets or to collect
any payment. 37 Accordingly, the Court considered the detention
beyond May 14, 1965, in the fraudulent bankruptcy case unreasonable.
Regarding the causes for the second detention in the fraud case,
danger of absconding and further offenses, the Court thought that
no precise information or facts justifying these causes had been
supplied. Rather it explained the second order of arrest in the fraud
case with the fact that since May 15, 1965, Ringeisen was being held
in the fraudulent bankruptcy case. It considered it as significant
that on one occasion Ringeisen's appeals against decisions denying
his release in both cases had lead to a further (negative) decision
only in the fraudulent bankruptcy case. 3 0 The Court then dealt with
the Government's argument that the detention in the fraud case was
removed from the application of Article 5(3) of the Convention with
Ringeisen's conviction on January 14, 1966, since from then on the
detention became unconditionally subject to Article 5(1)(a). As to
this point, the Government relied on the Court's judgment in the
Wemhoff Case.38' The Commission suggested that Article 5(3)
should remain applicable up to the final conviction, if, as was done
in this case, the respondent State maintained up to this point the
provisional character of the detention (on remand) and subjected it
to the same conditions and afforded to the person detained the same
remedies as before. The Court refused to go into this argument. As
the detention in the fraud case fell entirely within the detention in
the fraudulent bankruptcy case, the Court thought that it could be
explained in fact only by the latter one and that therefore the fraud
conviction on January 14, 1966, signified no change. It observed that
at that time the prosecution objected to Ringeisen's release for the
reason that the release would not help Ringeisen because of the still
existing detention order in the fraudulent bankruptcy case. Also the
Court of Appeal in November 1966 in denying a release in this latter
case stated that Ringeisen would not be benefited by such a release
because he was also detained in the fraud case.3 82 In all this it saw
Ringeisen Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 41-43.
m*Text accompanying note 371 supra.
ul Text accompanying note 177 supra.
312 Text accompanying note 373 supra.
31,
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the interconnecting link which at all times existed between the two
detentions and therefore applied its finding of a violation of Article
5(3) of the Convention in the fraudulent bankruptcy case to the
whole of Ringeisen's detention up to his release on March 20, 1967. M
It found a violation of Article 5(3) for the period from May 14, 1965
(date of adjudication as a bankrupt) to January 14, 1966 (first judgment in the fraud case). Further, there was a violation for the period
from January 14, 1966 (first judgment in the fraud case) to March
20, 1967 (release of Ringeisen). The Court reserved for the applicant
the right, should the occasion arise, to apply for just satisfaction as
regards these violations.
Three dissenting opinions were filed regarding this part of the
judgment. Judge Holmbdck briefly stated that he believed the
Austrian authorities had sufficient reasons to refuse Ringeisen's request for release and therefore saw no violation of Article 5(3).3
Judge Verdross, (the Austrian Judge sitting ex officio) dissented
regarding the violation for the period after the fraud conviction of
January 14, 1966.m He emphasized that the Court of Appeal which
allowed the prosecution's appeal on March 2, 1966, expressly observed that the main reason for upholding the detention was the
danger of absconding enhanced by his conviction for fraud so that
this detention was not just a prolongation of the detention ordered
in the fraudulent bankruptcy case. The same resulted, the Judge
continued, from the Appeal Court's remark in November 1966, that
a release in the fraudulent bankruptcy case would not help Ringeisen because of his being held also in the fraud case in which he
was sentenced to 5 years severe imprisonment in October 1966.
Ringeisen's release, in March 1967 was ordered because the danger
of flight and of further offenses had ceased in the fraud case, while
the detention in the other case was terminated only as a consequence of the release in the fraud case. From this, the Judge concluded that from the first conviction the detention was 'Mainly
maintained by reason of danger of flight in the fraud case and therefore was no longer governed by Article 5(1)(c), but by Article
5(1)(a).
Judge Zekia in his dissent 3le divided the detention period into
these three parts: (1) from August 5, 1963 to December 23, 1963; (2)

"

Ringeisen Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 43-45.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 50-51.
d. at 53-56.
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from March 15, 1965 to January 14, 1966 (date of conviction); (3)
from January 14, 1966 to March 20, 1967 (date of release). He eliminated from consideration under Article 5(3) the third period, since
it did not refer to a detention under Article 5(1)(c). He declined to
assume that a detention ordered under Article 5(1)(c), even if not
expressly revoked, could still be counted for the purpose of Article
5(3) after a conviction. He maintained this view also if an appeal
against the conviction should have a suspensive effect, as the conviction replaced the presumption of innocence (guaranteed by Article 6(2) of the Convention) with a presumption of guilt and brought
the case under Article 5(1)(a). Although he considered that the
detention after the conviction was not one under Article 5(1)(a)
since Ringeisen was then detained only by virtue of the detention
order in the fraudulent bankruptcy case, he placed more importance
on the conviction in the fraud case than on the other proceedings
which may not have been substantiated by evidence and were later
withdrawn. He conceded that the reasons for the post-conviction
detention were not clear, but he claimed that if there was a valid
reason for continuing the detention this was enough to take the case
out of consideration under Article 5(3). He consequently held that
the post-conviction detention could not be added to the other period
in considering a violation under Article 5(3).
The Judge did not think that the first 4 and one-half months
period of detention could establish a violation under Article 5(3)
since it was not unreasonably long for the investigation of a great
number of frauds. The Judge emphasized that the alleged numerous
frauds preceded the fraudulent bankruptcy charges, which were investigated much later. In such circumstances the rearrest and holding in detention for the later group of offenses should be considered
separately even if the later offenses were in some way related to the
earlier ones.
Finally, Judge Zekia examined the second period of detention
which lasted 10 months. He did not find that it constituted a violation under Article 5(3) because multiple alleged offenses had to be
examined and Ringeisen himself, through his constant and unjustified applictions and appeals, had unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings. In conclusion, he denied any violation of Article 5(3).
The case confirms the principle that a period of detention, though
in itself not subject to scrutiny because of the effect of the time limit
under Article 26 of the Convention, is still to be considered under
the viewpoint of reasonableness of the total period of detention. Yet
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its special aspect seems to be the fact that, for a greater part, the
detention took place contemporaneously in two proceedings under
two separate orders of detention. This complication in the procedure
had to be unraveled. In this, each order should have been based
exclusively upon the reasons for detention arising in the respective
proceedings. Therefore, attempts of the Austrian prosecution and
the Court of Appeal to justify one detention on the basis that a
release would be futile because of the still existing order of detention
in the other proceedings are obviously to be condemned. The Court
went in the opposite direction. Somewhat formalistically it considered the whole period beginning in March 15, 1965, as dominated
by the fraudulent bankruptcy order because it was the first in time
to be issued and the last to be lifted. As a matter of substance, the
detention was based, at least from the first conviction on January
14, 1966, mainly on the conviction for fraud and the Court should
perhaps have considered the further detention in this light, i.e.,
under Article 5(1)(a) of the Convention which would have taken it
out of the protection of Article 5(3). After doing this, whether the
period from March 15, 1965, up to the conviction, even in connection
with the first period of 4 and one-half months in 1963, was still
unreasonable, may then appear doubtful.
L.

Ringeisen Reparation Case

On the basis of the pronunciation by the Court that it reserved
for the applicant the right, should be occasion arise, to apply for just
satisfaction as regards the violations, Ringeisen with letter dated
August 18, 1971, asked the Commission to apply to the Court in his
behalf for a decision under Article 50. The Commission transmitted
this letter to the Court on September 27, 1971. The President of the
Court directed that this part of the case should be handled by the
same Chamber that had given the Judgment of July 16, 1971.2 7
Ringeisen's lawyer had requested the Austrian Federal Minister of
Justice to make proposals for the reparation of his loss consisting not
only of the loss of his fortune but also of irreparable damage to his
health. On September 10, 1971, i.e., more than 3 weeks after Ringeisen's application to the Commission, the Minister replied that for
"I Ringeisen Case, [1974] 15 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 4, 5. See text accompanying note
323 supra and Rule 50(3) of the Rules of Court as amended on November 8, 1972, COLLECTED
TExTs, supra note 78, at 421.
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lack of his Ministry's competence under the Austrian Constitution
he could not deal with the matter. In some later letters to the Commission Ringeisen estimated his financial damages as of some
hundred million schillings and asked for further compensation for
personal injury and damage to his reputation in an amount which
he left to the Court to assess.3 8
The Court divided its Judgement into three parts: (I) On the
admissibility of the claim; (II) Fulfillment of the conditions for the
application; and (III) Question of affording just satisfaction. 39 As to
(I), the Government contended that after the Court's final judgment
that (Article 52 of the Convention) the Court could entertain the
claim for compensation only after a new petition was lodged with,
and investigated by, the Commission-and then referred to the Court.
The Court rejected this argument. It noted that if the Government
were right the Court could not deal with the application under Article 50 in its present composition since for each new case a new
Chamber would have to be set up under Article 43, while proper
administration of justice required that the damages should be adjudicated by the judicial body which had found the violation in question. It explained that the finality of the judgment established in
Article 52 has only the meaning that the judgment is not subject to
any appeal to another authority. To maintain that the Court could
apply Article 50 only if it ruled on the damages in the same judgment in which it found a violation or if this judgment expressly kept
the case open would be formalistic and alien to international law.
It declared that the purpose of the reservation was to make it clear
to the applicant that he could, if need be, obtain from the Court the
award of just satisfaction under Article 50. Scrutinizing the procedural steps taken by Ringeisen, the Court found it normal that
having no locus standi before the Court he presented his claims to
the Commission which was duly seized of the case. 9 0
As to II, the Government submitted that the prerequisites of Article 50 were not fulfilled since (1) the Austrian Courts had made full
reparation by reckoning the entire time spent in detention on remand as part of the prison sentence and (2) assuming that this did
not accomplish a restitutio in integrum and that the violation of
Ringeisen Case, [1974] 15 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 6.
' Text accompanying note 326 supra.

Ringeisen Case, [1974] 15 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 7, 8.
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Article 5(3) had caused other damage, several internal remedies
were available.
The Court rejected the first argument for the reason that, though
the deduction of the detention on remand time from the prison
sentence must be taken into consideration, it did not have the effect
of a restitutio in integrum as no freedom was given in place of the
freedom taken away unlawfully. In a situation like the Ringeisen
Case the Government's view would deprive Article 5(3) of much of
its effectiveness. Furthermore, it explained that if Ringeisen had
been released on May 14, 1965, the day of his adjudication as a
bankrupt from which date on his detention was judged by the Court
to be in violation of Article 5(3), and had been rearrested after the
final Austrian judgment to serve the remainder of his sentence, he
would possibly have been released on probation for one-third of the
prison term; this would have reduced his deprivation of liberty to
22 months, while his detention on remand had lasted almost 29
months.
As to the second argument the Court referred to what it had
adjudged in the Vagrancy Cases, namely that Articles 26 and 27(3)
of the Convention requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies are not
applicable to claims under Article 50.11' The Court admitted that
the Government had not invoked Article 26 nor insisted on exhaustion of domestic remedies prior to any consideration by the Court.
It observed that a partial exercise of domestic remedies would only
prevent the Court from speedily affording reparation. It conceded
that in order for the Court to be able to act under Article 50 there
should be a need to do so but saw this need in the refusal by the
Government of the reparation. That Ringeisen had (in vain) applied
to the Austrian Minister of Justice the Court explained with the fact
that an Austrian Act of 1918 indicated this course of action for
92
compensation for detention on remand.1

As to III, Ringeisen made claims of various natures for reparation,
among others for financial loss caused by the detention and for
serious deterioration of his health while in prison. As to most of
these claims the Court felt that Ringeisen had not brought sufficient proof. It concentrated, therefore, on the very fact that the
detention exceeded a reasonable time by more than 22 months. It
Texts accompanying notes 327-28 supra.
"I Ringeisen Case, [1974] 15 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 8, 9.
3"
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saw some compensation of the damage in the fact that the total
time of detention was reckoned as part of the sentence and that in
detention on remand Ringeisen was subjected to a regime less severe than in penal service. Yet it also considered the fact that Ringeisen, protesting his innocence, felt the excessive detention on remand as a great injustice, especially as it made it much more difficult for him to reach a composition in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Assessing the various factors the Court arrived in its judgement of
June 22, 1972 at a just satisfaction in the form of 20,000 German
Marks. 3 Because of the pending bankruptcy the question arose as
to whether payment should go to Ringeisen or to the trustee in
bankruptcy for the benefit of the creditors. The Court declared
that it could leave this point to the discretion of the Austrian authorities. The Court referred to two Austrian statutes dealing with
compensation for detention on remand both of which contain the
provision that "no attachment or seizure may be made against the
right to compensation except to procure payment of maintenance as
provided for by law." It intimated that the same exemption should
be allowed as to a compensation due under a decision of the Court
regarding a violation of Article 5(3) of the Convention. 94
In a "separate declaration," Judges Holmbick and Wold declared
that as to the jurisdiction of the court they referred to their joint
separate opinion to the reparation judgment of March 10, 1972 in
the Vagrancy Cases.395 Judge Holmbick also declared that, after his
dissent from the main judgment of July 16, 1971, in the present case
regarding the presence of a violation of Article 5(3) had been overruled,9 he agreed with the amount of compensation awarded on the
basis of a violation of Article 5(3).
Judge Verdross' declaration referred to his separate opinion to
the main judgment of July 16, 1971, in the Ringeisen case in which
he dissented as to the calculation of the unreasonable time of detention on remand. 397 He also'recalled his separate opinion to the
reparation judgment of March 10, 1972, in the Vagrancy Cases in
which he dissented from the interpretation by the Court of Article
3,' The Court gave no explanation why the payment should be made in German Marks
instead of in Austrian Schillings. See as to this point infra text accompanying note 416.
"9 Ringeisen Case, [1974] 15 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 9-11.
"3 Text accompanying note 331 supra.
I" Text accompanying note 384 supra.
u, Text accompanying note 385 supra.
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50.398 However, citing Rule 48 of the Rules of Court under which, as
he stated it, "a Chamber may not, of its own will decline to follow
an interpretation of the Convention given by the plenary Court or a
Chamber," he felt obliged to take those judgments as a basis for the
present judgment.
Judge Zekia, referring to his separate opinion to the main judgment of July 16, 1971, in this case,"' made a declaration substantially identical with the individual declaration by Judge Holmb~ck.
Because of the references back to the separate opinions in the
Vagrancy Reparation Case, it appears desirable to weigh the
Vagrancy and Ringeisen Reparations judgments together in the
light of the separate opinions to the Vagrancy judgments.4 ®
Judge Zekia's dissent from the Vagrancy Reparationjudgment of
March 10, 1972, referred only to the denial of damages with regard
to the expenses of the proceedings before the Commission and the
Court. 01' The Court appeared sufficiently justified in denying those
damages on the basis of the fact that free legal aid had been ex40 2
tended to the claimants.
Approval has herein been expressed of the Court's rejection in the
Vagrancy Reparationjudgment of the requirement of exhaustion of
domestic remedies in the sense of Articles 26, 27(3) before making
claims under Article 50.'10 In the Ringeisen Reparation Case the
Court had occasion to elaborate on the admissibility of claims under
Article 50. That admissibility was opposed by the Government argument that the finality of the main Judgment under Article 52
required a completely new petition lodged under Article 25 with the
Commission in order to obtain a reparation judgment from the
Court. ' ' The reasons expounded by the Court against this argument
appear convincing.
The separate opinions in the Vagrancy Reparation Cases other
than Judge Zekia's center around the scope of the jurisdiction of the
Court under Article 50. Judge Verdross seems to come closest to
the majority opinion. He seems to agree that this question is to be
answered out of the wording of Article 50 and independently from
IN

Text accompanying note 332 supra.
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329
338
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the scope of other treaties that formed its background and that
Article 50 gives the Court competence to grant, if necessary, just
satisfaction also in cases where, as in the Vagrancy Cases, the nature of the injury makes restitutio in integrum impossible. He recommends an intermediate attitude between the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies in the reparation stage (rightly rejected by the Court) and the somewhat largeminded way of the
majority which sees in the mere refusal of the Government to grant
compensation a sufficient opening for the Court's going into the
merits of the question of compensation. He concludes that the Court
should first give the Government a chance for a domestic judicial
adjudication of compensation before taking up its merits.0 5 His
point seems to be well taken.
Judges Holmbick, Ross and Wold argue that the maxim of impossibilium non est obligatio overcomes the conclusion of the Court
that Article 50 covers the situation where the very nature of the
injury results in the impossibility of restitutio in integrum. This is
not convincing. Article 50, it seems, has the very purpose of creating
a substitute for the nonexistent obligation in order to achieve an
equitable result where this substitute is necessary. In the Vagrancy
Reparation judgment the Court dealt effectively with the further
argument of this separate opinion that Articles 5(5) and 13 of the
Convention are an obstacle against the wide competence of the
Court in reparation matters. 06
The gist of Judge Mosler's separate opinion seems to be his statement that, though general international law establishes a right to
compensation for an injury established by an international court, it
was necessary to confer upon the Court competence to grant satisfaction by an express provision of the Convention. For the party
injured is not a party to the proceedings before the Court whose
basic task is not to ascertain an injury to a person but a violation
of the Convention. This express provision gives the Court jurisdiction to decide as to all damages no matter whether domestic law
allows, does not allow, or allows only partial reparation. The text of
Article 50 which is broader than those of the model treaties does not
restrict the jurisdiction to cases involving restitutio in integrum or
compensation for an irreversible act causing damage. The considerText accompanying note 332 supra.
," Text accompanying note 331 supra and text accompanying note 431 infra.
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ation of domestic law as to reparation shall preserve to the respondent State the option of voluntary compliance with the main judgment without going to the extreme of demanding an exhaustion of
local remedies. In this regard Judge Mosler seems to follow Judge
Verdross' sound approach.'0
M.

Ringeisen InterpretationCase

The Ringeisen Reparationjudgment was not the end of the proceedings regarding the application of Article 50. On December 21,
1972, within the period of 3 years fixed by Rule 53(1) of the Rules
of Court"' regarding a request for interpretation of a judgment, the
Commission filed a request with the Court, appending also a letter
by Ringeisen to the Commission of October 9, 1972, having the same
aim."' Under rule 53(4) of the Rules of Court the same Chamber
that previously rendered the Ringeisen Reparation judgment of
June 22, 1972, considered the request of the Commission. 40 However, as two members of the Chamber had died and a third Judge
was unable to take part, three Substitute Judges were called upon
to sit.41I Following the strict requirements of Rule 53(2) of the Rules
of Court the Commission submitted to the Court these two questions: "First, what was the intended effect of the order for payment
of compensation in D. Marks, particularly in respect of the actual
currency and place of payment? And Secondly, whether the term,
'compensation' is to be understood as payment of a sum free of any
lawful claims made against it under Austrian law, or subject to such
claims?" In its judgment of the Ringeisen Interpretation Case of
June 23, 1973, the Court, before going into the questions of law,
cited the following facts: it had been known throughout the case
that Ringeisen was and for some time had been residing in Heidelberg in the Federal Republic of Germany from where he asked the
Austrian Government in July 1972 to pay the 20,000 German Marks
Text accompanying note 334 supra.
Couz CT TEXTS, supra note 78, at 422.
'" Ringeisen Case, [1975] 16 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 4, 7.
", Text accompanying notes 387 supra.
,, Ringeisen Case, [1975] 16 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 4. The judgment does not say that
the President of the Chamber drew by lot the names of these substitute Judges. From this it
may be concluded that the substitute Judges "called upon to sit" were the ones whose names
had been drawn to be substitute Judges in the main case but were not revealed in the
narrative part of the main judgment of July 16, 1971. Ringeisen Case, [1971] 13 Eur. Ct.
Human Rights 5.
"0
'*
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awarded by the judgment of June 22, 1972. On the other hand,
several parties laid claim in Austria to that money on the basis of
debts alleged to be due to them by Ringeisen. On behalf of the
Republic of Austria the Attorney General's office applied in July
and August 1972 under Article 1425 of the Austrian Civil Code to
the Vienna Central District Court for acceptance of 143,808 schillings, the equivalent of 20,000 German Marks, to the credit of four
claimants, among them Ringeisen. This sum of schillings was deposited and on September 1, 1972, the District Court acknowledged
receipt of the money and declared it would be paid out on application in writing by the beneficiaries or pursuant to a final court order.
Of this the Committee of Ministers, responsible for supervising the
execution of the Court Judgment of June 22, 1972, under Article 54
of the Convention was notified by Austria's representative to the
Council of Europe. In the letter of October 9, 1972, to the Commission and transmitted by it to the Court, Ringeisen emphasized his
poor state of health and lack of means and asked the Court to
interpret its judgment of June 22, 1972, as if its operative part read
that Austria had to pay the applicant at once 20,000 German Marks
free from all seizure or attachment at his Heidelberg address and
to reimburse all damage and expenses suffered after June 22, 1972.412
The Government contended in these proceedings that the Commission did not in fact ask for an interpretation of the judgment of
June 22, 1972, but sought to induce the Court to supplement unlawfully the "entirely clear" operative provisions and reasons thereof
and even to interfere with the supervisory function of the Committee of Ministers under Article 54. It doubted whether the competence of the Court to interpret its judgments, based solely on the
Rules of Court, is compatible with the Convention in the light of its
Article 52 under which the Court's judgments are final.413
Regarding the last argument the Court recalled its statement in
the reparation judgment of the Ringeisen case that the sole meaning
of Article 52 is to make the Court's judgment not subject to any
appeal to another authority. 4 ' It did not consider a request for
interpretation directed to the Court itself to be an appeal but saw
in its consideration only an exercise of the Court's inherent jurisdic"2 Ringeisen Case, [1975] 16 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 6, 7.
,13 Id. at 7, 8.
"I Text accompanying note 390 supra.
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tion to clarify the meaning and scope of its previous decision, completely compatible with Articles 52 and 54 of the Convention. It
recalled that the Austrian Government itself once had envisaged
availing itself of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court the validity of which
415
it now tried to doubt.
Regarding the substance of the request for interpretation the
Court held, as to the first question, that it intended that the compensation of 20,000 DM should be paid to Ringeisen in German
Marks and in the Federal Republic of Germany. It took into account
the uncontested residence of Ringeisen in the Federal Republic of
Germany, and the oral submission of the Commission in the reparation proceedings when it asked the Court to rule whether any compensation due Ringeisen for violation of Article 5(3) of the Convention "should not be paid to him without delay in view of his state
41
of health and needy situation."
As to the second question the Court held that by the term
"compensation" it meant that an award was to be paid as compensation for nonmaterial damage to Ringeisen personally and free
from attachment. It explained that in referring to the discretion of
the Austrian authorities it did not qualify its intentions by a limitation; the two Austrian statutes 41 were mentioned only to indicate
that direct payment to Ringeisen was all the more justifiable because the freedom of payments of this kind from attachments was
applied also by Austrian law in analogous cases. It stated that it had
entrusted to the discretion of the Austrian authorities the practical
execution of the measures ordered in conformity with this princi8
ple.4 1
Judge Verdross, the Austrian member of the Court, in a separate
opinion agreed that the Court had jurisdiction to interpret its judgments but disagreed as to the substantive issue. In his opinion the
power of the Court under Article 50 of the Convention did not embrace the competence to restrict the rights of creditors of the applicants. He assumed that the Judgment of June 22, 1972, was not to
exceed the jurisdiction conferred by the Convention. From this, he
concluded that the Court's statement that it can leave this point
"'

Ringeisen Case, [1975] 16 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 8.

,lS
Id. at 8, 9.
417
Text accompanying note 394 supra.
11 Ringeisen Case, [1975] 16 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 9.
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(payment to the applicant free from attachment) to the discretion
of the Austrian authorities-who could apply, by analogy, the
Austrian statutes mentioned by the Court-must be interpreted
literally, because the Court could and should clearly have said if it
intended to oblige Austria to act differently. He agreed with the
Government's action to deposit the money and to leave it to the
domestic court to apply the Austrian law to this case. He dissented
from the operative provision of the judgment of Interpretation as
construed by the reasons given in it.4"9
Judge Zekia, in his separate opinion, agreed with the jurisdiction
of the Court to interpret its judgment and with the implication that
the award, expressed in German currency, was to reach Ringeisen
in the Federal Republic of Germany, given the fact known to the
Court of Ringeisen's residence there. Regarding the other substantive issue he felt that the Court when issuing its Reparationjudgment expected Austria to make payment free from claims and attachment, yet he emphasized that the Court did not take a firm
stand of imposing an obligation to pay in this manner. On the contrary, it clearly left this question to the discretion of the Austrian
authorities and the Austrian government properly exercised its discretion though perhaps not strictly in the way indicated by the
Court. The reference by the Court to the two Austrian acts he
considered together with leaving the issue to the discretion of the
Austrian authorities only as an obiter dictum without binding effect
on the party concerned.2 0
The Interpretationjudgment is of interest, being the first of its
kind pronounced by the Court. It rightly reaffirms the jurisdiction
of the Court spelled out in Rule 53 of the Rules of Court to interpret
ambiguities of the judgment rendered by it. It appears that such an
ambiguity existed and was well interpreted as to the questions of the
currency and place of payment involved. As to the question of freedom of the payment from all attachment, the dissenting opinions
seem to carry considerable weight. The words used in the original
reparation judgment leave little room for doubt that this question
was to be resolved by the Austrian authorities so that there was
probably in this regard no ambiguity open to a new judgment of
interpretation.
"I Id. at 11.
IN Id. at 12, 13.
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Neumeister Reparation Case

As mentioned before4"' the decision in the Neumeister Case that
there had been a breach of Article 5(3) of the Convention led to a
proceeding under Article 50 in which the Court rendered judgment
on May 7, 1974.422 Neumeister was sentenced on July 2, 1968, a few
days after the Court had issued its Judgment of June 27, 1968,23 to
5 years severe imprisonment for aggravated fraud. The total periods
of detention on remand (from February 24 to May 12, 1961, and
from July 12, 1962, to September 16, 1964) were reckoned as part of
the sentence which was upheld by the Supreme Court in decisions
of June 16 and November 4, 1971. Neumeister presented to the
Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice in December 1970 a claim for
a provisional overall sum of 3,500,000 schillings in reparation of the
damage he was alleged to have sustained through the violation established by the Court. On March 17, 1971, the revenue department
of the Attorney General's office rejected the claim, stating that it
was not entitled to grant such compensation under the existing law.
Considering this as a final decision, Neumeister submitted his claim
to the Commission with reference to Articles 5(5) and 50 of the
Convention on September 16, 1971. He requested the Commission
to initiate the proceedings provided for in this connection. The
Commission transmitted the request to the Court on September 27,
2 5 the President of the Court di1971.24 As in the Ringeisen Case"
rected that the Chamber that had given the judgment of June 27,
1968, in the main Neumeister Case should examine the reparation
aspect; some changes of its composition were necessitated by death
or other reasons of elimination of some of the original Judges.2 "
The reparation proceedings of the Court were greatly delayed by
lengthy negotiations between Neumeister and the Austrian authorities toward a friendly settlement, to include a pardon concerning the
remaining part of the prison sentence. Those negotiations led to the
Text accompanying note 211 supra.
Neumeister Case, [1974] 15 Eur. Ct. Human Rights, reprinted in [1974] Y.B. EUR.
CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 536-41 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights) [hereinafter cited as Neumeister Reparation Case].
2 Text accompanying note 195 supra.
424 Neumeister Reparation Case, supra note 422, at 4, 5.
"
Note 387 supra and accompanying text. By then, Rule 50(3) of the Rules of Court had
become applicable in its amended form.
42I Neumeister Reparation Case, supra note 422, at 5.
4
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grant of a remission of February 14, 1973, having the effect of a
conditional sentence subject to a probationary period of 3 years
(solely conditioned by the Austrian Act on conditional sentences).
Further delay was caused by inquiries of the Court into the details
of those negotiations.12
The judgment of the Court of May 7, 1974, dealt first with two
procedural questions and then with the merits of Neumeister's
claim. 28 The first procedural question was whether Article 50 was
applicable at all. The Austrian Government claimed that the Commission, instead of transmitting Neumeister's claim to the Court,
should have considered it as an application lodged under Article 25
and alleging a violation of Article 5(5) of the Convention: "Everyone
who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of
the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation." It submitted that Article 5(5) is a lex specialis in relation to Article 50 so that the latter article does not apply in cases of
violation of freedom of the person and that Neumeister, according
to the wording of his letter of September 16, 1971, had apparently
understood it to be an application under Article 25. The Government at one point in the reparation proceedings also relied on the
text of Articles 50 and 52 and on the fact that the main Judgment
of June 27, 1968, had omitted in its operating provisions to reserve
to Neumeister the right to apply for just satisfaction." 9
Regarding the first argument the Court admitted that subjectively the letter of September 16, 1971, could possibly have had the.
meaning given to it by the Government. But it countered this by
saying that, whatever may have been Neumeister's intentions, the
Court had to determine whether the Convention requires or authorizes in such a case the procedure which the Commission had chosen
to follow. It referred back to the Ringeisen Case where it had implicitly rejected the position already taken by the Government in holding Ringeisen's claim for compensation to be admissible.'13 It explained that Articles 5(5) and 50, though both dealing with compensation are on different levels; the first is a rule of substance, guaranteeing an individual right among others established in Section I
4 Id.
' Id.
' Id.
Id.

at 6-12.
at 12-21.
at 12.
at 13 and text accompanying note 390 supra.
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of the Convention and the second is a rule of competence of the
Court in the frame of Section IV of the Convention. Held together,
the Court found that in the exercise of the wide competence conferred by Article 50 it must take into consideration all the rules of
substance including both Articles 5(3) and 5(5). To require two
successive petitions to the Commission, on each of which the Court
or the Committee of Ministers could be called upon to rule, would
mean an extremely slow pace in the case of Article 5. The Court
concluded that the proceedings no longer fell within Section III of
the Convention (dealing with the Commission) but were a final
phase of the proceedings under Section IV so that the claim could
not be dealt with as a new petition presented under Article 25 and
the Commission was right to transmit it to the Court.4 3' The last
argument of the Government the Court brushed aside with a special
reference to its holdings in the Ringeisen Case.43 In the operative
part of its judgment of May 7, 1974, it found unanimously that
33
Article 50 was applicable.
The second part of the Judgment was directed to the question of
whether Neumeister, during the extended dealings with the
Austrian authorities aimed at the granting of a pardon, had waived
his claims for pecuniary compensation should he obtain remission
of the unserved part of his prison sentence.' 4 The Court, after evaluating the facts, denied this. It emphasized, however, that even if it
had reached the opposite conclusion it could not, because of its
responsibilites under Article 19 of the Convention, terminate the
proceedings without first being satisfied that the aim of Article 50
had been achieved. On the other hand, it admitted that a declaration of an applicant that he would settle for the satisfaction obtained or to be obtained from the Government might be an important or even a decisive factor for the Court's assessment of the just
character of that satisfaction within the meaning of Article 50.135
On the basis of these procedural preliminaries the Court approached the question as to the merits of Neumeister's claim. 3 Yet
"I Neumeister Reparation Case, supra note 422, at 13, 14. The Court referred back to its
judgment of March 10, 1972 in the Vagrancy Reparation Cases. See text accompanying notes
327-28 supra.
2 Neumeister Reparation Case, supra note 422, at 14. See text accompanying note 390.
413 Neumeister Reparation Case, supra note 422, at 21.
'

''

Id. at 14-16.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16-21.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 7:315

also in the context of this examination some procedural aspects had
to be considered. The Court realized that in the main judgment of
June 27, 1968, it had not determined from which point in time
Neumeister's second detention on remand (from July 12, 1962 to
September 16, 1964) had become unreasonable. It explained this by
saying that this has not been done since Neumeister had not as yet
claimed damages. Rejecting Neumeister's view that the main Judgment implied that the second detention was in breach of Article 5(3)
ab initio, it arrived at the conclusion, on the basis of the facts
involved, that the second detention amounted to a violation approximately from March 1, 1963. Due to this finding the Court reasoned
that only damages proved to have resulted from the detention beyond that point of time could be considered. Even supposing that
some damages so caused existed, the Court considered the reckoning of the total detention toward the sentence and the remission of
the remaining part as counterweights since further imprisonment
would inevitably have caused adverse consequences in Neumeister's
business. Considering also Neumeister's indications in his endeavors to obtain the remission that it would be the best possible form
of reparation, the Court arrived at the decision to deny satisfaction
for material damage.437 The Court applied this reasoning also for
rejecting moral damage suffered by reason of the detention beyond
a reasonable time, stressing that Article 50 provides for just satisfaction only if necessary. 38 Finally, the Court dealt with Neumeister's
claim of about 250,000 schillings for lawyers' fees. It was of the
opinion that the reasons for dismissing the claims for material and
moral damages, among them especially the granting of the remission, do not necessarily apply to the expenses incurred by Neumeister in vindicating his rights guaranteed by the Convention. It distinguished between damage caused by a violation of the Convention
and the necessary costs of trying to prevent such violation, to have
it established by the Commission and the Court, and to obtain just
satisfaction. Noting that Neumeister did not receive legal aid either
before the Commission or with the Commission's Delegates after
referral to the Court, it arrived at a sum of 30,000 schillings taking
as a basis for calculation the rates payable under the scheme for free
"IId.

at 16-19.

'I Id. at 19. The Court referred in this regard to the Vagrancy Reparation Judgment; see

text accompanying note 329 supra.
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legal aid operated by the Commission and Delegates of the
Commission." 9 The Court held unanimously that the reparation
claim was not wellfounded, except for attorney's costs for which the
Republic of Austria was to pay the applicant the sum of 30,000
schillings.1"
The judgment presents an important clarification of the relation
between Articles 5(5) and 50 of the Convention. The position it took
appears well founded. As to the second part it could seem disturbing
that the Court, in the frame of a judgment of reparation under
Article 50, actually made a new determination not rendered in the
main judgment as to the point in time from which the detention on
remand constituted a violation of Article 5(3). It can, however, be
argued that without such a determination the Court could not have
arrived at fulfilling its duty under Article 50 to find and adjudicate
just satisfaction. Of special interest is the point that the Court,
though denying reparation for material or moral damages on the
basis of the facts involved, afforded reparation for the costs for
bringing about an adjudication under the Convention of the violation of one of the rights guaranteed by it, including those of the
proceedings toward obtaining reparation. This point appears well
taken.
0.

Golder Case

The Golder Case"' originated in an application and later supplement by Sidney Elmer Golder, a United Kingdom citizen, lodged
with the Commission in 1969 and April 1970, in which he complained of violations of Articles 6(1) and 8 of the Convention. The
Commission declared, on March 30, 1971, that the first application
was inadmissible because all domestic remedies had not been exhausted, but accepted the other for consideration of the merits
under Articles 6(1) and 8 of the Convention."' After failing to reach
a friendly settlement, the Commission drew up its Report in accordance with Article 31 of the Convention and transmitted it to the
Committee of Ministers on July 5, 1973.111 In it the Commission
'13 Neumeister Reparation Case, supra note 422, at 19-21.

I at 21.
Id.
Golder Case, [19751 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights; reprinted in [1975] Y.B. EUR. CONv.
ON HuMAN RIGTrs 290-94 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). See as to the decision on admissibility, [1973] Y.B. Etm. CoNV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 416-44.
",2 [1973] Y.B. EuR. CONy. ON HuMAN RIGHTs 444 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights).
"1 Golder Case, [19751 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 5.
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expressed the opinion that there were violations of Articles 6(1) and
8 of the Convention."' The government of the United Kingdom,
under Article 48 of the Convention, referred the case to the Court
on September 27, 1973.115 It requested the Court to hold that there
had been no violation by the United Kingdom of Articles 6 and 8 of
the Convention. 4 The competent Chamber of the Court unanimously decided on May 7, 1974, according to Rule 48 of the Rules
of Court, to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the plenary court, for
the reason that "the case raises serious questions affecting the interpretation of the Convention." 7 The elected Judge, a national
of the United Kingdom, sitting ex officio under Article 43 of the
Convention, was Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice.4 45 The question raised was
whether Article 6(1) of the Convention, in addition "to guaranteeing
in substance the right to a fair trial in legal proceedings which are
already pending," also secures "a right of access to the courts for
every person wishing to commense an action in order to have his
civil rights and obligations determined."44' 9
In 1969 Golder was serving a sentence of imprisonment of 15 years
for robbery with violence in Parkhurst Prison on the Isle of Wight.
On the evening of October 24, 1969, a serious disturbance occurred
in a prison area where Golder happened to be. The next day, Laird,
a prison officer, identified his assailants and in his statement declared that together with others "another prisoner whom I know by
sight, I think his name is Golder" was swinging vicious blows at me.
Golder was thereupon, together with other suspected prisoners, segregated from the main body of prisoners. In an interview he was
informed that it had been alleged that he had assaulted a prison
officer and was warned that the facts would be reported to consider
"' Id. at 10-11.
'" Id. at 6. The referral was within the period of three months prescribed in Articles 32(1)
and 47.

"I Id. at 11.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
"4 Id. at 12. Article 6(1) of the Convention reads: "In the determination of his civil rights
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from
all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the
parties so required, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the Court in special
circumstances were publicity would prejudice the interests of justice."
"

41
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whether or not he should be prosecuted for assaulting a prison officer. Golder wrote to his Member of Parliament and to a Chief Constable about the disturbance and the hardships that resulted for
him therefrom. The prison governor stopped these letters since
Golder had not raised this subject through the authorized channels
beforehand. On November 5, 1969, Laird qualified his former
statement, saying that when he had mentioned Golder he had said,
"I think it was Golder" who was present when others attacked him,
and that he certainly remembered seeing him in the immediate
group, but was not absolutely certain that Golder himself had made
an attack on him. On November 7, 1969, another prison officer
reported that Golder was with prisoners who did not participate in
the disturbance in a television room and, to the best of his knowledge, took no part in the riot. Golder was thereupon returned to his
ordinary cell the same day. Entries relating to possible charges
against Golder were made in his prison record but were later marked
"charges not proceeded with" and finally expunged from the prison
record in 1971 during the examination of applicant's case by the
Commission. Golder was released on parole on July 12, 1972.450
On March 20, 1970, Golder petitioned the Home Secretary. He
asked for a transfer to some other prison and added that he understood that an incorrect statement by Laird was in a prison record
and had prevented his parole. He requested permission to consult a
solicitor with a view of taking civil action for libel for that statement
or, alternately, for an independent examination of the matter by a
certain magistrate. On April 6, 1970, the Home Office had Golder
notified that none of the requests would be granted.451
The Court, in its judgment of February 21, 1975, started by saying
that the Home Office's act in preventing Golder from contacting a
solicitor cannot be judged strictly from the viewpoint of interference
with correspondence to the exclusion of all questions of accessibility
Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 8-10.
4 Id. at 10. According to the English Prison Act of 1952 and the Regulations issued under
it, a prisoner shall (except as provided otherwise) not be permitted to communicate with any
outside person without leave of the Secretary of State; he shall not be entitled to communicate with any person in connection with any legal or other business except with the leave of
the Secretary of State. The Act further provides that the legal advisor of a prisoner in any
legal proceeding, civil or criminal, in which the prisoner is a party shall be afforded reasonable
facilities for interviewing him out of hearing but in the sight of an officer, and a prisoner's
legal advisor may, with the leave of the Secretary of State, interview the prisoner in connection with any other legal business in the sight and hearing of an officer. Id. at 9, 10.
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to the courts and that a court in England would not dismiss an
action by a convicted prisoner on the sole ground that he had managed to obtain the writ without leave from the Home Office under
the prison rules. It admitted that Article 6(1) does not state a right
of access to the courts in express terms; yet the Article enunciates
distinct rights stemming from the same basic idea which, taken
together, make up a single right not specifically defined. The Court
concluded from this that it had to ascertain whether access to the
court constitutes one aspect of this right by means of interpretation .45'
Following the submissions of the Government4 53 and the Commission,"' the Court leaned in its interpretation of the Convention upon
Id. at 13.
, Before the Court, the Government submitted that Article 6(1) confers only a right in
any proceedings to a hearing that is fair and in accordance with the other requirements of
the paragraph and that therefore the Government's refusal to allow the applicant to consult
a lawyer was not violative of Article 6. In the alternative, if the Court found that the rights
conferred by Article 6 include a general right of access to the courts, this right is not unlimited
in the case of persons under detention. It further submitted that therefore a reasonable
restraint on recourse to the courts for the applicant was permissible in the interest of
prison order and discipline and thus the Government's refusal did not violate Article 6. The
control over the prisoner's correspondence was a necessary consequence of the deprivation of
his liberty and therefore not violative of Article 8(1) and in any case within the exception of
Article 8(2) since the restriction was in accordance with law and within the Government's
power to find that the restriction was necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of
disorder or crime.
'5 The Commission submitted to the Court for their consideration the following questions:
(1) Does Article 6(1) of the Commission secure to persons desiring to institute
civil proceedings a right of access to the courts?
(2) If so, are there inherent limitations to this right, or its exercise, applicable
to the facts of this case?
(3) Can a convicted prisoner who wishes to write to his lawyer in order to
institute civil proceedings, rely on the protections of Article 8 to respect for
correspondence?
(4) Do the facts of this case, according to the answers to questions 1-3, disclose
a violation of Articles 6 and 8?
Id. at 11, 12. After declaring Golder's application inadmissible as to the stopping of his letters by the prison governor, but accepting it with regard to the refusal of the Home Secretary
to permit him to consult a solicitor (for consideration of his claim under Articles 6(1) and 8
of the Convention) the Commission had expressed in its Report the following opinion:
-unanimously, that Article 6(1) guarantees a right of access to the courts;
-unanimously, that in Article 6(1), whether read alone or together with other Articles of the Convention, there are no inherent limitations on the right of a convicted
prisoner to institute proceedings and for this purpose to have unrestricted access
to a lawyer; and that consequently the restrictions imposed by the present practice
of the United Kingdom authorities are inconsistent with Article 6(1);
-by seven votes to two, that Article 8 is applicable to the facts of the present case;
452

19771

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

443

Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 55 It
did so, although that Convention has not yet entered into force and,
according to its Article 4, is not retroactive. Articles 31-33 of the
Vienna Convention essentially express generally accepted principles
of international law, including the one stated in Article 5 of the
Vienna Convention that the interpretation must also be guided by
"any relevant rules of the organization" (here the Council of Europe) within which the treaty (European Convention on Human
Rights) was adopted.45
With regard to the question of a right of access to the courts, the
court emphasized that in the French text of Article 6(1) the word
"cause" means not only "proc~s qui se plaide" as the Government
the wider "l'ensemble des claims but also int~rkts & soutenir, a
faire pr~valoir," and that "contestation" claim generally exists
prior to the legal proceedings and is a concept independent of
them. As to the English text, it observed that the phrase "in the
determination of the civil rights and obligations" does not necessarily refer only to judicial proceedings already pending but can also
be synonymous with the phrase "wherever his civil rights and obligations are being determined." This would imply the right to have
the determination of disputes relating to civil rights and obligations
made by a court or "tribunal." The Court admitted that the right
to fair and expeditious judicial procedure can only apply to proceedings in being, but it denied that this excludes a right to the very
institution of such proceedings. It mentioned that in criminal matters the "reasonable time" may start to run from a date prior to the
seisin of the "tribunal" and that conceivably it may also begin to
run in civil matters before the issue of the writ commencing the
court proceedings.457
A further argument circled around the relation between Article
6(1) and Articles 5(4) and 13. The expressly established access to
the courts in the latter articles seemed to the Government to be a
-by eight votes to one, that the same facts which constitute a violation of Article
6(1) constitute also a violation of Article 8.
-that the right of access to the courts guaranteed by Article 6(1) is not qualified by
the requirement "within a reasonable time."
Id. at 10, 11.
"' Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, Doc.

A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 8

INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls

679 (1969).

Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 14.
,s'Id. at 14-15.
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clear indication that the lack of an express provision in Article 6(1)
excludes such a right in its connection and that a different interpretation would make Articles 5(4) and 13 superfluous. The Commission replied that Articles 5(4) and 13, as opposed to Article 6(1), are
"accessory" to other provisions, and that they do not state a specific
right but are designed to afford procedural guarantees for the "right
to liberty" (Article 5(1)) as to the whole of the "rights and freedoms
as set forth in this Convention" (Article 13), while Article 6(1) shall
in itself protect the right to a proper administration of justice of
which the right that justice should be administered is an essential
element. It further stated that this difference also explains the contrast between the wording of Article 6(1) and that of Articles 5(4)
and 13.158
The Court saw no danger of confounding Article 6(1) with the two
other provisions nor of making Articles 5(4) and 13 superfluous if
Article 6(1) is given the wider meaning. Article 13 requires an
"effective remedy before a national authority" which need not be a
tribunal or court in the sense of Articles 6(1) and 5(4). "Effective
remedy" deals with a violation of a right guaranteed by the Convention while Articles 6(1) and 5(4) cover civil rights and arrest or
detention, respectively. None of these three groups of rights necessarily coincide with any one of the others. The requirements of
Article 5(4) are somewhat stricter than those of Article 6(1), particularly with respect to the element of "time."4 "9
In deference to Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention, the Court
quoted from the Preamble to the European Convention the passage
that the signatory Governments are "resolved as the Governments
of European countries which are like-minded and have a common
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law
to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the
Rights stated in the Universal Declaration" of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Asembly of the United Nations of December
10, 1948. The Court admitted the selective nature of the protected
"UId. at 15. Article 5(4) reads: "Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall
be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful." Article
13 reads: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity." Convention, supra note 25.
"' Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 16.
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rights and that the Preamble does not include the rule of law as an
object or purpose of the Convention, yet pointed to it as being one
of the features of the common spiritual heritage of the Member
States of the Council of Europe. It saw in this reference more than
a theoretical reference without relevance in the interpretation of the
Convention; it rather considered the profound belief in the rule of
law as one reason why the signatory Governments took the first
steps for the collective enforcement of certain human rights. Following the rules of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, the Court
bore this in mindwhen interpreting the terms of Article 6(1) in good
faith, in accordance with its context and in light of the object and
purpose of the Convention. The Statute of the Council of Europe,
of which each signatory State to the Convention is a Member, affirms the devotion of its Members to the rule of law (Preamble of
the Statute) and requires that every Member must accept this principle.6 0
In civil matters the Court said one can scarcely conceive of the
rule of law without access to the courts; "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties" to the
treaty46 ' and especially the "general principles of law recognized by
4 2 have to be taken
civilized nations""
in account together with the
context of the provisions to be interpreted. The principles contested
here ranked among the universally recognized principles of law.
Article 6(1) must be read in the light of these principles of law and
the principle of international law which forbids the denial of justice.
Should Article 6(1) concern only the conduct of an action already
initiated before a court, a State could do away with its courts entirely or entrust certain classes of civil actions to organs dependent
on the Government. Such a result would be repugnant to the principles mentioned. The fair public and expeditious characteristics of
judicial proceedings are of no value if there are no judicial proceed463
ings.
The Court concluded that the right of access is inherent in the
right stated in Article 6(1). It said that it arrived at this result
without "an extensive interpretation," but on the basis of the very
terms of the first clause of Article 6(1) "read in its context and
4" Id. at 16, 17; Art. 3 of the Statute.
Vienna Convention, supra note 455, art. 31(3)(c).
V'
'B' Statute of Int'l Ct. of Justice, supra note 159, art. 38(1)(c).
"s

Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 17, 18.
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having regard to the object and purpose of the Convention," and "to
the general principles of law." It denied any need for "supplementary means of interpretation" as described in Article 32 of the Vi4
enna Convention. 64
The Court then considered whether its basic interpretation of
Article 6(1) had any built-in limitations that could justify the action
of the Home Office. It admitted that certain limitations could exist
such as special regulations relating to minors or persons of unsound
mind. The Court denied that it was its function to elaborate a
general theory of limitations applicable in the case of convicted
prisoners or to rule "in abstracto" on the compatibility of the Prison
Rules with the Convention; rather, it restricted itself to a decision
on whether or not the application of those rules in the present case
violated the Convention to the prejudice of Golder. 4 5
In arriving at a decision on this point the Court recalled that
Golder was seeking to exculpate himself of the charge made by
Laird that resulted in unpleasant consequences to him. It recognized that the contemplated libel proceedings would have been
directed against action of a prison official in the course of his duties,
an official subject of the Home Secretary's authority. It held that it
was not for the Home Secretary, but for an independent court, to
rule on any claim that might be brought, and that in denying the
leave requested the Home Secretary had violated Golder's right to
go before a court as guaranteed by Article 6(1). 466
The Court then dealt with the opinion of the Commission that the
stated facts also violated Article 8 of the Convention dealing with
the freedom of correspondence.4 11 It emphasized that the Home Secretary's prevention of Golder from initiating a correspondence with
a solicitor is the most far-reaching form of "interference" forbidden
in Article 8(2), and that it would be paradoxical to say that Golder,
Id. at 18.
Id. at 18, 19.
Id. at 19, 20.
Id. at 20. Article 8 reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others.
Convention, supra note 25.
"u
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by not writing to a solicitor in compliance with the Home Secretary's ruling, would lose the benefit of the protection of Article 8.
The Government submitted that the right of correspondence is, in
addition to the restrictions enumerated in Article 8(2), subject to
implied limitations such as enunciated in Article 5(1)(a), dealing
with persons lawfully detained after conviction by a competent
court who necessarily are subject to consequences affecting the operation of other articles, including Article 8. The Court also rejected
this argument, especially because it conflicted with the explicit text
of Article 8(2), which by establishing definite exceptions to the principle of Article 8(1) left no room for implied exceptions."'
Finally, the Court contemplated whether the explicit conditions
of Article 8(2) justified the Home Office's interference with the correspondence. The Court, taking up some of the express provisions
of Article 8(2), admitted that the interference was "in accordance
with the law" (the Prison Rules), and even accepted that the
"prevention of disorder or crime" may justify somewhat wider measure of interference in the case of a convicted prisoner than in that
of a person at liberty. The Government advanced this latter argument and the arguments of "public safety" and "the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others." But the Court thought that, even
given the discretionary power of the Contracting States, the facts
emphasized by it with regard to Article 6(1) could not possibly
justify any of the exceptions of Article 8(2) "necessary in a democratic society," especially as the applicant's correspondence with a
solicitor would have been a preparatory step toward the exercise of
the right of access to courts embodied in Article 6 of the Convention.
The Court therefore concluded that there was also a violation of
Article 8.469
By deciding that there were violations of the Convention, the
question of affording just satisfaction under Article 50 was addressed by the Court. It stated that the question had been duly
raised and was ready for decision. However, without further explanation, the Court found that it was not necessary to afford to the
applicant any just satisfaction other than that resulting from the
finding of a violation of his rights. 70
,' Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 20, 21.
,' Id. at 21, 22.
110Id. at 22, 23.
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The Court held there had been a breach of Article 6(1) and Article 8 and that the preceding findings amount in themselves to adequate just satisfaction under Article 50.171
Judge Verdross dissented as to the violation of Article 6(1). From
the Preamble and Article 1 of the Convention, he concluded that
only rights and freedoms stated by the Convention in express terms
or included in any of them are protected, and this was not the case
as to the alleged right of access to the courts. The interpretation
chosen by the Court ran, in his opinion, counter to the fact that the
provisions relating to the protected rights and freedoms constitute
limits on the jurisdiction of the Court, and this delimitation must
be interpreted strictly. He believed that the States which have submitted to the Commission and the Court with respect to "certain"
rights and freedoms "defined" in the Convention must be sure that
these bounds will be strictly observed. Judge Verdross believed the
only explanation of why the Convention refrained from formally
stating the right of access to the courts was the fact that this right
has been implanted for so long in the national legal order of the
civilized states that there was no further need to guarantee it by the
procedures under the Convention. Legal institutions presupposed
by the Convention must, according to the Judge, be distinguished
from the rights guaranteed by the Convention.'72
Judge Zekia briefly concurred with the opinion as to the violation
of Article 8 and the handling of Article 50,111 but dissented from the
ruling on Article 6(1).171 He agreed that Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the
Vienna Convention contain the guiding principles of the interpretation of a treaty. After stating Article 31(1), "[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose," he stated that he believed it necessary
to consider text, context, and object and purpose in interpreting a
treaty.
As to the text of Article 6(1) of the European Convention, he
emphasized that it clearly deals only with court proceedings already
instituted before a court. He did not think that the discrepancy
between the French text, "contestation," and the English text
,7 Id. at
,7 Id. at
,73Id. at
"I Id. at

23.
24-25.
31, 26.
26-31.
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would justify an alteration of his preceding statement.4 75
As to the context,7 8 the Judge stated that its examination will
overlap the considerations of the object and purposes of the treaty.
He argued against the Court's dealing with the relation between
Article 6(1) and Articles 5(4) and 13. 77 Extending this discussion to
Article 17 (which forbids that any greater limitations be imposed
upon the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention than is
provided in the Convention), he concluded from this that if a right
of access is to be read into Article 6(1), it would have to be absolute, 7 8 while the right of access in all civilized democratic societies
is usually regulated by many norms and in various aspects.479 This,
the Judge argued, showed that if the Convention intended to make
the right of access an integral part of Article 6(1), the draftsmen
would certainly have prescribed therein the restrictions and limitations attached to such right.41
With regard to object and purpose, the Judge warned against
underestimating the importance of Article 6(1), even if not comprising the right of access. He emphasized the words "the first steps"
and "enforcement of certain Rights" in the Preamble of the
Convention. He finally called attention to the fact that various other
international declarations or treaties concerning human rights do
contain provisions about access to courts, and saw in this a confirmation of the view that where a right of access to courts was intended to be incorporated in a treaty, it was done in express terms.4 8
Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice8 2 in Part One of his opinion dealt
with the question of the violation of Article 8.83 He concurred with
the Court that there was no obstacle to the application of Article 8
because no correspondence had actually started, 84 but he disagreed
with the Court's viewpoint that the wording of Article 8 ruled out
the possibility of unexpressed but inherent limitations. He felt that
respect for correspondence, which according to him is all that Arti, ' Id. at 27.
, ' Id. at 27-30.
,71 See text preceding note 459 supra.
,18Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 27, 28.
,71See text accompanying note 465 supra.
"* Colder Case, [19751 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 29.
,' Id. at 30-31.
m About his standing in Court see text accompanying note 448 supra.
I Colder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 32-40.
4'" Id. at 33-34; see text accompanying note 468 supra.

450

GA. J.

INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 7:315

cle 8(1) requires, is not equal to complete freedom of correspondence.4 - Still, in conformity with the Court's attitude,48 he looked at
the facts of the particular case and agreed that the Home Office's
refusal was not necessary under any express or implied limitation
of the right guaranteed by Article 8. He believed that the Home

Office acted not for "necessity" reasons, but because it considered
that the applicant's prospective claim was without basis. Therefore,
question was not for
he concurred in the Court's opinion" 7 that this
4 88
the Home Office but for the courts to decide.
The second part of Judge Fitzmaurice's opinion dealt with his
dissent as to the violation of Article 6(1). 4 9 The Judge explained
that a limine this was not a case to be contemplated under Article
6(1) but only under Article 8, for the the reason that he could not
see in the facts a denial of access to the courts but, at the most, a
delay up to the time of the applicant's release. This he felt was not
the same as a denial.4 90 The Judge, after stating that the text of

Article 6(1) presupposes the factual existence of proceedings in
which the express requirements of the article have to be applied,
reverted to the argument of Judge Verdross 45 ' that Article 1 only

protects the rights and freedoms "defined" in the Convention
which, according to Judge Fitzmaurice, would require at least a
naming, if not an exact defining, of such rights or freedoms. He
added that the notion of a right of access to the courts is ambiguous
and that the lack of any definition in the Convention would mean,
in case of recognition of such right as implied in Article 6(1), that
it would have to be defined by the Court in each individual case.
This he believed would be unacceptable to the State Members of
the Convention.

92

Dissecting the Court's opinion, the Judge interpreted it to say
that it is inconceivable that a Convention on human rights should
fail to provide for a right of access to the courts, and that therefore
it must be presumed to do so if such an inference is at all possible
' Id. at 35.
' See text accompanying note 465 supra.

See text accompanying note 466 supra.
,G Colder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 39, 40.
487

"' Id. at 40-63. This dissent is of approximately the same length as the judgment of the
Court.
"H Id. at 40-42.
"' See text accompanying note 472 supra.
"' Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 43-48.
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from any of its terms. He felt this attitude clearly was the basis for
the Court's saying that it was inconceivable that Article 6(1) should
establish procedural guarantees in a pending law suit without protecting the access to the courts.9 3 The Judge, in insisting that as to
international agreements interpretation should be allowed only if
necessary, believed that it is a perfectly conceivable situation that
a right of access to the courts would be limited, but that where it is
afforded 94' there should be safeguards regarding the proceedings. He
considered the only necessary interpretation of Article 6(1) was that
it assumed a legal proceeding in progress. He believed the Court's
attention to the Vienna Convention, to the Statute of the Council
of Europe, etc.,495 to be external to Article 6(1). He thought that the
determining element in the Court's judgment was fear of the supposed consequences of a denial of a right of access to the courts and
that this showed especially in the Court's statement that without
this right a State could do away with its courts without acting in
breach of the text of Article 6(1).111 He considered such conclusions
as unrealistic or at best highly exaggerated, as illogical, and as
typical of the attitude of the judiciallegislator.'97 These conclusions,
in his opinion, should have little or no justification as to international agreements which derive their obligatory force exclusively
from the consent of their parties.'9 8
Taking a different approach to the method of interpretation, the
Judge first emphasized the newness of the unique feature of the
Convention to submit the subject of human rights, formerly a most
cherished preserve of domestic jurisdiction, to adjudication by an
international court. From this he again deduced the necessity of a
cautious and conservative interpretation. He quoted in this regard
from the oral argument for the Government that it had no idea when
it was accepting Article 6 that it was accepting an obligation to
accord a right of access to the courts without qualification.499
He then readily admitted that it is hardly possible to establish
what really were the intentions of the contracting States as to the
See text accompanying note 463 supra.
Emphasis in the original.
,t See text accompanying notes 456, 460-463 supra.
"4 See text accompanying note 463 supra.
,, Emphasis supplied.
"G Golder Case, [19751 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 48-52.
"4 Id. at 52-53.
"13

'
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point in controversy, but this, he thought, was another reason for
not subjecting them to obligations which do not result clearly from
the Convention. Without going into the history of the drafting of
Article 6(1), he then examined provisions similar to this article
found in other human rights instruments.'"
Taking up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he quoted
Articles 8°10 and 10.02 With regard to Article 8 of the Universal
Declaration which he equates with Articles 5(4) and 13 of the Convention, he concurred with the Commission's and the Court's handling of these articles.0 3 He saw in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration the model from which Article 6(1) of the Convention was
drawn. It too, he said, expressed no more substantive right of access
to the courts than the parallel passage of Article 6(1) of the Convention. Thus, he thought, the two quoted articles established none of
those rights which Article 6(1) was alleged to help enforce.0 4
He then resorted to some international agreements younger than
the Convention and concluded that their wording does not go beyond that of Article 6(1) of the Convention. Finally, he mentioned
that both Article 8 of the Universal Declaration and Article 6(1) of
the Convention, at one stage of their drafting, contained terms that
might have been interpreted as providing for a right of access but
that they had subsequently disappeared. 0 5
From this and his conviction that the Convention is to be interpreted conservatively, 0 1 he concluded that the contracting States
were content to rely de facto on the practice in all European countries of affording a wide measure of access to the courts without any
definite intention of converting this into a binding international
obligation, 507 which, as the Court recognized, can not be generally
defined.0 8
10

Id. at 54.
1*1Id. at 54. Article 8 reads: "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law."
5"2 Id.
at 55. Article 10 reads: "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him."
See text accompanying notes 458, 459 supra.
Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 54, 55.
Id. at 55-57.
See text accompanying note 499 supra.
50 See text accompanying note 452 supra.
5 Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human rights 57-58.
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Judge Fitzmaurice concluded this dissent with a renewed survey
of all the provisions of the Convention that could possibly be of
importance to the controversy." 9 As to the Preamble, he recalled
that it proclaims the intention to take the first steps for collective
enforcement of "certain of the Rights" stated in the Universal Declaration. However, according to Judge Fitzmaurice, the Universal
Declaration makes no provision for the right of access to the
courts. 10 Article 1, he reiterated, presupposes that the rights and
freedoms to be protected must be "defined," while a right of access
is not even mentioned, let alone "defined." '' Regarding Articles
5(4) and 13, the Judge basically agreed with the Court's finding."'
Finally, the Judge took up Article 6(1).111 He emphasized the
exclusively procedural character of Article 6(1) ejusdem generis,
and claimed that, under the ejusdem generis rule, any implications
drawn from the text for the purpose of importing into it something
that is not actually expressed there should relate to something of the
same order as figures in the text itself. Yet any right of access,
though it has a procedural aspect, is basically a substantive right
of a fundamental character." 4
He then claimed that the Court's interpretation of Article 6(1)
also violated the rule of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." He
referred to the Court's statement" 5 that though Article 6(1) "does
not state a right of access . . . in express terms," it "enunciates
rights which are distinct but stem from the same basic idea and
which, taken together, make up a single right not specifically defined in the narrower sense of the term." This, the Judge said,
overlooked the fact that the only rights "enunciated" in Article 6(1)
are not "distinct rights," but are all of the same category relating
to the handling of the trial. Thus, nothing in the article constituted
the pretended "single right" that is said to embrace the right of
access in addition to the actually specified procedural rights. The
explicit stating of the latter ones should call for the application of
the expressio unius rule."'
Id. at 58-63.
510 Id. at 58. See text accompanying notes 501-04 supra.

5" Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 58.
5" Id. at 59. See text accompanying notes 458-59 supra.
113
Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 59-63.
51,Id. at 60.
"' See text accompanying note 452 supra.
5" Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 60-61.
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Next, the Judge pointed to the fact that Article 6(1) manifestly
deals with both civil and criminal proceedings. Yet, he added, the
question of access to the courts must arise primarily in civil proceedings since it would be absurd to speak of a right of access in criminal
proceedings initiated by the public authority. He noted that special
classes of criminal cases originated by private citizens would be a
limited exception." 7
The Judge also criticized the Court for not defining more precisely
the point of time from which the "reasonable time" of Article 6(1)
should run' since an ad hoc determination in each case would
consequently result in governments never knowing in advance
within what precise period cases must be brought to trial." 9
Judge Fitzmaurice stated that everything relating to the right of
access must concern the period prior to the formal initiation of
proceedings since, once proceedings have begun, access to the courts
has been had and the problem ceases to exist. Any alleged interference with or denial of access ought to relate, he thought, to the
period "within a reasonable time" to which Article 6(1) refers. This,
he concluded, shows that Article 6(1) did not propose to deal with
access at all.5 20
The Judge made a similar argument regarding the term "public
hearing" in Article 6(1). He envisaged a case of civil proceedings
where a hearing on the merits will occur if proceedings run their
normal course. Yet, he noted that proceedings may be stopped at
an earlier stage, 52 ' where a judge may deal with preliminary questions "in chambers," and the case may be "struck out" as disclosing
no cause of action. If the right of access were implied in Article 6(1),
this might be held to involve a right to public hearing in all circum' 22
stances, since anything less would not constitute "access.
The Judge's final conclusion was that a right of access is not to
be implied in Article 6(1) except by a process of interpretation of
which he disapproved. He considered the the cure of this deficiency
of the Convention to be a task the Court should not seek to carry
5 23
out itself but should refer to the contracting States.
SI? Id. at 61.
SI See text accompanying note 457 supra.

s" Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 61-62.
5a Id. at 62-63.
s" Cf. text accompanying note 465 supra.
12 Golder Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 63.
5n Id.
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The Golder Case appears to be a landmark among the decisions
of the Court for the reason that through interpretation of Article
6(1), it affirms the existence of the right of access to the courts as
one of the rights protected by the Convention, though its text does
not say so in so many words. Both the majority of the Court and the
dissenters used so impressive an array of arguments that it is not
easy to find which ones are more convincing. On the one hand the
spirit of the Convention pushes one in the direction of interpreting
its provisions-so as not to unduly interfere with the internal sphere
of law of the participating States-as meaning whatever assures the
most satisfying effect to the rights clearly expressed in it. From this
point of view, the idea that the rights expressly established in Article 6(1) as to the conduct of proceedings remains an empty shell if
the proceedings cannot start for lack of a right of access to the
courts. This is a strong argument that this latter right is implied in
the article. Actually, all the further points made by the majority are
only means to defend their main argument and to counter objections
to it. The dissenters, especially Judge Fitzmaurice, try honestly to
expose weaknesses of the majority's main argument and the underlying subordinate arguments. The Judge enlists the wording of the
Preamble of the Convention that says that certain of the Rights
stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be
actively enforced and then cites the absence of a right of access in
the Universal Declaration because he does not see such a right in
the words of its Article 8. Even if he should be right in this last
statement, the majority's insistence that the belief in the rule of law
stressed in the Preamble of the European Convention was actually
the drawing force toward collective enforcement possibly justified
the implied inclusion of the right of access in the Convention. Impressively, Judge Fitzmaurice concluded from the words of Article
1 of the Convention, which oblige the Contracting Parties to guarantee the rights "defined" in the Convention, that the right of access
cannot be included because it is not "defined" expressly in Article
6(1).
But is it impossible to define something by logical and clear
implication? Difficulties may arise because both, majority and dissenters feel that the right of access to the Court is not an unlimited
right and will need closer scrutiny in the individual case. But this
shortcoming is shared with many other rights and does not seem to
be sufficient to exclude this right a limine. Without reiterating all
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the arguments brought forward, the answer chosen by the majority
seems tenable and within the spirit of the Convention.
P.

National Union of Belgian Police Case

This case524 originated in an application against the Kingdom of
Belgium lodged by the National Union of Belgian Police with the
Commission on March 5, 1970, which declared it admissible on
February 8, 1972. It reached the Court on October 7, 1974, upon
referral by the Commission which requested the Court to decide
whether or not the facts of the case disclosed a violation of Articles
11 and 14 of the Convention by the Kingdom of Belgium.525 As in
the Golder Case, the competent Chamber of the Court by unanimous decision of April 12, 1975, relinquished jurisdiction to the
plenary court according to Rule 48 of the Rules of the Court since
the case raised serious questions affecting the interpretation of the
Convention. The elected Judge of Belgian nationality who sat ex
officio was Judge Ganshof van der Meersch.5 21 Procedurally, it is of
some interest that the Court decided proprio motu, according to
rules 38(1) and 48(3) taken together, to hear the Secretary General
of the applicant union on certain questions of fact and for the purpose of information.5 2
The facts of the case are fairly complicated since a large number
of laws, ordinances, etc., concerning labor unions and their representations are involved. The applicant complained that the Government did not recognize it as one of the most representative organizations which alone the Ministry of the Interior is required to consult
under the Act of July 27, 1961,52 s which relates to such matters as
staff structures, conditions of recruitment and promotion, pecuniary status and salary scales of provincial and municipal staff. The
applicant, who was excluded from this consultation as regards both

' National Union of Belgian Police Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 5, reprinted
in [19751 Y.B. Eusn. CoNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 294-99 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights). See
as to the decision of the Commission on admissibility, [1974] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 308-28.
"' Police Union Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 5-6, 15-16.
6 Id. at 4, 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Section 9 of that Act reads: "The general arrangements to be made by the King...
shall be decreed after consulting representatives of those organizations that best represent
the staff of the provinces and municipalities . . . . The forms of such consultation shall be
determined by the King." Police Union Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 11.
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questions of interest to all such staff and questions peculiar to municipal police, considered itself at a disadvantage compared with
three other unions open to consultation as a whole as defined in a
Royal decree of August 2, 1966.529 The applicant submitted that this
provision greatly restricts its field of action, thereby tending to
oblige the members of the municipal police to join the organizations
considered to be "representative" but having a "political" character
incompatible with the "special vocation" of the police. The applicant further maintained that the government had, on the other
hand, agreed to take account of this special vocation in the case of
the two other police forces which were subject to State authority,
namely the criminal police attached to the prosecuting authorities
and the gendarmerie.130 On these various points, the applicant relied
on Article 11(1) of the Convention both on its own and in conjunc53
tion with Article 14. '
The subject of the case in broad terms was the question whether
the applicant was in violation of the Convention, excluded from
consultation. to the effect that it was put at a disadvantage compared with the other unions. 53 The Court saw in Article 11(1) an
121 Article 2(2) of that Decree reads: "Those organizations which are open to all staff of the
provinces and municipalities and which protect such staff's occupational interests shall be
deemed to be organizations most representative thereof.
Each such organization shall make itself known by sending to the Minister of the Interior
by registered post, within forty days of publication of this Decree in the Moniteur beige, a
copy of its articles of association and a list of its officers. The Minister of the Interior shall
verify whether it complies with the conditions required and shall notify it of its decision."
Several trade unions concerned with civil servants, other than the applicant union, were
recognized as meeting these criteria. Id. at 12.
m Id. at 16-17. The applicant is open to all members of the municipal police, but members
of the two State police forces may not belong to it. The number of the members of the
applicant union declined steadily from 7,226 in 1961 to 5,748 in 1974. Id. at 8.
' Article 11(1) reads: "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for
the protection of his interest." Id. at 17. Article 14 reads: "The enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." Id. at 19.
5u The Commission expressed in its Report the following opinion:
-unanimously, that the State, whether acting as "legislator" or "employer" assumes obligations within the scope of Article 11(1) of the Convention;
-by eight votes to five, that the right to consultation and, more generally, freedom
to bargain collectively are important and even essential elements of trade union
action falling within the scope of Article 11(1);
-by eight votes to five, that this right to consultation is not however unlimited, the
limit being, in the case of the applicant union, the existence of an objective criterion
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assertion of freedom of trade unions as a special aspect of freedom
of association. However, the Court noted that the article does not
guarantee any particular treatment of trade unions or their members by the State, such as the right to be consulted by it. It emphasized that this latter right is neither mentioned in Article 11(1) nor
generally incorporated by all the contracting States in their national
law or practice, nor is it indispensable for effective union freedom.
In short, it was not an element necessarily inherent in a right guaranteed by the Convention as distinguished from the "right to a
court," embodied, according to the Golder judgment, in Article 6(1)
of the Convention.53 3 The Court called attention to the fact that
trade union matters are dealt with in detail in the Social Charter
of October 18, 1961, also drawn up within the framework of the
Council of Europe.5 34 Additionally, the Court observed that Article
6(1) of that Charter obliges the Contracting States "to promote joint
consultation between workers and employers," but that this wording does not provide for an actual right of consultation. Still, the
Court did not consider the words "for the protection of his interest"
in Article 11(1) of the Convention simply redundant. The Court
viewed the language as denoting purpose by showing that the Convention safeguards freedom to protect the occupational interests of
trade union members by union action which the States have to
make possible. Therefore the Court thought the union members
have a right that the union be heard. Yet Article 11(1) certainly left
each State a free choice of the means for unions to utilize, which
could include consultation, the presentation of claims and pursuing
the protection of members. The applicant, the Court said, did not
allege that its steps were ignored by the Government and in these
circumstances the mere fact that the Minister of the Interior did not
for representativeness;
-unanimously, that the regulations at issue on trade union consultation in Belgium
do not constitute a breach of Article 11(1) of the Convention;
-unanimously, that the difference in treatment introduced by Belgian legislation
between different categories of unions is justified in the circumstances of the case
and is consistent with Articles 11 and 14 taken together.
The Government asked the Court to declare that, in the first place, "Article 11 does not
apply in the present case and there is therefore no reason to consider whether there has been
a violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 11; alternatively that there has
been violation neither of Article 11, nor of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11." Police
Union Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 16.
'3
'3

Id. at 17, 18.
Id. at 17-18.
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consult the applicant under the 1961 Act did not constitute a breach
3
of Article 11(1) considered on its own.1
As to the alleged infringement of personal freedom to join or remain a member of the applicant union, the Court pointed to the fact
that every member of the municipal police retained this freedom in
spite of the 1966 Decree, even if a considerable decline in membership was partially caused as the applicant claimed by the disadvantage of the applicant as compared with other unions in a more
favorable position. The Court said that this was caused by Belgium's general policy of restricting the number of organizations to
be consulted, but reiterated that this policy was not on its own
incompatible with trade union freedom. The Court therefore denied
a violation of Article 11(1).531
Though the Court came to this conclusion, it maintained that it
had to ascertain whether the differences in treatment complained
of by the applicant contravened Articles 11 and 14 taken together.
It characterized Article 14 as having no independent existence, but
as complementing the other provisions of the Convention and Protocols by safeguarding individuals or groups in comparable situations from discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights set forth.
Thus, the Court concluded, a measure in conformity with a protected right or freedom may still violate the Article that protects
that right or freedom when read in conjunction with Article 14 when
it is of a discriminatory nature, especially where the right is, as here,
not defined precisely but leaves the State a wide choice of the means
for making the right effective.57
The Court referred to its finding that the subject matter of the
disadvantage, namely consultation, is a principle left by Article
11(1) to the discretion of the contracting States but forms one of the
methods of the right to be heard in the protection of the members'
interest. Belgium has instituted a system of consultation in its relations with provincial and municipal staff, as well as with its own
officials, and has selected consultation in certain cases so that Article 14 is pertinent in the present situation.5 3
The Court, however, emphasized that not every distinction
amounts to discrimination, that the principle of equality of treatId. at 18. See text accompanying notes 69-76 supra.
Id. at 18-19.
'
Id. at 19.
lu Id. at 20.
'"
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ment is violated only if the distinction has no objective and reasonable justification in relation to the aim and effect of the measure
under consideration in line with the principles prevailing in democratic societies. There must, however, be a reasonable relationship
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought
to be realized. 39
In determining whether there was discrimination, the Court said
it could not assume the role of the competent national authorities
which may choose the measures they consider appropriate in matters governed by the Convention. The Court again stated the matter
of the complaint, namely, that the applicant was not a body to be
consulted like the three unions open to all provincial and municipal
staff on proposals of interest to the municipal police, no matter
whether such proposals concern all categories of municipal officials
or particularly the police. The Court admitted that the 1966 Decree
caused inequality to the detriment of "category-based" unions such
as the applicant; it thought, however, that the Government's claim
that it wished to avoid "trade union anarchy" and considered it
necessary to ensure a coherent and balanced staff policy embracing
the interest of all provincial and communal staff showed a legitimate aim and did not reveal other and ill intentioned designs of the
1966 Decree. It added that nothing indicated an intention to confer
on the three large unions, on account of their political commitment,
an exclusive privilege and that if there existed or were to exist a
union without political leanings and open to all provincial and municipal staff protecting their occupational interests, the Decree
would compel the Minister to consult it, too. 4 °
The applicant had wondered how the Government could claim
that it was in the general interest to avoid fragmentation of unions
in matters connected with the municipal police while separating the
union activities of the criminal police and recognizing a categorybased apolitical union as the only organization representing members of the gendarmerie. The Court felt that Articles 11 and 14 do
not oblige Belgium to set up a consultation system analogous to the
one in operation for State officials (including members of the criminal police and of the gendarmerie)for the provincial and municipal
staff, particularly the municipal police. 54 '
'
"

Id.
Id. at 20, 21.
Id. at 21.
I4
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The Court then considered whether the disadvantages imposed
upon the applicant in comparison with members of unions consulted under the 1961 Act were justified both in principle and in
scope. The Court said that clearly as to consultation regarding question of a general nature which are of interest to all provincial and
municipal staff, the regulation in the 1966 Decree is a proper means
attaining the legitimate aim sought to be realized. Finally, the
Court examined whether discrimination resulted from the further
fact of denying applicant the right to consultation on matters that
concern the municipal police alone, such as conditions for appointment to superintendent or deputy superintendent. The Court envisaged that special questions may also arise concerning other categories of provincial or municipal staff which, if they were to unite in
category-based unions, would have no right to consultation either.
Therefore, the Court thought it understandable that the Government did not feel bound to make exceptions which might in the end
have robbed the 1966 Decree of all significance. The Court thought
that the uniform nature of the rule did not justify the conclusion
that the Government had exceeded the limit of what it was allowed
to do in laying down the measures it deemed appropriate in its
relations with the unions. It finished by saying that it had not been
clearly established that the applicant's disadvantage was excessive
in relation to the legitimate aim pursued by the Government and
that therefore the principle of proportionality had not been offended. 52
After denying a violation of Article 11 or of Article 11 in conjunction with Article 14, the Court stated that the question of Article
543
50 of the Convention did not arise.
Judge Zekia reiterated in his dissent the general norms established by the majority as to the meaning of discrimination.,44 He
differed from the majority mainly in the evaluation of the facts in
this regard. He was not impressed by the Government's claim that
if consultation were extended to unions with category-based membership not embracing the total staff, chaos and anarchy was to be
feared from proliferation of consultation. He felt that consultation
with the applicant could not have been an addition to the self54

Id. at 21-22.

'

Id. at 22.
Id. at 24-27. See text accompanying notes 539-40 supra.

'.
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understood right of communication and submission of claims large
enough to inconvenience the Government greatly. He concluded
that there was neither reasonable justification nor reasonable relationship of proportionability in withholding consultation from the
applicant.
The three joint dissenters, Judges Wianda, Ganshof van der
Meersch, and Binschedler-Robert, emphasized the point (which
Judge Zekia had also noted) that the 1966 Decree gave protection
in so far as consultation covered questions of a general nature of
interest to all provincial and municipal staff but not matters peculiar to the municipal police. (Such peculiar matters are numerous
and important for the applicant since the police in its various functions (administration and crime prevention versus criminal investigation) is subject to separate authorities (local-State).) The responsible authorities had recognized the special situation by making
various regulations valid only for the municipal police. The
dissenting Judges found, therefore, that the Government should
consult (under Articles 11(1) and 14 in conjunction) the applicant
in which the persons interested combine and that this would not
lead to any real danger of "trade union anarchy." They concluded
that the disadvantage suffered by the members of the applicant by
reason of the inflexible character of the 1966 Decree was not justified
and necessarily entailed discrimination.5 4 5 It should be mentioned
here that Judge Fitzmaurice would have shared this joint separate
opinion had he not considered Article 14 irrelevant in this case. 5"
Judge Fitzmaurice's separate opinion, as far as it refers to the
question of violation of Articles 11 and 14 in conjunction, centers
around this basic thesis: Article 14 applies only to the "enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention" which is to
be "secured without discrimination." As the majority rightly has
found that the right to form and join trade unions for the protection
of the members' interests does not comprise any right of trade unions to be consulted by authorities, then a right of consultation is
not one of "the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention" and
the issue of discrimination becomes irrelevant.547 Judge Fitzmaurice
considered the reasoning of the majority incorrect and also held the
' '

Police Union Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 28, 29.
Id. at 30.

",

Id. at 37-44.
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Court's judgment in the Belgian Language Case"8 which the majority had cited as precedent for its decision to be wrong. He suggested
that the Court, not bound by precedent, should have corrected its
former mistake. 54s To clarify the difference between his viewpoint
and that of the Court he quoted a passage from the Court's judgment in the Belgian Language Case:
To recall a further example . . . Article 6 of the Convention does
not compel States to institute a system of appeal courts. A State
which does set up such courts consequently goes beyond its obligations under Article 6. However, it would violate that Article, read
in conjunction with Article 14, were it to debar certain persons
from these remedies without a legitimate reason while making
them available to others in respect of the same type of [legal]
actions. In such cases there would be a violation of a guaranteed
right or freedom as it is proclaimed by the relevant Article read in
conjunction with Article 14. It is as though the latter formed an
integral part of each of the Articles laying down rights and freedoms. 5 0
Emphasizing that the "the Court is not a court of ethics but a
court of law,""55 Judge Fitzmaurice considered this train of thought
attractive for moral reasons but incompatible with the wording of
the Convention.
It is not easy to say whether the majority or the four dissenters
who found discrimination in the Government's attitude were right.
The evaluation of the facts with regard to "reasonable justification
and reasonable relationship of proportionality" is hampered by borderlines that are difficult to trace. Perhaps one can say that the
dissenters focused their attention too much on the special situation
of the applicant and did not sufficiently consider a possible proliferation of category-based unions.
Judge Fitzmaurice's elaboration is, as in the Golder Case, most
detailed and challenging. Yet again, as in the Golder Case, it appears to cling too much to form and not enough to substance. He
overlooked, it seems, that Article 14 speaks not of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention but of their enjoyment to be secured. This concept is wider and underpins the idea expressed by
See text accompanying notes 163-65 supra.
5" Police Union Case, [1975] 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 40.
Id. at 40-41.
' Id. at 43.
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the Court so well in the passage from the Belgian Language Case
552
quoted by Judge Fitzmaurice himself.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Between July 5, 1955, the date on which the right of individual
petitions became effective, and the end of 1975, 7313 such applications and 14 interstate applications were lodged with the Commission.. 5 3 Out of this number, 131 individual and 13 interstate applications were declared admissible. 514 Only 144 applications could ultimately have reached the Court. If one considers this fact, it is not
too surprising that the Court ever since its coming into being in
1958111 has been seized only with the small number of cases dealt
with in this survey. Roughly 10 percent of the applications by individuals declared admissible by the Commission were handled by the
Court through 1975, though it had no dealing with any interstate
55 6
case.
In this small number of cases, the Court has had the opportunity
to deal with a great variety of procedural problems and some important substantive issues. This is easily explained by the fact that the
Convention for the first time established a truly judicial international process to deal with violations of the human rights guaranteed by it. The Court has earnestly tried to solve these questions in
a way that best serves the lofty purposes of the Convention without
unduly interfering with the sovereign rights of the States involved.
It is to be hoped that its services will be used in an increasing
number of cases.
52

The Court's viewpoint is apparently accepted also by F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-

TION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 188-90 (1975).

"I Individual Applications, [1975] Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 128-52, (Eur.
Comm. on Human Rights), the latest Yearbook available at this writing.
SId.
's

See note 62 supra.

At least two other non-interstate cases were pending before the Court at the time of this
writing. Police Union Case, [19751 18 Eur. Ct. Human Rights 31 n.3. Any judgments rendered in them have not yet become available.
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